Dana Marie Douglas

“For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM.”

“We AFFIRM.”

“Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court's determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction.”

“Thus, we CERTIFY the relevant question to the Supreme Court of Texas. ... We certify the following question of state law to the Supreme Court of Texas: In an action under Chapter 542A of the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, does an insurer's payment of the full appraisal award plus any possible statutory interest preclude recovery of attorney's fees?”

“We AFFIRM.”

“We see no error. The jury instructions were not erroneous, and the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.”

“Finding the dismissal to be in error, we VACATE and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion. ... Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment dismissing Carmouche's complaint with prejudice and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

“Finding that the district court applied the correct legal standards and did not abuse its discretion in certifying a collective action, we AFFIRM.”

“We hold that Bailey's post was constitutionally protected speech, and that the grant of summary judgment was improper. Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

“Finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion, we DISSOLVE the administrative stay and AFFIRM.”

“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of qualified immunity as to Williams and Herbrich and REVERSE the district court's denial of qualified immunity as to Juarez.”

“we AFFIRM the district court's judgment insofar as it concluded that BeckerTime infringed Rolex's trademarks, that the laches defense prevented disgorgement of BeckerTime's profits, and that Rolex was not entitled to treble profits or attorneys' fees. We AFFIRM AS MODIFIED the district court's injunction in part and REMAND in part to correct the errors outlined above.”