Catharina Jacoba Hendrika Dubbeldam Haynes
How Judge Haynes rules, drawn from 42 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Haynes decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a statutory appointment case, Haynes treated clear text as controlling and used statutory purpose only as confirmation. Competing accounts of legislative history could not alter the result once the vacancy provision was unambiguous.
“we are not permitted to look to legislative history where—as here—the statutory text is unambiguous.”
In an employment-retaliation case, Haynes treated conflicting termination paperwork and testimony as a credibility question for the jury. Timing, deviations from progressive discipline, comparator evidence, and shifting explanations together supported a triable inference.
“As far as the stated reason for discharge, the discrepancy between Cristain’s termination paperwork and Edmonds’s testimony is a credibility issue, which is for a jury to assess.”
Haynes separated the reasonableness of an agency interpretation from whether regulated parties had fair notice before a penalty. Earlier agency approval and the absence of clear guidance made the later citation unforeseeable despite a permissible reading of the rule.
“Although we ultimately determine the Secretary and Commission’s interpretation of § 1910.132(d)(1) to be reasonable, because Wal-Mart lacked adequate notice of that interpretation, we VACATE the citation and the related $1,700 penalty.”
In her Debrow dissent, Haynes treated a predicate felony requiring foreseeable danger to human life as involving a clear threat of violence sufficient to defeat the as-applied firearms challenge.
“In my view, Debrow’s as-applied challenge fails because the face of his predicate felony clarifies that its commission involved ‘a clear threat of violence to others.’”
In her Texas Medical Association separate writing, Haynes read “provided” in the No Surprises Act to require that a service be available, not that claims previously have been paid at the contracted rate.
“By using the term ‘provided,’ id., the Act requires only that a given service be available.”
Procedural preferences
Haynes independently enforced appellate finality and would not let the parties create jurisdiction by dismissing unresolved claims without prejudice. A partial ruling requires a proper final judgment or Rule 54(b) certification before appeal.
“parties cannot manufacture appellate jurisdiction by agreeing to dismiss remaining claims without prejudice.”
In her Mississippi concurrence, Haynes favored a narrow remand so the agency could reconsider its own decisions in light of the appellate record rather than having the court decide more.
“Turning to the merits, my view is that we should simply remand to the Department to reconsider its decisions in this situation in light of the information set forth in this appeal.”
In her Sterling separate writing, Haynes emphasized that dismissal on the pleadings requires accepting well-pleaded facts and resolving factual questions and legal ambiguities for the plaintiffs.
“We apply the same standard of review when considering Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions—we must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.”
Cautions
In a consumer-redress case, Haynes required the monetary award to match the injury caused. Full purchase-price refunds for late delivery demanded evidence about customer satisfaction, returns, and shipping losses because the statute allowed redress rather than punitive recovery.
“we are not satisfied that the $25,308,436.45 portion of the damages award complies with § 57b(b)’s requirement that the remedy be ‘necessary to redress’ that injury, or its prohibition on ‘exemplary or punitive damages.’”
In her Holberg separate writing, Haynes would have granted capital-sentencing relief where the aggravating case depended heavily on a paid informant with pending charges whose credibility could have changed the jury’s decision.
“Had Kirkpatrick not testified or been discredited, it is highly likely that the jury would not have sentenced Holberg to death.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“In light of the agreements, we REVERSE and RENDER judgment in favor of Anadarko for the amount of the credit, and REMAND for a determination of interest and attorney's fees.”
“Under the facts here, we answer the question ‘no’ and AFFIRM.”
“For the following reasons, we VACATE the district court's remand order and REMAND this case to the district court for proceedings consistent herewith.”
“Samuel Quezada Rojas appeals his conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) for illegally reentering the United States after deportation on the grounds that he was neither ‘found’ nor ‘in’ the United States as required by statute. We AFFIRM.”
“We DISMISS this case for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the district court's September 2013 Order is not a final, appealable order within the meaning of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ... or the Federal Arbitration Act.”
“Concluding that Amerisure has exhausted its policy limits, we AFFIRM the part of the judgment regarding the duty to indemnify, REVERSE the part of the judgment regarding the duty to defend, and RENDER judgment in Arch's favor.”
“Accordingly, we (1) REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Travelers on the bond claim; (2) RENDER judgment in favor of JSI on the issue of Travelers's liability under the bond in the amount of $36,346.09; (3) REMAND for the district court to consider the other fees and costs relevant to JSI's bond claim; and (4) VACATE the summary judgment on the bad faith claim and REMAND for reconsideration.”
“Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. ... DISMISSED.”
“Although we ultimately determine the Secretary and Commission's interpretation of § 1910.132(d)(1) to be reasonable, because Wal-Mart lacked adequate notice of that interpretation, we VACATE the citation and the related $1,700 penalty.”
“Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in Billings ... and REVERSE the district courts' denials of defendants' motions to dismiss in Torres ...; Thiery ...; and Orosco ... and RENDER judgment dismissing those cases.”
“Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part for lack of jurisdiction.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Circuit judges do not manage an assigned federal trial docket in their appellate role. Haynes previously served on the 191st District Court of Texas.
Draft for Judge Haynes with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Haynes, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Grounded in Judge Haynes's own signed orders
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace