Diana Gribbon Motz
How Judge Motz decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She reads a remedial statute for the concrete comparison it commands rather than a coarser proxy: under the Equal Pay Act the question is whether a woman is paid at a lower rate than a similarly situated man, not whether her total remuneration happens to come out even.
“Rather, the statute and the EEOC's regulations make clear that an employer violates the Equal Pay Act if it pays female employees at a rate less than that of similarly situated male employees.”
In reviewing agency denials of relief she insists on reasoned decisionmaking that engages the record: the tribunal abuses its discretion when it fails to explain itself or distorts or disregards important aspects of the applicant's claim.
“The agency "abuse[s] its discretion if it fail[s] to offer a reasoned explanation for its decision, or if it distort[s] or disregard[s] important aspects of the applicant's claim."”
Procedural preferences
At summary judgment she applies the governing standard without shortcut: the nonmovant's evidence is taken as true and every justifiable inference drawn in that party's favor before deciding whether a genuine dispute exists.
“In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor."”
In federal habeas she enforces the comity-based limits closely: when a state court declines to reach a federal claim because the prisoner failed a state procedural requirement, the judgment rests on independent and adequate state grounds and federal review is foreclosed absent an exception.
“When a state habeas court declines to address a prisoner's federal constitutional claims "because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement[,] . . . the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds." In these circumstances, "concerns of comity and federalism" dictate against a federal court's review of that judgment.”
Cautions
On the Fourth Amendment she will not let a search be justified by what it turns up: probable cause that arises only after officers find incriminating evidence cannot retroactively validate the search that produced it.
“A finding that this search was incident to Patiutka's subsequent arrest would permit the Government "to justify the arrest by the search and at the same time to justify the search by the arrest." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1948). The Fourth Amendment forbids this type of unreasonable search.”
She holds officers to the warrant-affidavit standard: qualified immunity does not shield an officer who seeks a warrant on an affidavit that a reasonably well-trained officer would have known failed to establish probable cause, even if a magistrate mistakenly issued it.
“Malley holds that qualified immunity does not protect an officer who seeks a warrant on the basis of an affidavit that a reasonably well-trained officer would have known failed to demonstrate probable cause — even if the magistrate erroneously issues the warrant.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The decision of the district court is, therefore, vacated and remanded with instructions to enforce the subpoena. VACATED AND REMANDED.”
“For all of these reasons, the judgments of the district courts are REVERSED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Board of Immigration Appeals is AFFIRMED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court holding that the administrator abused its discretion in denying coverage, but reverse the award of attorneys' fees against the administrator. AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART”
“For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Det. Dougans and the County is AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.”
“For all of these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED”
“Since the troopers seek to appeal from an order that simply determines that "the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial," Johnson, 515 U.S. at 320, we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. DISMISSED”
“In sum, we hold that the error asserted here did not produce a "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court denying habeas relief is AFFIRMED.”
“Because we find each of Hamilton's claims on appeal to be without merit, we affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED”
Put Judge Motz's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Motz actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Motz's own signed orders and cites them.