Stanley Francis Birch Jr.

How Judge Birch rules, drawn from 26 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Birch no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Position
circuit
Status
Retired 2010
Served
1990–2010
Appointed by
George H. W. Bush (Republican)
Commissioned
1990-05-14
Education
University of Virginia (B.A., history, 1967); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1970); Emory University School of Law (LL.M., taxation, 1976)
Signed orders read
26

How Judge Birch decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In evaluating reasonable suspicion, he gives a face-to-face tip greater weight than an anonymous telephone tip because the officer can observe the informant’s demeanor and credibility.

“A face-to-face anonymous tip is presumed to be inherently more reliable than an anonymous telephone tip because the officers receiving the information have an opportunity to observe the demeanor and perceived credibility of the informant.”

For architectural works made from common components, he confines the copyright comparison to the original selection, coordination, and arrangement of those elements.

“Thus, when viewed through the narrow lens of compilation analysis only the original, and thus protected arrangement and coordination of spaces, elements and other staple building components should be compared.”

He treats a state-law duty as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Federal Tort Claims Act negligence claim, rather than allowing a federal duty alone to supply liability.

“The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction: Ochran did not allege facts which support a violation of a state law duty, a prerequisite to liability under the FTCA.”

Procedural preferences

To distinguish a reviewable agency rule from a policy statement, he asks whether the policy binds the agency or leaves room to consider individual facts.

“As long as the agency remains free to consider the individual facts in the various cases that arise, then the agency in question has not established a binding norm.”

He follows controlling circuit precedent even when the opinion explains that he would reach a different result on a clean slate.

“This court's recently announced decision in In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.2000), controls the disposition of the case now before us.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Midwest Holding #7, LLC v. Anderson (In re Tanner Family, LLC)
556 F.3d 1194 · 2009-02-03
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Midwest argues that the bankruptcy and district courts erred in concluding that a lease termination payment made by Tanner Family, LLC (‘Debtor’) to Midwest was ‘for or on account of an antecedent debt’ and thus avoidable as a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2). For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.”

National Mining Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor
589 F.3d 1368 · 2009-12-15
Petition for review (petitioner) Moot / procedural

“After careful review, we find the PIL to be a general statement of policy and DISMISS for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”

Zurich American Insurance Co. v. O'Hara
604 F.3d 1232 · 2010-04-26
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Zurich. We AFFIRM.”

Butler v. Sukhoi Co.
579 F.3d 1307 · 2009-08-19
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“Because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Butlers' claims, we REVERSE and REMAND to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case.”

United States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center of Florida, Inc.
486 F.3d 1248 · 2007-05-18
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“We hold that the services performed by medical residents are not categorically ineligible for the student exemption from FICA taxation. As a result, we VACATE the summary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Close v. United States
336 F.3d 1283 · 2003-07-08
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“We AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of the § 2255 motions as time-barred.”

United States v. Heard
367 F.3d 1275 · 2004-04-30
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Distinguishing J.L., the district court here denied defendant-appellant's motion to suppress evidence seized and statements made during a Terry stop-and-frisk. We AFFIRM.”

United States v. Don Newcombe Brown
332 F.3d 1341 · 2003-06-05
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“For that reason, we REVERSE the district court's denial of Don Newcombe Brown's motion for modification of his original sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).”

United States v. Massey
443 F.3d 814 · 2006-03-23
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Finding no reversible error with regard to the sentencing enhancement, we AFFIRM the sentence; however, we VACATE and REMAND for the limited purpose of correcting a clerical error in the judgment.”

Steed v. Head
219 F.3d 1298 · 2000-07-26
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Frederick T. Steed appeals the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition as untimely. ... We affirm for the reasons that follow.”

Madu v. U.S. Attorney General
470 F.3d 1362 · 2006-12-01
Appeal (petitioner) Granted

“Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order transferring this case to us, and remand it to the district court for habeas proceedings pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”

United States v. Dupree
258 F.3d 1258 · 2001-07-25
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Our holding in McAllister that the jurisdictional element of § 922(g) brings it within the commerce powers of the Congress is not overruled by Morrison. Accordingly, Dupree's conviction is AFFIRMED.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Circuit judges do not carry a trial caseload; not enumerated.

A historical record

Judge Birch no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.