Robert Lanier Anderson III
How Judge Anderson rules, drawn from 30 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Anderson
Robert Lanier Anderson, III is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appointed by President Jimmy Carter, Judge Anderson was commissioned to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on July 13, 1979 and reassigned to this court on October 1, 1981. Judge Anderson assumed senior status on January 31, 2009.
Judge Anderson's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Anderson's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Anderson decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Public Risk Management of Florida v. Munich Reinsurance America, Inc., the court rejected PRM’s reading of the reinsurance agreement because the April 1, 2008 loss date applied only after the loss fell within the 2008/2009 coverage document.
“PRM’s interpretation is inconsistent with the plain meaning of this provision of the Reinsurance Agreement: the April 1, 2008 date of loss applies only once it has been established that the loss fell within the 2008/2009 Coverage Document.”
In Whitten v. Clarke, the court found that the complaint did not show the board knew of the allegations in Chevron’s complaint before May 1, 2017.
“Nothing in Whitten’s complaint shows that the Board was aware of the allegations in Chevron’s complaint prior to May 1, 2017.”
In Nagle v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., the court read the fee statute’s reference to liability under “this section” to mean actual damages, the only liability that section provided.
“The plain language of the statute requires that the plaintiff be successful in enforcing liability under ‘this section,’ and the only liability provided for in ‘this section’ is actual damages.”
Procedural preferences
In United States Sugar Corp. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the court directed dismissal of the plaintiffs’ second claim for lack of finality and ripeness.
“We instruct the district court on remand to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second claim for lack of finality and ripeness.”
In United States Trustee v. Bast Amron, Anderson described two possible remedies for unequal treatment: extend the favorable rule to everyone or withdraw it from the favored class.
“A court can level up by extending the favorable treatment to everyone or level down by treating everyone like the disfavored class.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the following reasons, we reverse the district court's dismissal and remand this case for further proceedings on the merits.”
“Because Ledesma was not convicted of stealing the Mercedes, he cannot be ordered to pay restitution for injury which resulted from the car's theft. Thus, the restitution portion of the district court's sentence is VACATED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED.”
“The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, and Nelson's motion for stay of execution is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Reese's conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.”
“The district court granted summary judgment to Lull, reasoning that Sanders had misused the forklift, and that his misuse negated any liability on the part of Lull. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“With the understanding that '[t]he question of whether equitable tolling applies is a legal one subject to de novo review,' Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2005), we now affirm the district court's ruling.”
“Finally, Ace argues that the district court applied an incorrect rate of prejudgment interest. We find no error. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in greater detail below, we affirm.”
“The instant case presents a question of Georgia insurance law that we believe is appropriate for certification to the Supreme Court of Georgia.”
“The judgment of the courts below, granting summary judgment in favor of the Trustee, is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Terrace. REVERSED and REMANDED.”
“The sentence imposed by the district court is vacated, and the case remanded for sentencing consistent with this opinion. VACATED AND REMANDED.”
“we certify three questions to the Florida Supreme Court, seeking guidance as to the application of Florida’s offer of judgment statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.79, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Circuit judges do not carry a trial caseload; not enumerated.
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