Frank Mays Hull

How Judge Hull rules, drawn from 43 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Position
Circuit judge
Status
Senior status
Appointed by
Bill Clinton (Democratic)
Commissioned
September 18, 1997
ABA rating
Well Qualified
Education
Randolph-Macon Woman's College (now Randolph College) (A.B., 1970); Emory University School of Law (J.D., cum laude, Order of the Coif, 1973)
Signed orders read
43

About Judge Hull

Frank M. Hull is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge Hull received a commission on September 18, 1997. Judge Hull previously served on the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, commissioned there on May 9, 1994. Judge Hull assumed senior status on December 31, 2017.

Judge Hull's practices and standing orders

The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Hull's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Hull decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

When a government agency's evidence is entitled to a presumption of good faith, she requires concrete evidence of bad faith rather than conjecture about why the agency acted as it did.

“Mere speculation, however, is not enough to rebut the presumption.”

In Rockwater, Inc. v. United States, Hull held that the trailers could qualify under the cited tax-code provision only if they satisfied both statutory criteria.

“In other words, we must reverse if Rockwater’s trailers fail to satisfy either of Code § 7701(a)(48)(A)(i)’s criteria.”

In Storey Mountain v. Del Amo, she read Florida section 655.79(1) to require an express written disclaimer of tenancy by the entirety; a different ownership label did not satisfy that requirement.

“In sum, section 655.79(1) requires an explicit statement in writing that the married couple expressly disclaims that the joint property is held as a tenancy by the entirety. It is not enough to say the account is something else.”

Procedural preferences

In National Labor Relations Board v. ArrMaz Products, Inc., she declined to address objections ArrMaz had not raised before the agency because it showed no extraordinary circumstances excusing that omission.

“ArrMaz has not identified any ‘extraordinary circumstances’ that excuse its failure to raise these points below, so we decline to address them now.”

She resolves subject-matter jurisdiction before reaching the merits; when jurisdiction is absent, alternative merits rulings cannot supply a fallback disposition.

“At the outset, we are thus obligated to determine whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction before we can address the merits of this appeal.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Mabra v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local Union No. 1996
98-9021 · 1999-05-27
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Ronald Mabra)) Denied

“the 1991 mixed-motive amendments to Title VII do not apply to 1981 claims, and the district court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants is AFFIRMED.”

United States v. Duffy
98-9020 · 1999-06-30
Appeal (appellant (defendant Frank Duffy)) Denied

“We hold the Government's filing was timely and thus affirm.”

United States v. Nelson
99-13906 · 2000-08-10
Appeal (appellant (defendant Safiallah Muhammad Nelson)) Denied

“After review, we affirm.”

United States v. Dowd
05-15067 · 2006-06-13
Appeal (appellant (defendant Robert Earl Dowd)) Denied

“After review and oral argument, we affirm.”

Gray v. Bostic
06-10216 · 2006-08-07
Appeal (appellants (defendants Deputy Antonio Bostic and Sheriff Edmund Sexton)) Granted in part

“we affirm the district court's denial of summary judgment on Gray's illegal seizure claim against Deputy Bostic in his individual capacity, reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment on Gray's claims against Sheriff Sexton and on her separate excessive force claim against Deputy Bostic, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND.”

Locke v. SunTrust Bank
06-12967 · 2007-04-23
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Martha Locke)) Denied

“After review and oral argument, we affirm.”

Mauk v. Lanier
06-12137 · 2007-04-23
Appeal (appellant (petitioner Lynn George Mauk)) Denied

“we affirm the district court's dismissal of the 2254 petition for failure to exhaust.”

Eugene v. 3Don & Partner Estate Group, LLC
08-15201 · 2009-09-29
Appeal (appellants (defendants 3Don & Partner Estate Group, LLC, Michelle Kettly Dumas, and M.G.N. Investments Corp.)) Denied

“we affirm the judgment of the district court in the amount of $187,500.00, plus post-judgment interest, in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Roselaure Eugene jointly and severally against Defendants-Appellants 3Don & Partner Estate Group, LLC, Michelle Kettly Dumas, and M.G.N. Investments Corporation. AFFIRMED.”

Speaker v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention
09-16154 · 2010-10-22
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Andrew Harley Speaker)) Granted

“Plaintiff Speaker appeals the district court's grant of Defendant CDC's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). After review and oral argument, we reverse.”

Martinez v. Hutton (In re Harwell)
09-14997 · 2010-12-29
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Lynn H. Martinez, Bankruptcy Trustee)) Granted

“After review and oral argument, we reverse.”

Owen v. I.C. System, Inc.
09-15464 · 2011-01-07
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Kendra Owen)) Granted

“After review and oral argument, we reverse.”

T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, Georgia
12-12250 · 2013-10-01
Appeal (appellant (defendant City of Roswell, Georgia)) Granted

“we reverse and remand for further proceedings.”

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