Diana Gribbon Motz
How Judge Motz rules, drawn from 35 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Motz no longer sits on this court. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Motz
Diana Gribbon Motz joined the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 1994 after appointment by President Bill Clinton. She assumed senior status in September 2022 and retired from active court service in 2024.
How Judge Motz decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Sempowich’s Equal Pay Act case, she examined pay rates for similarly situated female and male employees in applying the statute.
“Rather, the statute and the EEOC's regulations make clear that an employer violates the Equal Pay Act if it pays female employees at a rate less than that of similarly situated male employees.”
In Orellana’s immigration appeal, she applied the abuse-of-discretion standard requiring the agency to explain its decision without distorting or disregarding important parts of the claim.
“The agency ‘abuse[s] its discretion if it fail[s] to offer a reasoned explanation for its decision, or if it distort[s] or disregard[s] important aspects of the applicant's claim.’”
Procedural preferences
In Raynor’s appeal, she applied the summary-judgment rule that the nonmovant’s evidence is believed and justifiable inferences are drawn in that party’s favor.
“In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, ‘[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’”
In Prieto’s federal habeas appeal, Motz held his Atkins claim procedurally defaulted because he had not raised it on direct review; relief depended on an exception to that default.
“As such, Prieto’s Atkins claim is procedurally defaulted, and he is ineligible for relief unless one of the two exceptions to procedural default applies.”
Cautions
In United States v. Patiutka, she rejected an attempt to justify a search by an arrest that followed the search, citing the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on that reasoning.
“A finding that this search was incident to Patiutka's subsequent arrest would permit the Government ‘to justify the arrest by the search and at the same time to justify the search by the arrest.’ Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1948). The Fourth Amendment forbids this type of unreasonable search.”
In Miller’s warrant case, she applied Malley’s rule that qualified immunity does not protect an officer whose affidavit a reasonably trained officer would know lacked probable cause.
“Malley holds that qualified immunity does not protect an officer who seeks a warrant on the basis of an affidavit that a reasonably well-trained officer would have known failed to demonstrate probable cause — even if the magistrate erroneously issues the warrant.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The decision of the district court is, therefore, vacated and remanded with instructions to enforce the subpoena. VACATED AND REMANDED.”
“For all of these reasons, the judgments of the district courts are REVERSED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Board of Immigration Appeals is AFFIRMED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court holding that the administrator abused its discretion in denying coverage, but reverse the award of attorneys' fees against the administrator. AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART”
“For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Det. Dougans and the County is AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.”
“For all of these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED”
“Since the troopers seek to appeal from an order that simply determines that ‘the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial,’ Johnson, 515 U.S. at 320, we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. DISMISSED”
“In sum, we hold that the error asserted here did not produce a ‘substantial and injurious effect’ on the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court denying habeas relief is AFFIRMED.”
“Because we find each of Hamilton's claims on appeal to be without merit, we affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED”
A historical record
Judge Motz no longer sits on this court. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.