Sarah A. L. Merriam
How Judge Merriam decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Textualist statutory/constitutional interpretation -- she begins with and is governed by the plain text. In Unkechaug she resolved treaty preemption by parsing Article VI of the Constitution clause-by-clause, including the placement of commas in the Supremacy Clause.
“In interpreting Article VI of the United States Constitution, we begin with the text. ... The placement of the commas around “or which shall be made” makes very clear that the phrase “under the Authority of the United States” modifies “all Treaties made.””
Willing to overrule circuit precedent (en banc) to protect a criminal defendant’s procedural rights -- here the right to be present when supervised-release conditions are imposed.
“[we] overrule Truscello. We VACATE the portion of the defendant’s sentence imposing the thirteen discretionary conditions of supervised release.”
Procedural preferences
Addresses appellate jurisdiction and sovereign immunity before reaching the merits, and resolves issues on the narrowest dispositive ground.
“Because our conclusion that the Andros Order is not federal law is dispositive of this appeal, we need not address the parties’ remaining arguments.”
Cautions
Deems inadequately-briefed arguments forfeited -- arguments raised only in a footnote, or not pleaded, will not be considered.
“We ordinarily deem an argument to be forfeited where it has not been sufficiently argued in the briefs, such as when it is only addressed in a footnote.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the District Court appropriately entered summary judgment in defendants' favor, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.”
“We hold that a sentencing court intending to impose non-mandatory conditions of supervised release, including the “standard” conditions described in §5D1.3(c), must notify the defendant during the sentencing proceeding ... [we] overrule Truscello. We VACATE the portion of the defendant’s sentence imposing the thirteen discretionary conditions of supervised release. ... We REMAND this matter to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.”