Theodore A. McKee
How Judge McKee decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Fourth Amendment stop cases he keeps the officer's conduct tethered to the reason for the stop: an officer who manufactures a safety concern by turning to matters unrelated to the stop's mission cannot then invoke that self-created concern to justify prolonging the detention.
“Because Cannon created a safety concern by going off-mission, the officers cannot rely upon that concern to justify detouring from the original purpose of the traffic stop.”
In employment-retaliation cases he refuses to let after-acquired justifications launder a retaliatory motive: a rule immunizing an employer that retaliates only after stumbling onto grounds for termination would perversely reward the retaliatory search itself.
“Indeed, a contrary rule would not only immunize employers who retaliate against employees only after they stumble upon something that would justify their termination; it would also incentivize such retaliatory forays.”
Procedural preferences
He favors letting state courts pass first on whether a claim is procedurally barred: where the answer is genuinely uncertain, comity counsels leaving that determination to the state courts rather than resolving it in the first instance on federal habeas.
“[i]n questionable cases it is better that the state courts make the determination of whether a claim is procedurally barred.”
When announcing a constitutional rule prospectively he stresses fair notice to those who must follow it: officials charged with administering the prisons are entitled to clear statements of what the law permits before they can be held to have violated a right.
“Those responsible for discharging the difficult responsibility of administering our nation's prisons deserve clear statements about what the law allows.”
Cautions
On public-employee speech he draws the protected/unprotected line by content, not tone: a grievance does not lose First Amendment protection because the employee is aggrieved; what removes protection is that the speech is private rather than a matter of public concern.
“It is not the grinding of the proverbial axe that removes the protection of the First Amendment, it is the private nature of the employee's speech.”
On speech-restricting ordinances he treats the constitutional question as record-bound rather than categorical: the validity of a buffer-zone law depends on the specific factual circumstances that produced it, so the same measure may survive on one record and fall on another.
“the constitutionality of buffer zone laws turns on the factual circumstances giving rise to the law in each individual case—the same type of buffer zone may be upheld on one record where it might be struck down on another.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons stated above, we will vacate the District Court's order denying habeas relief and remand with instructions for the court to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus.”
“For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the District Court's denial of relief and we will remand to the District Court with instructions to issue a conditional writ.”
“Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Meyers was prejudiced by the erroneous advice his trial counsel gave him. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the district court's order dismissing Kapral's § 2255 motion, and we will remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the reasons set forth herein, we will affirm the district court's conditional grant of habeas relief and remand to the district court so that the matter may be returned to state court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For all the reasons set forth above, we hold that the district court's order granting habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must be vacated, and we will remand the matter for consideration of the remaining claims in Whitney's amended habeas petition.”
“Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing Lines’ federal habeas petition; and we will affirm, but modify, the District Court’s order by dismissing the petition with prejudice.”
“We must, therefore, vacate the district court’s denial of the writ of habeas corpus and remand with instructions that the district court issue a writ of habeas corpus releasing Buhl from custody on these charges conditioned upon Buhl being retried within 120 days of the date of the district court’s order.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the order dismissing this case is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.”
“For the reasons we have discussed, Sasay’s petition for review will be denied.”
“Because the record inadequately supports this enhancement’s application, we will vacate and remand for a new sentencing.”
Put Judge McKee's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge McKee actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge McKee's own signed orders and cites them.