Theodore A. McKee
How Judge McKee rules, drawn from 40 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge McKee
Theodore Alexander McKee is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge McKee received a commission on June 9, 1994. Judge McKee assumed senior status on October 20, 2022.
Judge McKee's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge McKee's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
- Third Circuit Motions Practice ↗
- Motions to Exceed the Page or Word Limitations ↗
- Motions for Extensions of Time and Clarification of L.A.R. 110 ↗
- Vacating Option B for Filing of an Appendix ↗
- Reduced Number of Copies of Briefs Required ↗
- Stays in Immigration Cases ↗
- Submission of Audio and Video Files ↗
How Judge McKee decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In United States v. Hurtt, McKee held that officers could not rely on the safety concern Cannon created by going beyond the traffic stop's mission to justify prolonging the detention.
“Because Cannon created a safety concern by going off-mission, the officers cannot rely upon that concern to justify detouring from the original purpose of the traffic stop.”
In Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., he rejected a rule that would excuse retaliation whenever an employer uncovered a separate ground for termination during a retaliatory search.
“Indeed, a contrary rule would not only immunize employers who retaliate against employees only after they stumble upon something that would justify their termination; it would also incentivize such retaliatory forays.”
Procedural preferences
In Lines v. Larkins, McKee held that returning to state court would be futile because the prisoner's claims were procedurally defaulted. He affirmed the dismissal of the habeas petition but modified it to be with prejudice.
“Although we agree with Lines that it would now be futile for him to return to state court and attempt to exhaust his claims, we do not agree with him that a federal court may therefore address his claims on the merits. Rather, Lines’ claims are procedurally defaulted because he is barred by state law from seeking further review of his claims in state court.”
In Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, he emphasized that prison officials need clear statements of what the law permits.
“Those responsible for discharging the difficult responsibility of administering our nation's prisons deserve clear statements about what the law allows.”
In Migliori, he affirmed denial of fees for litigating an attorney-fee petition after the voters failed to provide the separate lodestar analysis needed to support that request.
“Plaintiff Voters did not submit the necessary lodestar analysis”
Cautions
On public-employee speech he draws the protected/unprotected line by content, not tone: a grievance does not lose First Amendment protection because the employee is aggrieved; what removes protection is that the speech is private rather than a matter of public concern.
“It is not the grinding of the proverbial axe that removes the protection of the First Amendment, it is the private nature of the employee's speech.”
On speech-restricting ordinances he treats the constitutional question as record-bound rather than categorical: the validity of a buffer-zone law depends on the specific factual circumstances that produced it, so the same measure may survive on one record and fall on another.
“the constitutionality of buffer zone laws turns on the factual circumstances giving rise to the law in each individual case—the same type of buffer zone may be upheld on one record where it might be struck down on another.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons stated above, we will vacate the District Court's order denying habeas relief and remand with instructions for the court to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus.”
“For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the District Court's denial of relief and we will remand to the District Court with instructions to issue a conditional writ.”
“Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Meyers was prejudiced by the erroneous advice his trial counsel gave him. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the district court's order dismissing Kapral's § 2255 motion, and we will remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the reasons set forth herein, we will affirm the district court's conditional grant of habeas relief and remand to the district court so that the matter may be returned to state court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For all the reasons set forth above, we hold that the district court's order granting habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must be vacated, and we will remand the matter for consideration of the remaining claims in Whitney's amended habeas petition.”
“Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing Lines’ federal habeas petition; and we will affirm, but modify, the District Court’s order by dismissing the petition with prejudice.”
“We must, therefore, vacate the district court’s denial of the writ of habeas corpus and remand with instructions that the district court issue a writ of habeas corpus releasing Buhl from custody on these charges conditioned upon Buhl being retried within 120 days of the date of the district court’s order.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the order dismissing this case is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.”
“For the reasons we have discussed, Sasay’s petition for review will be denied.”
“Because the record inadequately supports this enhancement’s application, we will vacate and remand for a new sentencing.”
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