Albert Diaz
How Judge Diaz rules, drawn from 79 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Diaz
Albert Diaz is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Diaz received a commission on December 22, 2010.
Judge Diaz's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Diaz's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Diaz decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Gardner v. Ally Financial, he rejected a proposed reading that would remove “judgment” from the statute and conflict with another express provision.
“Gardner and Scott would have us read ‘judgment’ out of Section 12-1021(k)(4) and ignore the fact that Section 12-1018(a)(2) expressly permits creditors who violate CLEC to collect the principal amount of the loan. We decline to do so.”
In United States v. Walgreen, he assessed materiality by the likely or actual effect of the alleged misrepresentation on its recipient.
“The governments allege that the misrepresentations did, in fact, influence the decisionmakers. As we explain below, that’s what matters under Escobar.”
Procedural preferences
In Mascio v. Colvin, he remanded because the administrative law judge’s unexplained findings left the court unable to review the claimant’s work-related abilities.
“Because we are left to guess about how the ALJ arrived at his conclusions on Mascio's ability to perform relevant functions and indeed, remain uncertain as to what the ALJ intended, remand is necessary.”
In United States v. Castellon, he dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction despite expressing doubt about the district court’s ruling.
“While we doubt that the district court's ruling is correct, we lack jurisdiction over Castellon's appeal. Therefore, we must dismiss it.”
Cautions
In Craig’s sentencing appeal, he held that the government breached the plea agreement by seeking enhancements based on allegations outside the stipulated relevant conduct, and vacated the sentence.
“The government crossed the line when it advocated for two enhancements based on those allegations—which fell beyond the total relevant conduct stipulation—and thus deprived Craig of the benefit of his bargain.”
In O’Leary v. TrustedID, he found the asserted identity-theft risk too speculative to establish Article III injury.
“O'Leary can't connect the alleged statutory violation to an increased risk of identity theft without a Rube Goldberg-type chain reaction. . . . That's the kind of daisy chain of speculation that can't pass muster under Article III.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“For these reasons, we deny Corey's Petition for Review and grant the Department's Cross-Application for Enforcement of the Secretary's order.”
“For the reasons given, we deny Appellees' motion to dismiss this appeal, and affirm the district court's denial of Appellants' motions to intervene.”
“Because we conclude that CLEC requires borrowers to have repaid more than the original principal amount of their loans before they are entitled to relief, we affirm.”
“As a matter of procedure and substance, the garnishment proceeding we consider here is a ‘suit’ under the Eleventh Amendment. As a result, the Department is entitled to sovereign immunity. We therefore reverse the district court's order and remand with instructions to quash the writ of garnishment.”
“For the reasons given, we reverse the district court's judgment and remand with instructions to vacate the denial of benefits and remand for further administrative proceedings.”
“We conclude that E.L. did not exhaust her administrative remedies and that the school board did not violate the IDEA. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment.”
“we conclude that the circumstances of this case do not merit abstention . . . . We therefore reverse the district court's decision to abstain, and remand for further proceedings.”
“Accordingly, we affirm Royal's conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing.”
“For the reasons given, we affirm the district court's judgment.”
“we affirm the judgment of the district court with respect to Askew's CLEC and breach of contract claims. With regard to Askew's MCDCA claim, however, we reverse the district court's order granting summary judgment to HRFC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.”
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