Morris Ames Soper

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit circuit Deceased · served 1932–1963 Appointed by Herbert Hoover (Republican) 25 signed orders read

Judge Soper no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Soper decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Treats the negligent failure to discover a mutual mistake as compatible with equitable reformation when the evidence otherwise justifies relief.

“the negligent failure of a party to know the facts as to which both parties are under a mistake does not preclude reformation”

Applies federal wage protections to all commingled duties when an employee performs substantial interstate and intrastate work without separate treatment by the employer.

“if an employee's duties are partly intrastate and partly interstate, his entire compensation must conform to the provisions of the statute.”

Procedural preferences

Requires a genuinely final judgment before appellate review when unresolved claims or parties remain below.

“an appeal will not lie to bring up a judgment that has not completely disposed of an action”

Excuses exhaustion when an administrative process is inadequate or operates to deny the asserted right.

“administrative remedies need not be sought if they are inherently inadequate or are applied in such a manner as in effect to deny the petitioners their rights.”

Cautions

Requires balanced last-clear-chance instructions when the evidence supports negligence by both sides.

“should have emphasized the duty of each party to save the other from the consequences of the other’s negligence in substantially the same terms.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

United States v. Texas Co.
· 1959-12-31
Appeal (United States-appellant) Denied

“Affirmed upon the opinion of the District Court, 172 F.Supp. 905. Affirmed.”

Burleson v. Canada
· 1961-01-13
Appeal (plaintiff-appellant) Moot / procedural

“The appeal must therefore be dismissed.”

United States v. Davenport
· 1961-12-29
Appeal (taxpayer-appellant) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Crook v. Bryant
· 1959-04-08
Appeal (employer-appellants) Denied

“the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 11 Affirmed.”

Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
· 1962-11-05
Appeal (insurers-cross-appellants) Granted in part

“The judgment of the District Court is affirmed as to the liability of PTF under its policy but reversed as to the liability of Hartford under its policy, and the case is remanded so that judgment may be entered in the District Court in accordance with this opinion.”

General Construction Co. v. Hering Realty Co.
· 1963-01-07
Appeal (cross-appellants) Moot / procedural

“The appeal and the cross-appeal in this case will, therefore, be dismissed. Dismissed.”

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Morris Oil Corp.
· 1956-05-19
Appeal (insurer-appellant) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Harrison v. Boles
· 1962-09-13
Appeal (habeas-petitioner-appellant) Denied

“The District Judge was justified in dismissing the petition without a hearing and his order is affirmed,”

Morris Plan Bank v. Cook
· 1932-01-12
Appeal (bank-appellant) Denied

“The order of the District Court is therefore affirmed.”

Friedman v. Morris
· 1954-01-04
Appeal (defendant-appellant) Granted

“The judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded.”

Porter v. Eyster
· 1961-09-15
Appeal (plaintiff-appellant) Denied

“the summary judgment dismissing this suit was correct. See Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel Co., 125 W.Va. 731, 26 S.E.2d 209. Affirmed.”

C. V. Starr & Co. v. Commissioner
· 1939-02-03
Petition for review (taxpayer-petitioner) Granted

“The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is reversed.”

A historical record

Judge Soper no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.