Marjorie O. Rendell
How Judge Rendell rules, drawn from 34 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Rendell decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a compassionate-release appeal, Rendell compared the procedure Congress changed with the substantial-assistance procedure it left untouched. That contrast foreclosed using compassionate release to obtain a reduction that Rule 35 reserves for a government motion.
“As Congress chose, in passing the First Step Act, to change the procedure relating to motions for compassionate release but chose not to change the procedure around motions for a reduction in sentence based on substantial assistance, we must give effect to and ‘respect that choice.’”
In a suppression case arising from marijuana odor near a parked vehicle, Rendell separated probable cause to search the vehicle from probable cause to arrest a passenger. Arrest required facts connecting the odor to the individual rather than to the shared space alone.
“We now clarify the import of that phrase and join our Sister Circuits in concluding that, while the smell of marijuana alone can create probable cause to search a vehicle, there must be facts that connect the smell to an individual passenger for there to be probable cause to arrest that passenger.”
In an equal-protection challenge to different citizenship rules for adopted and biological children, Rendell applied rational-basis review without passing on the wisdom of the distinction. A conceivable rational relationship to legitimate immigration and fraud-prevention interests was sufficient.
“In so holding, we need not, and we have not, expressed our approval or disapproval of the challenged law. Rational-basis review does not require us to do so. It requires only that we find a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.”
Procedural preferences
In a qualified-immunity appeal, Rendell confined the narrow exception to ordinary summary-judgment fact crediting to recordings that capture the incident itself. A later video and disputed witness account could be weighed by a jury but could not displace the nonmovant's version at summary judgment.
“Unlike the videotape relied upon by the Supreme Court in Scott, which depicted the actual incident, the videotape in this case did not capture the incident and could not therefore contradict, let alone ‘blatantly contradict,’ the record as to what occurred.”
Cautions
In an immigration petition involving a special court-martial conviction, Rendell's answer to the threshold statutory question eliminated jurisdiction over the rest of the petition. Once the conviction qualified under the immigration statute, the court dismissed rather than reaching remaining issues.
“Because we agree with the BIA that convictions by special courts-martial are, as a general matter, convictions for purposes of § 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over Gourzong's petition for review.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons stated above, we will GRANT HRG's petition for review with regard to the employee notification requirements of the Cr(VI) standard, and REMAND the matter to OSHA for further consideration. We will DENY HRG's petition for review on all other grounds. We will DENY EEI's petition for review on all grounds.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court's order granting Outlaw's motion to suppress.”
“For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court's order denying Claude's sixth motion for compassionate release.”
“For this reason, we will affirm the District Court's order.”
“Because we have done so here, we will deny Cabrera's petition for review.”
“Because we agree with the BIA that convictions by special courts-martial are, as a general matter, convictions for purposes of Sec. 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over Gourzong's petition for review. ... We will therefore dismiss his petition for review.”
“Because substantial evidence supports the IJ's determinations that Romero did not have a reasonable fear of torture or a reasonable fear of persecution, we will deny his petition for review.”
“For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.”
“We hold that Appellant's post-petition payment pursuant to the Wage Order does not affect the calculation of Appellee's preference liability, pursuant to Sec. 547. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's order.”
“For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the order of the District Court. The case will be remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for entry of an order excluding the annuity from the bankruptcy estate and for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.”
“we will VACATE the order of the District Court insofar as it affirms the order of the Bankruptcy Court entering judgment in favor of Hechinger and denying Hechinger's prejudgment interest request. We will REMAND this matter ... We will AFFIRM the District Court's order insofar as it affirms the Bankruptcy Court's denial of UFP's spoliation motion.”
“The decisions by the ALJ and the Board are supported by substantial evidence and the petition for review will be DENIED.”
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