Susan Harrell Black
How Judge Black rules, drawn from 38 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Black decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
A state could not forbid a truthful product name when a disclosure would address its concern through a more precise and less restrictive means.
“Nevertheless, the State was unable to show that forbidding the Creamery from using the term ‘skim milk’ was reasonable, and not more extensive than necessary to serve its interest.”
Failing to raise a controlling, plainly meritorious argument on direct appeal established ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
“Overstreet’s appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to argue that there was insufficient evidence to support Overstreet’s kidnapping convictions in light of Garza.”
Filing written consent was enough to make an opt-in claimant a party plaintiff in a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action.
“We conclude that filing a written consent pursuant to § 216(b) is sufficient to confer party-plaintiff status.”
Procedural preferences
A debt-collection notice sent through the consumer's lawyer still triggered the statutory protections governing communications with consumers.
“We hold that a debt-collection letter sent to the consumer’s attorney is a ‘communication with a consumer’ within the meaning of § 1692g.”
Denial of a motion to quash a subpoena in a foreign-discovery proceeding was immediately reviewable as a final order.
“We conclude that an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena is a final, appealable order in proceedings brought under § 1782.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The question in this appeal is whether The Florida Bar's thirty-day ban on direct mail lawyer advertising soliciting personal injury and wrongful death clients violates commercial speech protections afforded attorney advertising under the First Amendment. The district court ruled that it does. We affirm.”
“In accordance with the foregoing, we vacate the district court's order granting Appellee Bramlett's motion for a new trial and remand for reinstatement of the jury verdict.”
“AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND VACATED IN PART.”
“AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART and REMANDED FOR RE-SENTENCING.”
“We therefore assume the district court understood it had authority to depart downward and simply decided not to exercise its discretionary authority. Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to review the district court's decision. AFFIRMED.”
“We hold that upon discovering it committed clear error by sentencing Appellant for a crime to which he had not pled guilty, the district court had authority under Rule 35(c) to resentence Appellant as it did. AFFIRMED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit a church from being sued under Title VII by its clergy. The district court therefore properly granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment. AFFIRMED.”
“AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.”
“The bankruptcy court and the district court were both correct in concluding that Appellee was entitled to summary judgment. AFFIRMED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Circuit judges sit on appellate panels rather than carrying an assigned trial caseload. Judge Black's 1979-1992 Middle District of Florida service is outside this appellate profile.
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