Allyson K. Duncan

How Judge Duncan rules, drawn from 28 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Duncan no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Position
circuit
Status
Retired 2019
Served
2003–2019
Appointed by
George W. Bush (Republican)
Commissioned
2003-08-15
Education
Hampton University (B.A., 1972); Duke University School of Law (J.D., 1975)
Signed orders read
28

How Judge Duncan decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In a copyright-damages appeal, Duncan required the copyright owner to connect the infringement to the particular revenue stream before the statutory burden shifted to the infringer to separate profits attributable to other factors.

“The copyright owner thus has the burden of demonstrating some causal link between the infringement and the particular profit stream before the burden-shifting provisions of § 504(b) apply.”

In a bankruptcy nondischargeability appeal, Duncan declined to give a state wrongful-death judgment preclusive effect because neither the compensatory nor punitive award necessarily decided whether the debtor actually intended the injury required by the federal discharge exception.

“At bottom, neither the wrongful death nor the punitive damages award in the state court involved the issue of whether Jacqueline Duncan intended to injure Meigan that controls resolution of this adversary proceeding. Because issues must be identical for collateral estoppel to apply, and such identity is lacking here, the state court judgment does not support application of collateral estoppel to the Estate's nondischargeability claim under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).”

In an oil-and-gas lease appeal, Duncan treated the agreement as an integrated whole because its durational clause used the disjunctive 'or'; performance of any listed activity therefore preserved the entire lease rather than only one asserted segment.

“In this case, a fair construction of the terms of the Lease compels the conclusion that the Lease was intended to be entire, not divisible. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the disjunctive use of the word ‘or’ in the Durational Provision.”

Procedural preferences

In a suppression appeal, Duncan applied Miranda's objective foreseeability test to an officer's follow-up after the suspect volunteered information, explaining that grammatical form alone does not determine whether police conduct amounts to interrogation.

“There are questions that are not reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses just as there are declarative statements or actions that are. The Miranda analysis does not turn on the form of an officer's articulation.”

Cautions

In an inevitable-discovery appeal, Duncan accepted testimony about a routine inventory practice without requiring a written policy, but only because the record gave the district court enough evidence to assess whether the practice met governing safeguards.

“The government need not provide a written inventory policy to prove that a law enforcement agency conducts its inventory searches according to routine and standard procedures so long as the district court has sufficient evidence to ensure that the practice conforms to our precedent.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

United States v. Michael Anthony Farrow
· 2004-04-15
Appeal (Defendant-Appellant Michael Anthony Farrow) Denied

“We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects.”

Kenneth L. Bonner, Sr. v. Bruce Dawson; Terry Bishop
· 2005-04-14
Appeal (Plaintiff-Appellant Kenneth Bonner) Denied

“The order of the district court is AFFIRMED.”

In re Jacqueline Duncan; James Duncan, Administrator of the Estate of Meigan Lin Duncan v. Jacqueline Duncan
· 2006-05-24
Appeal (Appellant the Estate (James Duncan, Administrator of the Estate of Meigan Lin Duncan)) Granted

“In light of the foregoing, we reverse the order of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED”

Angela Johnson v. H.S. Caudill
· 2007-02-02
Appeal (Defendant-Appellant Sheriff H.S. Caudill (movant for summary judgment on qualified immunity)) Granted

“Accordingly, we reverse the district court's ruling on Sheriff Caudill's motion for summary judgment and remand with instructions to enter an order granting the motion for summary judgment. REVERSED AND REMANDED.”

Robert Peterson v. National Telecommunications and Information Administration
06-1216; 06-1548 · 2007-02-27
Appeal (Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Peterson (movant for preliminary injunction)) Denied

“Based on the foregoing, the district court's order denying Appellant Robert Peterson's motion for a preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.”

Michelle Lane v. Eric H. Holder, Jr.
11-1847 · 2012-12-31
Appeal (Plaintiffs-Appellants (Michelle Lane, Matthew and Amanda Welling, and the Second Amendment Foundation)) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.”

United States v. Eric Johnson
No. 12-4176 · 2013-10-29
Appeal (Defendant-Appellant Eric Johnson) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, the district court's decision denying Johnson's suppression motions is AFFIRMED.”

United States v. 515 Granby, LLC
No. 12-2161 · 2013-11-20
Appeal (Defendants-Appellants 515 Granby, LLC and Marathon Development Group, Inc. (prevailing property owners seeking EAJA attorney's fees)) Granted

“For the reasons stated above, we vacate the district court's opinion and remand for a reexamination of substantial justification. The issue of special circumstances under the EAJA was not before us because the trial court made no finding on that issue. If necessary on remand, the district court should also consider whether special circumstances would make an award of attorney's fees unjust. VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS”

John Corr v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
No. 13-1076 · 2014-01-21
Appeal (Plaintiffs-Appellants John B. Corr and John W. Grigsby) Denied

“Under the Elizabeth River Crossings framework, therefore, the tolls charged for passage on the Dulles Toll Road are user fees, not taxes, under Virginia law. Their collection by the MWAA thus does not run afoul of the Virginia Constitution and, accordingly, does not violate the due process rights of motorists. The district court's order dismissing the complaint is therefore AFFIRMED.”

Chandra Anand; Renu Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC; Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
13-1900 · 2014-06-06
Appeal (appellants (plaintiff homeowners)) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, the district court's dismissal of the Anands' complaint with prejudice is AFFIRMED.”

United States v. Harvey Lee Mungro, Jr.
13-4503 · 2014-06-11
Appeal (Defendant-Appellant Harvey Lee Mungro, Jr.) Denied

“For the reasons above, Mungro’s sentence is AFFIRMED.”

McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation
13-2044 · 2014-06-25
Appeal (Plaintiff-Appellant McAirlaids, Inc.) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings. VACATED AND REMANDED”

A historical record

Judge Duncan no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.