Thomas Michael Hardiman
How Judge Hardiman rules, drawn from 41 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Hardiman
Thomas Michael Hardiman is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Appointed by President George W. Bush, Judge Hardiman received a commission on April 2, 2007. Judge Hardiman previously served on the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, commissioned there on October 27, 2003.
Judge Hardiman's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Hardiman's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
- Third Circuit Motions Practice ↗
- Motions to Exceed the Page or Word Limitations ↗
- Motions for Extensions of Time and Clarification of L.A.R. 110 ↗
- Vacating Option B for Filing of an Appendix ↗
- Reduced Number of Copies of Briefs Required ↗
- Stays in Immigration Cases ↗
- Submission of Audio and Video Files ↗
How Judge Hardiman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Caesars Entertainment v. Local 68 Pension Fund, he read “previously” by its ordinary meaning at enactment and checked that reading against the canon against surplusage.
“First, ‘previously’ connotes something that is no longer the case. In arriving at this conclusion, we give ‘previously’ its ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the relevant provision. ... Second, the canon against surplusage confirms that ‘previously’ means ‘no longer required.’”
In Caesars Entertainment v. Local 68 Pension Fund, he rejected a reading based solely on what might advance the statute’s broad purpose.
“The Fund's position thus shows why ‘it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law.’”
Procedural preferences
In Premier Comp Solutions v. UPMC, he required good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) for an amendment sought after the scheduling deadline.
“We will affirm because Rule 16(b)(4) applies once a scheduling-order deadline has passed, and Premier did not show good cause.”
In Starnes v. Butler County Court of Common Pleas, he reviewed a judge's appeal from denial of a Rule 12(b) motion on qualified-immunity grounds by accepting Starnes's pleaded allegations and reasonable inferences in her favor, then affirmed in part and reversed in part.
“Because Doerr appeals an order denying his motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), we must accept Starnes's well-pleaded allegations as true, construe them in the light most favorable to her, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.”
Cautions
In Johnson v. Mazie, he held that ancillary enforcement jurisdiction did not provide original jurisdiction sufficient for removal.
“Consistent with Syngenta, we hold that ancillary enforcement jurisdiction does not confer original jurisdiction sufficient to support removal.”
In Williams’s appeal, he reversed the denial of qualified immunity to three officers on false-arrest and excessive-force claims.
“Because the District Court erred in concluding the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for false arrest and the excessive force Williams alleges, we will reverse.”
In Mejia-Henriquez, Hardiman treated a CAT petition as moot after removal when no removal remained to defer, no sufficient collateral consequence followed from the denial, and return was exceedingly unlikely.
“So there is no longer a removal to defer, the BIA’s denial of CAT relief did not result in any sufficient collateral consequence for Mejia-Henriquez, and his return is exceedingly unlikely.”
In MacDonald, Hardiman upheld a streamlined licensing requirement for out-of-state telemedicine doctors where the conditions served the state’s traditional patient-protection role and imposed only limited administrative burdens.
“The licensing conditions aim to protect New Jersey-based patients from unqualified and unfit practitioners.”
In O’Bryant v. New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency, Hardiman wrote separately that the plaintiffs had not overcome qualified immunity on any of their civil-rights claims. He would have upheld dismissal more broadly than the panel majority; this was his partial dissent, not the court’s full disposition.
“Because the District Court correctly held that Plaintiffs did not overcome the high bar for qualified immunity on any of their claims, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.”
“We hold it does not, so Bailey-Snyder was not entitled to dismissal of his complaint. Nor was there improper vouching or cumulative error in Bailey-Snyder's trial. We will affirm.”
“So we will deny Nkomo's petition in part and dismiss it in part.”
“We will affirm the District Court's judgment of conviction and sentence.”
“We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.”
“Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court.”
“We will affirm Sims's judgment of sentence.”
“Because the District Court erred in concluding the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for false arrest and the excessive force Williams alleges, we will reverse.”
“We will affirm because Rule 16(b)(4) applies once a scheduling-order deadline has passed, and Premier did not show good cause.”
“So we will affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.”
“Because the substance of this appeal is as frivolous as its form, we will affirm the District Court's summary judgment and grant Appellee CBE Group's motion for damages under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.”
“For that reason, we will reverse in part the District Court's order dismissing her complaint with prejudice as to her statutory claim against Facebook. But the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the other parties, so they should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”
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