William J. Nardini

In a sentencing appeal, Nardini compared the elements of Hobbs Act robbery with the guideline's generic definition of a crime of violence. Because Hobbs Act robbery can be committed through force against property, it did not categorically satisfy a definition limited to force against a person.

“Applying the categorical approach, we now hold—joining the seven other Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue—that Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a ‘crime of violence’ under § 4B1.2(a) because it can apply to violence against property, not just against people.”

In a First Step Act appeal, Nardini identified the statutory provision that authorized the requested sentence reduction rather than importing limits tied to a different reduction mechanism. That framework left the defendant eligible for consideration even though the amended guideline range had not changed.

“We hold that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B), rather than § 3582(c)(2), is the correct basis for a motion to reduce a term of imprisonment under the First Step Act, and thus U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 does not affect a defendant’s eligibility for relief under the Act.”

In a Title VII appeal, Nardini held that a plaintiff could defeat summary judgment with evidence that protected status was one motivating factor, even without proving the employer's explanation was entirely false. The supervisor's alleged gender-biased remarks supplied enough evidence to proceed.

“To survive summary judgment on a Title VII disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff may, but need not, show at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test that the employer’s stated justification for its adverse action was nothing but a pretext for discrimination; however, a plaintiff may also satisfy this burden by adducing evidence that, even if the employer had mixed motives, the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class was at least one motivating factor in the employer’s adverse action.”

In reviewing settlement-class certification, Nardini required named plaintiffs to confront the same central proof problems as absent class members. Policyholders who relied on different issuers and contractual documents could not be represented by named plaintiffs whose privity theories required materially different evidence.

“Each group of policyholders, depending on which company issued their policies, would have to prove in a completely separate way how they came to be in privity with Lincoln. In short, each issuer’s policyholders were in different boats.”

In the foreign-tax-refund fraud appeal, Nardini distinguished collecting taxes from recovering money obtained by fraud. Because the defendants neither received the claimed dividends nor paid the foreign taxes, the revenue rule did not bar the tax authority's recovery action.

“Because defendants concededly never received any dividends on Danish equities and thus never owed or paid any foreign taxes, Skat’s suit does not seek to enforce foreign tax laws.”