David Brookman Smith
How Judge Smith rules, drawn from 34 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Smith
David Brooks Smith is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Appointed by President George W. Bush, Judge Smith received a commission on August 2, 2002. Judge Smith previously served on the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, commissioned there on October 17, 1988. Judge Smith assumed senior status on December 4, 2021.
Judge Smith's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Smith's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
- Third Circuit Motions Practice ↗
- Motions to Exceed the Page or Word Limitations ↗
- Motions for Extensions of Time and Clarification of L.A.R. 110 ↗
- Vacating Option B for Filing of an Appendix ↗
- Reduced Number of Copies of Briefs Required ↗
- Stays in Immigration Cases ↗
- Submission of Audio and Video Files ↗
How Judge Smith decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Parker’s three-strikes appeal, he read the statute to bar an appeal from a third-strike dismissal without prepayment of fees absent imminent danger, and denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
“We conclude, based upon the plain text of the statute, and guided by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Coleman, that we must answer this question in the negative. Accordingly, we will deny Parker’s motion to proceed informa pauperis.”
In United States v. Stevens, he declined to extend the child-pornography rationale of Ferber to another category of speech without express direction from the Supreme Court.
“For these reasons, we are unwilling to extend the rationale of Ferber beyond the regulation of child pornography without express direction from the Supreme Court.”
In the refinery permit dispute, he held that the agency had exceeded the Clean Air Act authority for its reactivation policy and vacated the resulting determination.
“We agree that EPA has exceeded its statutory authority under the CAA.”
In a wage settlement appeal, he read the federal opt-in provision as governing how claims are litigated, allowing the trial court to proceed with the full class settlement fairness inquiry.
“we hold that the statute does not forbid such settlements.”
Procedural preferences
In the NFL concussion settlement appeal, he concluded that preliminary approval reserved class certification for a later order, so the objectors’ petition was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
“In sum, the District Court’s order and memorandum pursuant to Rule 23(e) that provided preliminary approval of the proposed class ‘for settlement purposes only’ and explicitly reserved its certification order for a later date was not a class-action certification order under Rule 23(c). Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Objectors’ petition.”
In United States v. Tomko, he applied the rule that a procedurally sound sentence stands unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed it for the reasons given.
“if the district court's sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”
Cautions
In Henry Washington’s RLUIPA case, he described a substantial burden as a forced choice between religious practice and a generally available benefit, or government pressure to violate religious beliefs.
“For the purposes of RLUIPA, a substantial burden exists where: 1) a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; OR 2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”
In Ramon Williams’s immigration appeal, he found a logical connection between common-law forgery and false agency endorsement because they target the same core conduct.
“In short, common law forgery and false agency endorsement share a logical connection because they 'target the same, core criminal conduct such that they are directly analogous.'”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the above-stated reasons, we will reverse the District Court's Order dismissing Washington's RLUIPA claim and remand with instructions to consider whether any factual issues remain when that claim is evaluated under the proper legal standard.”
“Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's order dismissing Petruska's Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims, as well as her state civil conspiracy, negligent retention and supervision, and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. For the reasons set forth below, we will remand her breach of contract claim for further consideration by the District Court.”
“Accordingly, we will affirm the sentence that the District Court imposed.”
“Moreover, because we agree with Stevens that 18 U.S.C. § 48 is an unconstitutional infringement on free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, we will vacate his conviction.”
“The District Court held that the Act preempted all design defect claims and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the other two claims. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.”
“Thus, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court denying Greene’s habeas petition.”
“Having concluded that federal-question jurisdiction is lacking, we will reverse the District Court's March 20, 2013 order, and remand with instructions that the District Court remand this case to the Superior Court of New Jersey.”
“Ragbir's claims fail to satisfy at least one necessary requirement. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's denial of the petition.”
“We will affirm the District Court's denial of Plaintiffs' emergency motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction.”
“we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.”
“In sum, the District Court’s order and memorandum pursuant to Rule 23(e) that provided preliminary approval of the proposed class ‘for settlement purposes only’ and explicitly reserved its certification order for a later date was not a class-action certification order under Rule 23(c). Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Objectors’ petition.”
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