David Brookman Smith
Judge Smith no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Smith decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He resolves statutory and constitutional questions from the words the enacting body used, reading undefined terms against their established meaning and the structure of the whole provision, and he will follow the text even to a result of creating a split with another circuit when the language compels it.
“By its terms, Sec. 1915(g) applies when 'the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, ... brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on ... grounds' enumerated in Sec. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) or (ii).”
He declines invitations to expand judge-made categories beyond the ground the Supreme Court has staked out, refusing, for example, to recognize a new class of speech as unprotected by the First Amendment absent express direction from the Supreme Court.
“For these reasons, we are unwilling to extend the rationale of Ferber beyond the regulation of child pornography without express direction from the Supreme Court.”
Procedural preferences
He polices the boundaries of appellate and interlocutory jurisdiction closely, holding that only an order actually granting or denying class certification is reviewable under the interlocutory class-certification rule, so a preliminary conditional-approval order is not.
“Because the District Court's order does not constitute an order 'granting or denying class-action certification,' we have dismissed the Rule 23(f) petition for lack of jurisdiction by our Order of September 11, 2014.”
He reviews a district court's sentence for abuse of discretion and will not reverse merely because the appellate judges would have chosen differently, deferring to the sentencing judge's individualized, on-the-record assessment even when the sentence falls well outside the advisory range.
“if the district court's sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”
Cautions
He gives protective statutes their full remedial breadth where the text supports it, adopting an intentionally broad test for whether a government policy 'substantially burdens' religious exercise and placing the least-restrictive-means burden squarely on the government.
“For the purposes of RLUIPA, a substantial burden exists where: 1) a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; OR 2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”
He reads a phrase like 'relating to' in its broadest reasonable sense, asking whether the state offense shares a logical or causal connection with the generic federal crime rather than demanding a precise element-for-element match.
“In short, common law forgery and false agency endorsement share a logical connection because they 'target the same, core criminal conduct such that they are directly analogous.'”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the above-stated reasons, we will reverse the District Court's Order dismissing Washington's RLUIPA claim and remand with instructions to consider whether any factual issues remain when that claim is evaluated under the proper legal standard.”
“Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's order dismissing Petruska's Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims, as well as her state civil conspiracy, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. For the reasons set forth below, we will remand her breach of contract claim for further consideration by the District Court.”
“Accordingly, we will affirm the sentence that the District Court imposed.”
“Moreover, because we agree with Stevens that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 48 is an unconstitutional infringement on free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, we will vacate his conviction.”
“The District Court held that the Act preempted all design defect claims and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the other two claims. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.”
“Because the state court properly applied to Greene's Confrontation Clause claim the 'clearly established Federal law' that existed at that time, Bruton and Marsh, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.”
“Having concluded that federal-question jurisdiction is lacking, we will reverse the District Court's March 20, 2013 order, and remand with instructions that the District Court remand this case to the Superior Court of New Jersey.”
“Ragbir's claims fail to satisfy at least one necessary requirement. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's denial of the petition.”
“We will affirm the District Court's denial of Plaintiffs' emergency motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction.”
“we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.”
“Because the District Court's order does not constitute an order 'granting or denying class-action certification,' we have dismissed the Rule 23(f) petition for lack of jurisdiction by our Order of September 11, 2014.”
A historical record
Judge Smith no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.