Thomas Michael Hardiman
How Judge Hardiman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He resolves statutory questions with close, text-first work -- fixing on the ordinary meaning of a disputed word at the time of enactment, testing it against the canon against surplusage and neighboring provisions, and treating administrative guidance and legislative purpose as confirmation of a reading already reached from the text rather than its foundation. He is willing to marshal dictionaries and even corpus-linguistics data to pin down ordinary meaning.
“First, "previously" connotes something that is no longer the case. In arriving at this conclusion, we give "previously" its ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the relevant provision. ... Second, the canon against surplusage confirms that "previously" means "no longer required."”
He is skeptical of appeals to a statute's broad purpose that outrun its text: he holds that furthering a statute's primary objective is not itself the law, and directs parties disappointed by the text to the specific safeguards Congress actually enacted rather than to purposivist gap-filling.
“The Fund's position thus shows why "it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law."”
Procedural preferences
He enforces the sequence and preservation rules of civil and criminal litigation strictly: once a scheduling-order deadline passes, the good-cause standard governs a motion to amend before the liberal amendment standard is even reached, and an unconditional guilty plea forecloses relitigating a suppression ruling. He also does not hesitate to sanction a frivolous appeal.
“We will affirm because Rule 16(b)(4) applies once a scheduling-order deadline has passed, and Premier did not show good cause.”
On review of a dismissal under Rule 12(b), he accepts the well-pleaded allegations as true, draws all reasonable inferences for the pleader, and will reverse a dismissal that depends on resolving contested facts against the plaintiff at the pleading stage.
“Because Doerr appeals an order denying his motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), we must accept Starnes's well-pleaded allegations as true, construe them in the light most favorable to her, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.”
Cautions
He reads jurisdiction and the removal statute narrowly and enforces their limits even when doing so upends a judgment reached on the merits: an appeal resting on a non-final partial judgment, or a case removed on a theory that does not supply original jurisdiction, will be dismissed or remanded regardless of how the merits might come out.
“Consistent with Syngenta, we hold that ancillary enforcement jurisdiction does not confer original jurisdiction sufficient to support removal.”
In the qualified-immunity setting he protects officials unless the plaintiff clears both the constitutional-violation and clearly-established prongs with case-specific proof of each defendant's own conduct: a generalized theory, or a right not clearly established when the official acted, will not defeat immunity, and he insists district courts make individualized findings before sending officers to trial.
“Because the District Court erred in concluding the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for false arrest and the excessive force Williams alleges, we will reverse.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court.”
“For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.”
“We hold it does not, so Bailey-Snyder was not entitled to dismissal of his complaint. Nor was there improper vouching or cumulative error in Bailey-Snyder's trial. We will affirm.”
“So we will deny Nkomo's petition in part and dismiss it in part.”
“We will affirm the District Court's judgment of conviction and sentence.”
“We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.”
“Because the District Court erred in concluding the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for false arrest and the excessive force Williams alleges, we will reverse.”
“We will affirm Sims's judgment of sentence.”
“So we will affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.”
“We will affirm because Rule 16(b)(4) applies once a scheduling-order deadline has passed, and Premier did not show good cause.”
“For that reason, we will reverse in part the District Court's order dismissing her complaint with prejudice as to her statutory claim against Facebook. But the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the other parties, so they should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”
“Because the substance of this appeal is as frivolous as its form, we will affirm the District Court's summary judgment and grant Appellee CBE Group's motion for damages under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.”
Put Judge Hardiman's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Hardiman actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Hardiman's own signed orders and cites them.