Luis Felipe Restrepo
How Judge Restrepo decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He is a close textualist on statutory questions, reading the words Congress chose according to their ordinary meaning and treating mandatory terms as commands a court must follow, even where the result is one the court might not have chosen for itself.
“The meaning of the word 'shall' is not ambiguous. It is a 'word of command,' ... that 'normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion,'”
He declines to read into a statute exceptions or defenses that Congress did not write: where a law grants a screening privilege to some parties but withholds it from others, he will not imply the omitted exception, holding the party to the duty the text imposes.
“When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts have authority to create others.”
Procedural preferences
Drawing on his background as a defense lawyer, he guards a criminal defendant's right of allocution as a substantial right: unjustified interference with a defendant's opportunity to present mitigating information is presumptively prejudicial and requires resentencing even without a showing of concrete harm.
“The right to allocution is the right to have your request for mercy factored into the sentencing decision.”
He reads consumer-disclosure documents the way an ordinary recipient would, adopting a 'reasonable reader' standard that judges a credit report or similar disclosure by its whole context rather than by any single line read in isolation.
“we adopt a 'reasonable reader' standard which determines how a reasonable reader would have comprehended a report.”
Cautions
In excessive-force cases he holds officers to clearly established limits: a threat that has passed does not justify continued deadly force, and on an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal he will confine review to legal questions and let a jury resolve genuinely disputed facts.
“A passing risk to a police officer is not an ongoing license to kill an otherwise unthreatening suspect.”
He insists that sentencing be individualized and grounded in the particular defendant before the court: reliance on stereotypes or generalizations, or a mistaken belief that Guidelines adjustments already captured a defendant's mitigation, is procedural error requiring resentencing.
“By definition, gross generalizations or stereotypes—whether they be about race or gender—do not produce individualized sentences.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the District Court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.”
“Regardless of whether the letters would have in fact brought about a lesser sentence, the law – as well as a sense of basic fairness – dictates that Chapman not be prevented from presenting mitigating information because of his own counsel's oversight and the Court's congested docket. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case for resentencing.”
“Accordingly, we will deny Sambare's Petition because we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).”
“Given the foregoing, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court's ruling concerning Javitz's due process claim. We will, however, reverse its ruling regarding Javitz's First Amendment retaliation claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court's judgment sentencing Seibert to prison for 360 months.”
“In conclusion, Trooper Corrie, while participating in a coordinated effort to serve an arrest warrant on an armed robbery suspect, reasonably used lethal force against a dog who, unrebutted testimony shows, aggressively charged at him, growled, and showed his teeth, as though about to attack. We will thus affirm the District Court's order granting summary judgment.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand to the Benefits Review Board for a determination of benefits.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court's grant of NVR's mo- tion to dismiss and remand this case for further consideration consistent with this opinion.”
“Although we are sympathetic to Yasin's compelling circumstances, our lack of jurisdiction restricts us from re- viewing the underlying merits of his motion to reopen. Therefore, for these reasons, we will deny his petition for re- view.”
“Accordingly, we will affirm the district courts' order granting Trans Union's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
Put Judge Restrepo's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Restrepo actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Restrepo's own signed orders and cites them.