John M. Walker Jr.

How Judge Walker rules, drawn from 47 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Position
circuit
Appointed by
George H. W. Bush (Republican)
Commissioned
1989-11-27
Education
Yale University (B.A., 1962); University of Michigan Law School (J.D., 1966)
Signed orders read
47

How Judge Walker decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

He infers statutory scope from both the enacted language and the omission of a limitation that appears nowhere in the provision.

“The absence of a timeliness distinction in § 726(a)(1) strongly suggests that this subsection encompasses all priority claims whenever filed.”

Even under heightened securities pleading rules, he rejects an interpretation that makes particularized pleading effectively impossible or imposes burdens beyond the governing statute and precedent.

“In light of Second Circuit precedent and the provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (‘PSLRA’), we hold that the district court erred in: (1) concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to plead sufficient facts to support a strong inference of fraudulent intent; and (2) imposing an exceedingly onerous burden on the plaintiffs with respect to their obligation to plead facts with particularity.”

At the pleading stage, he requires factual allegations that plausibly state a legal violation rather than a recitation of legal conclusions.

“We hold that Drimal’s complaint in its present form does not plausibly state a claim because it recites only legal conclusions.”

Procedural preferences

For release pending sentencing after a crime-of-violence conviction, he does not treat ordinary personal circumstances as the exceptional reasons the statute requires.

“But the circumstances in this case do not approach being ‘exceptional.’”

He respects broad fee-award discretion but withholds deference when the reduction rests on an erroneous legal premise.

“Although we respect the district court’s ample discretion to reduce a fee award, deference is not warranted when the reduction rests on an erroneous premise.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Correa v. Thornburgh
89-2032 · 1990-04-20
Appeal (appellant (petitioner Alba Nubia Correa)) Denied

“Judgment affirmed.”

Stenclik v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
89-4162 · 1990-06-26
Appeal (appellant (taxpayers Richard and Dolores Stenclik)) Denied

“As we find taxpayers' other arguments to be without merit, the decision and order of the Tax Court is affirmed in all respects.”

DiBlasio v. Keane
90-2455 · 1991-05-09
Appeal (appellant (the Kings County District Attorney / the State)) Denied

“Affirmed.”

United States v. Grandia
93-1394 · 1994-03-09
Appeal (appellant (defendant John Grandia)) Denied

“Because we find from the surrounding circumstances and events following the plea allocution that the defendant entered a voluntary guilty plea, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.”

United States v. Vecchio (In re Vecchio)
93-5028 · 1994-04-05
Appeal (appellant (the United States / Internal Revenue Service)) Granted

“We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.”

Wall Street Associates, L.P. v. Becker Paribas Inc.
93-7566 · 1994-06-28
Appeal (appellants (defendants Becker Paribas, Merrill Lynch, Wise, and Friedman)) Denied

“The judgment of the district court is affirmed.”

680 Fifth Avenue Associates v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance
94-5013 · 1994-07-12
Appeal (appellants (debtors 680 Fifth Avenue Associates and 54th and Fifth Land Partners)) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Maric v. St. Agnes Hospital Corp.
94-7569 · 1995-09-13
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Dr. Radoslav Maric)) Denied

“The district court correctly concluded that this antitrust claim cannot survive summary judgment.”

Weldon v. United States
95-6041 · 1995-11-03
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Irene Weldon)) Denied

“We affirm for substantially the reasons set forth in Judge Munson's thoughtful opinion, Weldon II, 845 F.Supp. 72, and write principally to address the question of jurisdiction.”

Diaz v. Senkowski
94-2652 · 1996-02-02
Appeal (appellant (petitioner David Diaz)) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”

Pocchia v. NYNEX Corp.
95-7726 · 1996-04-09
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Anthony J. Pocchia)) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”

Glinka v. Bank of Vermont (In re Kelton Motors, Inc.)
95-5074 · 1996-09-25
Appeal (appellant (trustee Gleb Glinka)) Granted in part

“We affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.”

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