Pierre Nelson Leval
How Judge Leval rules, drawn from 39 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Leval
Pierre Nelson Leval is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge Leval received a commission on October 20, 1993. Judge Leval previously served on the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, commissioned there on October 31, 1977. Judge Leval assumed senior status on August 16, 2002.
Judge Leval's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Leval's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
How Judge Leval decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Authors Guild v. Google, Leval held that the search function made a transformative use of books without giving the public a substantial substitute for protected expression.
“Google’s making of a digital copy to provide a search function is a transformative use, which augments public knowledge by making available information about Plaintiffs’ books without providing the public with a substantial substitute for matter protected by the Plaintiffs’ copyright interests in the original works or derivatives of them.”
In Mantikas v. Kellogg, Leval held that the complaint plausibly alleged consumers would be misled by prominent whole-grain labels on the cereal packaging.
“Reviewed under the proper standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Complaint plausibly alleged that a reasonable consumer would be misled by Defendant's whole grain labels to believe that the grain in whole grain Cheez-Its was predominantly whole grain.”
In Capitol Records v. ReDigi, Leval held that fixing the transferred digital file on a server and a purchaser’s device created new phonorecords through reproduction.
“The fixing of the digital file in ReDigi's server, as well as in the new purchaser's device, creates a new phonorecord, which is a reproduction.”
Evidence that foot surgery involved continuing treatment could permit a jury to find an FMLA serious health condition and made the employee’s abbreviated notice potentially reasonable.
“The district court concluded that the Hospital was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Pollard could not prove a 'serious health condition.' We disagree and therefore vacate the judgment.”
In Capitol Records v. Vimeo, Leval held that the statutory safe harbor covered pre-1972 recordings and that an employee’s viewing of a video with recognizable music alone did not prove knowledge of infringement.
“We conclude that the safe harbor of Section 512(c) applies to pre-1972 sound recordings; the mere fact that a video contains all or virtually all of a 'recognizable,' copyrighted sound recording and was viewed in some fashion by a service provider's employee is insufficient to prove knowledge or red flag knowledge of infringement”
The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act supplied jurisdiction over the franchise dispute, and its lenient preliminary-injunction standard supported preserving the gas-station tenancy pending trial.
“Because we conclude that the PMPA provides jurisdiction over Koylum’s suit and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction under the PMPA’s lenient standard, we affirm.”
Procedural preferences
In Davis v. The Gap, Leval read copyright gross revenue to mean revenue reasonably related to the infringement, excluding unrelated revenue from the initial measure.
“Nonetheless we think the term ‘gross revenue’ under the statute means gross revenue reasonably related to the infringement, not unrelated revenues.”
A sentence-reduction denial was remanded when the record suggested that the court had not resolved eligibility or had used a miscalculated revised guideline range that might have prejudiced the defendant.
“Because the record strongly suggests that the court erred either by failing to determine the Defendant's eligibility for a sentence reduction, or by miscalculating the revised United States Sentencing Guidelines (the ‘Guidelines’) range, and the Defendant might have been prejudiced by the error, we REMAND for reconsideration.”
The Investment Company Act supplied a private right of action, but the judgment was still affirmed on the alternate ground that the indenture required distribution of the assets as ordered.
“We conclude that the district court erred in finding that ICA Section 47(b) does not provide a private right of action. However, we agree with the district court that Lansuppe has demonstrated that it is entitled to summary judgment ordering distribution of Soloso's assets according to the terms of the Indenture”
In an appeal about public access to newly filed complaints, Leval held that delaying disclosure to check technical filing requirements failed the First Amendment's narrow-tailoring requirement.
“A system (such as Vermont’s) designed to delay disclosure of filed complaints until they had been checked by clerk’s office personnel for compliance with technical requirements was not ‘narrowly tailored’ to preserve higher values without undue interference with First Amendment rights.”
Cautions
In Register.com v. Verio, Leval found that the complaint adequately notified Verio that Register challenged its robot queries as unauthorized and harmful.
“As the district court noted, Register’s complaint sufficiently advised Verio that its use of robots was not authorized and, according to Register’s contentions, would cause harm to Register’s systems.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We reject these arguments and conclude that the district court correctly sustained Google's fair use defense.”
“For the reasons stated above, the petition for rehearing is denied.”
“We reject Shabazz's arguments and deny his motion.”
“The district court's judgment is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED with instructions to enter a default judgment in Plaintiff's favor.”
“Reviewed under the proper standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Complaint plausibly alleged that a reasonable consumer would be misled by Defendant's whole grain labels to believe that the grain in whole grain Cheez-Its was predominantly whole grain. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.”
“We respectfully disagree with the district court's view that Connecticut's robbery statute does not require at a minimum force that would satisfy the ACCA standard. We think that the threat of force capable of causing pain or injury is inherent in the crime of robbery. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment.”
“Because the record strongly suggests that the court erred either by failing to determine the Defendant's eligibility for a sentence reduction, or by miscalculating the revised United States Sentencing Guidelines (the ‘Guidelines’) range, and the Defendant might have been prejudiced by the error, we REMAND for reconsideration.”
“We conclude that the district court erred in finding that ICA Section 47(b) does not provide a private right of action. However, we agree with the district court that Lansuppe has demonstrated that it is entitled to summary judgment ordering distribution of Soloso's assets according to the terms of the Indenture and that Intervenors' cross-claims fail. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Lansuppe.”
“The district court concluded that the Hospital was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Pollard could not prove a 'serious health condition.' We disagree and therefore vacate the judgment.”
“We find that the district court erred in its reasoning. We accordingly vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand.”
“The District Court ruled in MetLife's favor, staying arbitration of Bucsek's claims. We affirm.”
“We agree with BNY Mellon. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for consideration of Chesapeake's second claim for declaratory relief.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Circuit judges do not carry an assigned trial-court caseload.
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