Stephanos Bibas
How Judge Bibas rules, drawn from 55 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Bibas
Stephanos Bibas is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Bibas received a commission on November 20, 2017.
Judge Bibas's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Bibas's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
- Third Circuit Motions Practice ↗
- Motions to Exceed the Page or Word Limitations ↗
- Motions for Extensions of Time and Clarification of L.A.R. 110 ↗
- Vacating Option B for Filing of an Appendix ↗
- Reduced Number of Copies of Briefs Required ↗
- Stays in Immigration Cases ↗
- Submission of Audio and Video Files ↗
How Judge Bibas decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In United States v. Safehouse, he held that the proposed safe-injection site fell within 21 U.S.C. § 856 despite Congress’s original focus on crack houses, because the statute’s words reached the proposed use.
“A court's job is to parse texts, not psychoanalyze lawmak- ers.”
In United States v. Yung, he chose a narrower plausible reading of the statute to avoid constitutional problems with a broader interpretation.
“Though the text supports the broad reading, constitu- tional avoidance tells us to select the narrow one.”
In a criminal-history hiring case, Bibas enforced the exemptions the legislature actually listed and declined to create another for information disclosed by the applicant. An employer should connect its use of a conviction to the statute's substantive hiring criteria rather than rely on the source of the information.
“We cannot create an exemption from § 9125(a) when the legislature failed to do so.”
In an ERISA case, Bibas evaluated prudence through the fiduciaries' decision process rather than investment performance alone. Regular advisor review, active committee engagement, documented monitoring, and follow-up supported judgment for the plan fiduciaries despite periods of underperformance.
“ERISA, like trust law, does not hold trustees liable for poor performance alone. Courts review process first.”
In Second Amendment analysis, Bibas distinguishes weapons commonly used for lawful purposes from those principally associated with crime, and treats narrow, objective registration steps as incidental burdens rather than infringements.
“Machine guns are commonly used for crime, not self-defense. So they can be banned. And reasonable registration requirements are not infringements.”
Procedural preferences
In Papera v. Pennsylvania Quarried Bluestone, he construed ambiguity in a prior dismissal order against claim preclusion.
“We construe ambiguities in dismissal orders against claim preclusion. So we will not read a dismissal order as dismissing involuntarily, or voluntarily with prejudice, unless it says so clearly and expressly.”
Bibas enforced the contractual boundary of a broad labor-arbitration clause. Invoking a provision was not enough when the claimed payment right flowed from a prior award rather than from the collective-bargaining agreement that contained the clause.
“If the rights claimed are not covered by the contract that contains the arbitration clause, then the dispute falls outside the clause’s limits.”
A strong merits showing did not itself require preliminary relief when the feared injury could be remedied later, the requested order would disrupt the status quo, and the case could survive without it.
“Even when the merits are strong, courts may properly deny a preliminary injunction because the feared injury is reparable without preliminary relief, an injunc- tion would needlessly disrupt the status quo, or one is not needed to keep the case alive.”
Cautions
He holds lawyers to a rigorous duty of candor as officers of the court: statements that are literally true but misleading, or factual assertions made without a reasonable investigation, can draw sanctions even absent bad faith, because the standard is objective reasonableness and there is no empty-head, pure-heart excuse.
“Courts rely on lawyers' honesty; lawyers may not mislead them.”
He insists that equitable relief is never automatic: even a plaintiff likely to succeed on a constitutional claim is not entitled to a preliminary injunction as of right, because a court must still weigh irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest, and the absence of irreparable harm alone can defeat the request.
“A preliminary injunction is not a shortcut to the merits. Before granting one, a district court must also weigh the equi- ties, the public interest, and the threat of irreparable harm.”
Bibas upheld sanctions where lawyers used scripted dispute letters and half-truths to manufacture debt-collection claims. Prelitigation conduct can support inherent-authority sanctions when it was designed to mislead the court and improperly shape the later judicial process.
“Courts may sanction prelitigation conduct ‘intended to improperly influence the judicial process.’”
In an academic defamation case, Bibas distinguished disclosed scholarly disagreement from opinions implying undisclosed defamatory facts. Pleading should identify the factual implication, read the statement in context, and explain why it can be proven false rather than merely offensive or critical.
“Statements of fact can be defamatory. So too can statements of opinion that ‘give[] rise to the inference that there are undisclosed facts that justify the forming of the opinion.’”
In Gabriel v. DSM Biomedical, he found that workplace stress alone did not establish harm to an identifiable employment term.
“Mere emotional harm and stress are not enough.”
He treats suppression as a deterrent reserved for deliberate, reckless, grossly negligent, or systemic police misconduct, not as an automatic remedy for an isolated mistake.
“That drastic measure is reserved for officer misconduct that is deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent.”
In Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Albence, he held that the balance of equities could defeat preliminary relief despite some showing of likely success and irreparable injury.
“Even if there is some likelihood of success and some irreparable injury, a district court may find that the balance of equities is enough to cut the other way.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“This we cannot do. So we will affirm.”
“So we will deny his petition for review.”
“So it could not preclude this suit. We will thus vacate and remand for further proceedings.”
“So like the District Court before us, we will affirm.”
“We will thus affirm the dis- missal of the statutory right-to-counsel claim and otherwise re- verse and remand for the District Court to address the merits.”
“As long as an opinion relies on disclosed facts, it is privileged. That is what happened here. And C.M. did not plead that Newsweek knew the facts were false or recklessly disregarded the truth. We will thus affirm.”
“So we will vacate and remand the District Court's order to the contrary.”
“We will thus re- verse and remand for the District Court to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”
“We cannot rewrite the statute. Only Congress can. So we will reverse and remand for the District Court to consider the RFRA counterclaim.”
“Here, we are confident that Yung's conviction is lawful, as is his duty to compensate the interviewer for the harm he caused. But because Georgetown suffered no damage to any property right, we will vacate that restitution order.”
“These claims check neither box. So we cannot hear them.”
“Because those mild sanctions were justified and reasonable, we will affirm.”
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