Arlin M. Adams

How Judge Adams rules, drawn from 31 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Adams no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Position
circuit
Status
Retired 1987
Served
1969–1987
Appointed by
Richard M. Nixon (Republican)
Commissioned
1969-10-02
Education
Temple University, B.S., 1941; University of Pennsylvania Law School, LL.B., 1947; Temple University, M.A., 1950
Signed orders read
31

How Judge Adams decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

When state law requires expert proof that an accident caused a nonobvious injury, satisfying that threshold does not end the inquiry. The factfinder must then weigh the complete record under the ordinary preponderance standard.

“After the plaintiff has presented unequivocal medical testimony on causation, the trial court must then evaluate, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, whether the accident, in fact, did cause the injury.”

Changed circumstances do not moot a case when practical equitable relief remains available. Completion of a challenged project did not foreclose narrower relief directed to the disputed uses within it.

“Although emphasis on the efficacy of the remedy is appropriate, changed circumstances will frequently moot only some forms of relief, leaving other useful forms available.”

Procedural preferences

Before imposing dismissal as a sanction for failure to prosecute, the court should consider less severe alternatives and place that consideration on the record.

“Donnelly and Titus require that the consideration of lesser sanctions be made and set forth on the record.”

Cautions

A tender-offer claim under the Williams Act cannot rest only on alleged substantive unfairness or breach. Without deception, federal courts would be drawn into supervising the fairness of nearly every tender offer.

“Absent a requirement of deception, the Williams Act would mandate that the federal courts supervise the substantive fairness of practically all tender offers.”

Release on bail before a habeas petition is decided requires exceptional circumstances, and failure to exhaust available state remedies weighs independently against that extraordinary relief.

“Because Lucas did not make the requisite showing of exceptional circumstances that would justify a grant of bail pending exhaustion of his claim in the State courts, the district court's order admitting him to bail will be reversed”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Government of the Virgin Islands v. Paul Testamark
· 1978-01-10
Appeal (appellant (Paul Testamark (criminal defendant))) Denied

“Accordingly, the conviction will be affirmed.”

United States v. Raymond Carter
· 1978-05-23
Appeal (appellant (Raymond Carter (criminal defendant))) Denied

“Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be affirmed.”

Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged v. Mathews
· 1978-12-29
Appeal (appellant (Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged (provider))) Granted in part

“The judgment of the district court will be reversed with respect to the recapture of the excess of accelerated depreciation over straight-line depreciation for fiscal periods ending on or before December 31, 1969.”

Tilden Financial Corporation v. Palo Tire Service, Inc.
· 1979-04-18
Appeal (appellant (Palo Tire Service, Inc. (defendant))) Denied

“We conclude that we have jurisdiction, and affirm the judgment of the district court.”

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Marshall
· 1980-11-13
Petition for review (petitioner) Granted in part

“Accordingly, the Commission's determination that petitioner violated the Occupational Safety and Health Act will be affirmed. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the Commission's judgment that these violations are ‘repeated’ is vacated, and the proceedings will be remanded with instructions to reduce the characterization of the violations from ‘repeated’ to ‘nonserious,’ and to reduce the penalty from $180 to $90 in each proceeding.”

United States v. Dominick J. Mariano
· 1981-05-01
Appeal (appellant (Dominick J. Mariano (criminal defendant))) Denied

“Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be affirmed.”

Donna M. Murillo v. W. Lewis Bambrick, Clerk of the Superior Court of New Jersey
· 1982-06-17
Appeal (appellant (W. Lewis Bambrick, Clerk of the Superior Court of New Jersey (defendant))) Granted

“Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be reversed, and the matter will be remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

The Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Service Electric & Gas Company
· 1982-08-27
Petition for review (petitioner) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review will be denied.”

Elsa Garcia v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
· 1982-10-06
Petition for review (petitioner) Moot / procedural

“For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”

United States v. Ruth M. Anderson
· 1983-04-06
Appeal (appellant (Ruth M. Anderson (criminal defendant))) Denied

“The judgment of the district court, 535 F.Supp. 1230, will be affirmed.”

Madesky v. Campbell
· 1983-04-28
Appeal (appellant (Matthew T. Madesky (plaintiff-employee))) Granted

“Accordingly, the order of dismissal will be vacated and the case remanded so that the district court may consider alternative sanctions in accordance with Donnelly, and place on the record the fact that it has considered alternative sanctions less severe than dismissal in accordance with Titus.”

State of New Jersey, Dept. of Education v. Hufstedler
· 1984-02-17
Petition for review (petitioner) Granted

“Accordingly, this matter will be remanded to the Secretary for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

A historical record

Judge Adams no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.