Herbert Funk Goodrich

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit circuit Deceased · served 1940–1962 Appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt (Democratic) 25 signed orders read

Judge Goodrich no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Goodrich decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Treats written terms as the safer foundation for a new commercial venture.

“putting things in writing is not a bad idea at the beginning of a new venture.”

Applies filing deadlines as firm administrative cutoffs in bankruptcy.

“Modern administration requires a definitive cutoff date past which claims may not be filed,”

Procedural preferences

Will withdraw a merits discussion when the court lacks appellate jurisdiction.

“However good the advice was, federal courts do not give advisory opinions.”

Leaves the hardship of statutory limitations periods to legislative policy rather than judicial exception.

“Statutes of limitation frequently involve some hardship, but the alleviation of that *369 hardship is a matter of policy for the Congress.”

Cautions

Will not disturb a damages verdict merely because it is large unless the result is shocking.

“the adequacy of damages in such a case is not one for an appellate court to interfere with unless the result is shocking.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

In re Pearl Coal Co.
· 1940-10-09
Appeal (bankruptcy-petitioners-appellants) Denied

“The order of the District Court dismissing the petition of .the appellants is affirmed.”

In re Podolsky
· 1940-11-27
Appeal (bankruptcy-trustee-appellant) Granted

“The order of the District Court is reversed and the case remanded, with instructions to reinstate the orders of the referee disallowing these claims.”

Oughton v. National Labor Relations Board
· 1941-02-26
Appeal (employer-petitioners) Granted in part

“A decree will be entered enforcing the order of the Board upon the conditions and to the extent herein indicated.”

Lane v. School District of City of Monessen
· 1941-05-28
Appeal (bank-receiver-appellant) Denied

“The judgment is affirmed.”

Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. v. Klaxon Co.
· 1942-02-09
Appeal (contract-defendant-appellant) Denied

“The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.”

Mearkle's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
· 1942-06-17
Appeal (taxpayer-executors-appellants) Denied

“The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is affirmed.”

United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Philadelphia
· 1942-09-17
Appeal (landowner-appellants) Granted

“The order is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”

Mennen Co. v. Kelly
· 1942-11-24
Appeal (manufacturer-appellant) Granted

“The judgment is, therefore, reversed and remanded for modification in accordance with this opinion.”

Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co.
· 1943-05-05
Appeal (injured-seaman-appellant) Denied

“The decree of the District Court is affirmed.”

United States v. Steese
· 1944-08-25
Appeal (criminal-defendant-appellant) Granted

“The judgment of the District Court is, therefore, vacated and the case remanded to that court to give the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence to establish his allegations of fact which would show that his original conviction was in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”

Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co.
· 1945-04-11
Appeal (injured-longshoreman-appellant) Granted in part

“The judgment of the District Court is affirmed as to the Bethlehem companies, No. 8706, and reversed as to Seas Shipping Co., No. 8722.”

Cromwell v. Hillsborough Township
· 1945-05-09
Appeal (taxpayer-plaintiff-appellant) Denied

“The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.”

A historical record

Judge Goodrich no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.