Reena Raggi

How Judge Raggi rules, drawn from 49 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Position
Circuit judge
Status
Senior status
Appointed by
George W. Bush (Republican)
Commissioned
October 4, 2002
Education
Wellesley College (B.A., 1973, Phi Beta Kappa); Harvard Law School (J.D., cum laude, 1976)
Signed orders read
49

About Judge Raggi

Reena Raggi is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Appointed by President George W. Bush, Judge Raggi received a commission on October 4, 2002. Judge Raggi previously served on the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, commissioned there on May 7, 1987. Judge Raggi assumed senior status on August 31, 2018.

Judge Raggi's practices and standing orders

The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Raggi's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).

How Judge Raggi decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In United States v. Maher, Raggi held that police needed a warrant to visually inspect an unopened file image after Google's hash match because the inspection went beyond the private search.

“To secure that further evidence, police had to conduct a visual examination of the unopened Maher file image. Because that search went beyond Google’s own hash value search of the Maher file, it required a warrant.”

In United States v. Dennis, Raggi held that the true-threat charge required proof that Dennis understood the threatening character of his statements.

“the ‘First Amendment still requires proof that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of his statements.’”

In United States v. Valder, Raggi treated the statutory minor-victim requirement as circumstance-specific and found that the prior offense satisfied it.

“Valder fails to demonstrate error in the application of § 3559(e)(1)’s minor-victim requirement to his case because that requirement is circumstance-specific, rather than categorical, and the circumstances of Valder’s prior New York State sex offense satisfy the minor-victim requirement.”

Procedural preferences

In Reyes, Raggi sent an unclear state-law question to the state’s highest court because state courts had not construed the laws and the answer affected important law-enforcement interests.

“Because the laws do not speak clearly to that question, New York courts have not yet construed these laws, and any construction will significantly affect the state’s important interests in the conduct of law enforcement activities, we do not now attempt to answer it ourselves.”

Cautions

In Bochner, Raggi found that the plaintiffs lacked pre-enforcement standing where the city had not threatened or enforced the law and disavowed future enforcement against them.

“the City has not enforced or threatened to enforce the Guaranty Law against them or anyone else in the past, and it unqualifiedly disavows intent to enforce the law against the Bochner Plaintiffs in the future.”

In United States v. Ross, Raggi held that this forfeiture case required judgment for the claimant before a certificate of reasonable cause could issue.

“certificate of reasonable cause is properly issued under CAFRA only ‘[u]pon the entry of a judgment for the claimant.’”

In her Massimino v. Benoit concurrence, she said this particular qualified immunity ruling did not require the court to announce a broader First Amendment right to record public law enforcement activity.

“I write separately because, on the qualified immunity point, I think it unnecessary and inadvisable to go further in this particular case and to pronounce a First Amendment right to record any law enforcement activity occurring in public”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

United States v. Florez
05-2999-cr · 2006-05-03
Appeal (appellant (defendant Jose Dorance Florez)) Denied

“We reject these claims as without merit and hereby affirm the judgment of conviction.”

ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.
05-4192-cv · 2008-02-26
Appeal (appellant (plaintiffs ITC Limited and ITC Hotels)) Denied

“Having received the Court of Appeals' response, ... we now affirm the district court's award of summary judgment in its entirety.”

Ajlani v. Chertoff
07-1568-cv · 2008-10-07
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Majed Ajlani)) Denied

“We now answer that question in the negative and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of dismissal.”

United States v. Pizzonia
07-4314-cr · 2009-08-19
Appeal (appellant (defendant Dominick Pizzonia)) Denied

“As Judge Weinstein correctly observed, even though the predicate acts proved in this case were outside the statute of limitations, other trial evidence permitted the jury to conclude that both the charged racketeering conspiracy and Pizzonia's membership in it continued into the limitations period. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.”

ReliaStar Life Insurance Co. of New York v. EMC National Life Co.
07-0828-cv · 2009-04-09
Appeal (appellant (ReliaStar Life Insurance Co.)) Granted

“We conclude that it does not and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ... insofar as it vacated that part of an arbitration award requiring respondent EMC National Life Company ... to pay such fees to petitioner ReliaStar Life Insurance Co. of New York.”

Ericksson v. Commissioner of Social Security
07-3627-cv · 2009-02-19
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Sandra Ericksson)) Granted

“Accordingly, the challenged judgment is REVERSED and the case REMANDED with instructions to award [EAJA fees].”

United States v. Parker
08-4199-cr · 2009-08-14
Appeal (appellant (defendant Travious Parker)) Denied

“Because we identify no error in the first sentencing challenge, we need not address the second, as any error would necessarily be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ... Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED.”

In re Baker (Swimelar v. Baker)
09-4656-bk · 2010-05-14
Appeal (appellant (Chapter 13 Trustee Mark W. Swimelar)) Denied

“We conclude that New York law permits the debtor to exempt the annuity payments and that he gave consideration for the contract when he released a wrongful death claim. AFFIRMED.”

United States v. Thorn
11-37-cr(L) · 2011-10-20
Appeal (cross-appellant (United States)) Granted

“Because defendant's Santos-based claim is procedurally barred, the money laundering count of conviction should not have been vacated. All other arguments raised by the parties on these cross-appeals are moot. AMENDED JUDGMENT VACATED AND PRIOR JUDGMENT REINSTATED.”

Kruse v. Securities Investor Protection Corp. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC)
12-0389-bk · 2013-02-22
Appeal (appellants (indirect Madoff investors via feeder funds)) Denied

“Accordingly, like the Trustee, the bankruptcy court, and the district court, we conclude that appellants do not qualify as BLMIS 'customers' under SIPA.”

Johnson v. Priceline.com, Inc.
12-1744-cv · 2013-03-27
Appeal (appellants (plaintiffs Lee Johnson and Joey Marie Kelly, putative class)) Denied

“Like the district court, we conclude that plaintiffs fail as a matter of law to plead a fiduciary relationship and, accordingly, affirm the challenged judgment.”

United States v. Kleiner
13-2949-cr · 2014-09-02
Appeal (appellant (defendant Cary Lee Kleiner)) Denied

“The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.”

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