Tamika Renee Montgomery-Reeves
How Judge Montgomery-Reeves rules, drawn from 34 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Montgomery-Reeves
Tamika Renee Montgomery-Reeves is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Appointed by President Joseph R. Biden, Judge Montgomery-Reeves received a commission on February 7, 2023.
Judge Montgomery-Reeves's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Montgomery-Reeves's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
- Third Circuit Motions Practice ↗
- Motions to Exceed the Page or Word Limitations ↗
- Motions for Extensions of Time and Clarification of L.A.R. 110 ↗
- Vacating Option B for Filing of an Appendix ↗
- Reduced Number of Copies of Briefs Required ↗
- Stays in Immigration Cases ↗
- Submission of Audio and Video Files ↗
How Judge Montgomery-Reeves decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In United States v. Caraballo, Montgomery-Reeves used traditional interpretive tools and found the Guidelines phrase "serious bodily injury" genuinely ambiguous before considering sentencing commentary.
“Because the traditional tools of statutory interpretation do not reveal a single reasonable definition of the phrase serious bodily injury, we hold that the phrase is genuinely ambiguous.”
In United States v. Hill, she held that Rehaif announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review.
“This makes the new rule announced in Rehaif substantive and thus retroactive for collateral review purposes.”
In Murrin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Montgomery-Reeves's amended opinion affirmed the Tax Court. It held that the statutory limitations exception for a fraudulent return did not require the taxpayer herself to intend to evade tax because the statute did not specify whose intent mattered.
“And because the statute is agnostic about who must intend to evade tax, we hold that taxpayer intent is not required.”
In a franchise dispute, she vacated summary judgment on a wrongful nonrenewal claim because the franchisor had not established an undisputed material breach.
“HHF did not meet this burden, and the District Court should have denied HHF’s motion for summary judgment on Count One.”
Procedural preferences
In Roberts v. Lau, she analyzed prosecutorial immunity by the nature of the function performed.
“whether absolute immunity applies, ‘we examine “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.”’”
Requires market definitions in antitrust cases to reflect current economic conditions rather than historical assumptions.
“And when markets change, so too must antitrust analyses.”
In Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs v. Attorney General, Montgomery-Reeves wrote separately in an en banc firearms case. Although she agreed existing precedent dictated the result, she would have held the appeal pending Supreme Court review of materially similar laws.
“I would therefore hold this case c.a.v. pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of Viramontes and Grant.”
In an immigration petition, remanded when the appeals board reweighed factual findings without properly applying clear-error review.
“Because the BIA improperly applied the clear error standard, we will GRANT Lemus Palma’s petition, VACATE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Cautions
Distinguishes corporate setbacks and negligence from the particularized deception required for federal securities fraud.
“But corporate trauma alone does not constitute securities fraud, and neither does ordinary negligence.”
In a separate concurrence, questioned reliance on discriminatory historical restrictions when considering modern firearm regulation and pointed to other historical examples.
“less constitutionally infirm comparators support the same conclusion.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Thus, we will affirm because Baer has failed to show that he is entitled to absolute immunity on the face of the complaint.”
“vacate the District Court’s order, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the reasons discussed above, we will deny both Edwards’s request to pursue a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and his request to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”
“Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s order remanding this case to New Jersey state court because the federal-officer removal statute is inapplicable.”
“Thus, we will vacate and remand for resentencing.”
“not required. Thus, we will affirm the judgment of the Tax Court.”
“Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction.”
“prejudice. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.”
“For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“Amended Complaint (the ‘Complaint’), and we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.”
“We will therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment.”
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