Patty Shwartz
How Judge Shwartz decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She approaches recurring platform-liability and statutory questions as a careful textualist who distinguishes a company's own conduct from third-party inputs: she held that a social-media platform's algorithmic curation and recommendation of videos on a user's personalized feed is the platform's own expressive activity, so federal immunity for 'information provided by another' does not shield claims premised on that recommendation.
“Because the information that forms the basis of Anderson’s lawsuit—i.e., TikTok’s recommendations via its FYP algorithm—is TikTok’s own expressive activity, § 230 does not bar Anderson’s claims.”
She reads statutes closely against their structure, presuming that Congress's choice to use one phrase in one provision and a different phrase in another was deliberate, and she uses that presumption to hold parties to the specific jurisdictional and substantive requirements the text actually imposes rather than a more convenient workaround.
“Where a statute or regulation uses specific language in one [provision] but different language in another, the Court presumes different meanings were intended.”
Procedural preferences
She treats a litigant's competency as a threshold the court must protect on its own motion: when the record contains verifiable evidence that a party may be incompetent, the district court must conduct a Rule 17 inquiry and consider appointing a guardian ad litem or next friend before dismissing the case, even if the party is represented by counsel.
“A district court presented with verifiable evidence of incompetence may abuse its discretion under Rule 17(c) if it fails to appoint a next friend or guardian ad litem to represent an incompetent person, even when he or she is represented by counsel.”
When a case becomes moot while an appeal is pending, through events outside the parties' control, she follows the established equitable practice of vacating the judgment below and remanding with instructions to dismiss, so that an unreviewable ruling does not retain precedential or preclusive force.
“When a case becomes moot while an appeal is pending, appellate courts generally follow the “established practice” of vacating a district court’s judgment with directions to dismiss.”
Cautions
She will not let a litigant manufacture appellate review of an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order by refusing to comply with it: a party disappointed by a ruling who then stops litigating and invites a dismissal cannot use that dismissal as a vehicle to obtain review of the underlying order.
“A party disappointed with a court’s ruling may not refuse to proceed and then expect to obtain relief on appeal from an order of dismissal or default.”
She construes statutory exemptions narrowly and holds the party invoking one to its burden of proof: an employer claiming an exemption from the overtime laws must show plainly and unmistakably, with real record evidence, that the exemption applies -- generic or thin proof will not carry it.
“Defendants have simply not met their burden to “plainly and unmistakably” show that the MCA exemption applies.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence.”
“we will affirm the District Court’s conclusion regarding drug quantity, reverse the enhancement for obstruction of justice, and remand for resentencing.”
“we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.”
“we will dismiss the appeal in part and affirm in part.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order certifying a direct purchaser class.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s preliminary injunction.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.”
Put Judge Shwartz's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Shwartz actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Shwartz's own signed orders and cites them.