Joseph F. Bianco

“Because we conclude that the contested documents pertain to the issuance and refusal of a visa, we hold that they were properly withheld under FOIA Exemption 3, and specifically INA § 222(f). ... we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”

“Because we conclude that at the time of the incident, the law was clearly established that a police officer cannot use significant force against an individual who is no longer resisting arrest and poses no safety threat, and the evidence allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that Jones was no longer resisting arrest and was not a safety threat to the officers or others at the time of Lt. Treubig's second use of the taser against him, we REVERSE the district court's judgment and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

“Accordingly, we AFFIRM Bryant's conviction and sentence, except ... we will remand (1) the risk condition so that the district court can formally incorporate its oral amendment of that condition into the written judgment of conviction, and (2) the communication condition so that the district court may provide the necessary justification for restricting Bryant's communications with his brother, or exempt such communications from that condition.”

“Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Subway's motion to compel arbitration and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

“We conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the ADA claim because there was no evidence demonstrating the City delayed administering medication 'by reason of' Tardif's disability, as required under the statute.”

“In light of the statutory language in Section 404, we hold that Jordan's multi-object conspiracy conviction, with a crack cocaine object that included a drug-quantity element triggering the statutory penalties set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), qualifies as a 'covered offense' eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act. Accordingly, we VACATE the order of the district court and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

“We conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Kee's false arrest claim because probable cause existed for his arrest on the charge of loitering for the purpose of gambling. With respect to the federal malicious prosecution claim, we hold that the district court erred in concluding that the dismissal of Kee's underlying narcotics charges on speedy trial grounds could not satisfy the 'favorable termination' element for that claim.”

“We conclude that DFS lacks Article III standing because it failed to allege that the OCC's decision caused it to suffer an actual or imminent injury in fact, and we find that DFS's claims are constitutionally unripe for substantially the same reason. Accordingly, we REVERSE the amended judgment and REMAND to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of dismissal without prejudice.”

“Accordingly, the petition for review is GRANTED, the BIA's decision is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

“We hold, based upon the plain language of Section 525(a), that the PPP is a loan guaranty program and not an 'other similar grant,' and Section 525(a) does not apply to the PPP. ... Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment, VACATE the permanent injunction, and REMAND to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

“Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' First Amended Compliant without leave to amend and the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. We also AFFIRM the district court's unsealing order.”

“On this interlocutory appeal, our review is limited to the rulings on absolute and qualified immunity, and we affirm the district court's denial of summary judgment on both grounds.”