Richard J. Sullivan
How Judge Sullivan rules, drawn from 76 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Sullivan
Richard Joseph Sullivan is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Sullivan received a commission on October 17, 2018. Judge Sullivan previously served on the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, commissioned there on August 1, 2007.
Judge Sullivan's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Sullivan, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Contacting chambers
For SDNY district matters before Judge Sullivan, counsel must docket letters on ECF and email a PDF to chambers.
“Letters on behalf of parties represented by counsel must be both docketed on ECF and e-mailed as a PDF attachment”
Filing
For SDNY district motion papers, send chambers both a hard courtesy copy and an emailed electronic courtesy copy.
“a party shall submit a hard courtesy copy and, via e-mail, an electronic courtesy copy thereof to chambers”
Motions
For SDNY district civil motions, request a pre-motion conference unless a listed exception applies.
“a pre-motion conference with the Court is required before making any motion, except motions previously authorized by the Court”
Motions
For SDNY district motions, opening and opposition memoranda are limited to 25 pages and replies to 10 pages without permission.
“memoranda of law in support of and in opposition to motions are limited to 25 pages, and reply memoranda are limited to 10 pages.”
Discovery
For SDNY district discovery motions, present the dispute in one jointly composed letter of no more than five pages.
“before making any discovery motion, counsel should describe their discovery disputes in a single letter, jointly composed, not to exceed five pages.”
Discovery
For SDNY district discovery disputes, confer with the other parties before submitting the joint letter.
“Before filing the joint letter, the parties shall confer in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action”
How Judge Sullivan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Buller, Sullivan held that the tax petition deadline was a claim-processing rule because Congress had not clearly made it jurisdictional. The court left equitable tolling available under the ordinary presumption.
“For all these reasons, we hold that section 6213(a) is – quite clearly – a nonjurisdictional, claim-processing rule.”
In Mueller, Sullivan held that providing routine financial services at arm’s length did not itself establish participation in the alleged venture. The complaint needed conduct showing the service provider’s purpose or interest in advancing it.
“Participation in a venture therefore requires more than providing financial services at arm’s length.”
In Wong, Sullivan read the immigration statute independently after the end of agency deference. He held that the relevant conviction required constitutionally adequate criminal process and exposure to a criminal sentence.
“we hold that, as relevant here, the term ‘conviction’ in section 1101(a)(48)(A) refers to a ‘formal judgment of guilt’ that (i) was reached at a criminal proceeding in which the accused was provided the minimum constitutional protections required to impose a criminal penalty and (ii) subjected the accused to a criminal sentence.”
Procedural preferences
In Alessi Equipment, Sullivan held that a final judgment in a case with multiple parties and counterclaims had to identify each party and the relief awarded without referring to another document. Unresolved prejudgment interest postponed finality.
“a final judgment entered in a multi-party action or any action involving claims and counterclaims must describe the parties and the relief to which each and every party is entitled, and must also be self-contained and complete, such that it can stand alone without reference to any other document.”
In Gendron, Sullivan concluded that a limiting instruction could address the risk of juror confusion from a legally permissible aggravating factor.
“the way for the district court to cure that problem is by issuing a limiting instruction – not striking the entire aggravator.”
In Trireme Energy, Sullivan held that a substantive denial of leave to add a claim could preclude a later suit on that claim when the plaintiff could have appealed the denial.
“Accordingly, because the new suit was barred by the old judgment, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
In his dissent in Bagley, Sullivan applied plain error review to the sentencing objection and would have affirmed because the district court had not plainly erred.
“Because the district court did not plainly err in sentencing Bagley above the advisory Sentencing Guidelines”
Cautions
In Smart Study, Sullivan held that the Hague Service Convention barred email service on the China-based defendants. The plaintiffs’ wish to serve them quickly did not excuse the treaty process.
“the Hague Service Convention does not permit email service on the China-based defendants.”
In his separate writing in Leeper, Sullivan would not have added general procedural due process balancing to a warrant challenge because the Fourth Amendment governed the asserted search protections.
“Where search warrants are involved, there can be no doubt that the only ‘process that is due’ is supplied by the Fourth Amendment.”
In a separate concurrence and dissent in Santos, Sullivan argued that a regulation for reconsidering immigration-benefit decisions did not extend to Customs and Border Protection’s reinstated removal orders. The panel majority disagreed and permitted review of the reopening denial; this separate view is not the court’s holding.
“103.5 governs only requests for certain immigration benefits, not motions asking”
In an appeal over nonprofit debt-collection advice, Sullivan held that the challenged licensing rule regulated speech but was content neutral, so the district court had to apply intermediate scrutiny before granting preliminary relief.
“We agree with the district court that New York’s UPL statutes, as applied to Plaintiffs, constitute a regulation of speech. Nevertheless, we hold that such regulation is content neutral and thus subject only to intermediate scrutiny.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS this appeal as moot.”
“Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
“Applying de novo review here, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Clark's motion to proceed pro se. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the orders of the district court.”
“Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the Tax Court and REMAND for consideration of whether Petitioners are entitled to equitable tolling.”
“Now guided by the New York Court of Appeals's decision that Article 52 of the CPLR is a judgment debtor's exclusive avenue for relief from a procedurally defective execution and levy, we AFFIRM the district courts' judgments dismissing Plaintiffs' actions.”
“We hold that Plaintiffs are not entitled to bring suit under Argentine law and that nothing in Rule 17 can be read to alter that result. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
“Accordingly, we REVERSE the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Kasiotis and the class and REMAND the case with instructions to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim.”
“Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we VACATE the district court's judgment with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court to consider whether appellate fees ought to be awarded.”
“we reserve decision on this appeal in order to CERTIFY the following question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether New York law requires a specific promise to provide exclusively in-person learning as a prerequisite to the formation of an implied contract between a university and its students with respect to tuition payments.”
“Accordingly, we REVERSE the orders of the district court and REMAND with instructions to dismiss Relator's section 1320a-7b(a)(4)-based claims.”
“Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED as to the Section 1692g claim and VACATED as to the Section 1692e claim. The case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.”
“Finally, Doherty has forfeited any claims for other damages. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
Draft for Judge Sullivan with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Sullivan, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
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