Barbara Lagoa
How Judge Lagoa rules, drawn from 57 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Lagoa decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She applies statutory limits according to their ordinary meaning even when extending the statute further might seem more efficient or advance a broader policy goal.
“The plain and ordinary meaning of § 1915(g) is clear—it only applies to cases commenced in federal court by a prisoner who sought and was granted in forma pauperis status in that court.”
Arbitration depends on consent; a policy favoring arbitration does not authorize compelling a nonsignatory who never agreed to arbitrate the dispute.
“Without an agreement to arbitrate, ‘a court cannot compel the parties to settle their dispute in an arbitral forum.’”
A party is entitled to a jury determination when record evidence creates a genuine dispute on consent, particularly where the same evidence bears on intertwined liability claims.
“evidence of Doe’s consent to her encounter with Anggara creates a dispute of material fact under either legal framework.”
Procedural preferences
A discretionary sentencing decision still needs a reasoned explanation sufficient for meaningful appellate review.
“A bare bones order that solely denies or grants a sentence reduction without more is insufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review.”
When a dispositive and unsettled issue is exclusively a matter of state law, she favors certification to preserve statewide uniformity rather than making a federal prediction.
“Moreover, the answer to how Florida’s statutory safe harbor operates is exclusively one of Florida law.”
She enforces the final-judgment rule and treats an order compelling insurance appraisal while staying further proceedings as nonappealable at that stage.
“we conclude that the district court’s order compelling appraisal and staying the proceedings pending appraisal is an interlocutory order that is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm Andres's convictions and sentences. AFFIRMED.”
“Because the district court applied the incorrect legal standard in denying Nationwide's motion in limine, we vacate the final judgment and remand for the district court to apply Alabama's rules of issue preclusion to determine the issue of privity in the first instance. VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“Section 1231(a)(5) unambiguously bars the reopening of a reinstated removal order where the alien has illegally reentered the United States following his or her initial removal. ... Accordingly, we deny Alfaro-Garcia's petition for review. PETITION DENIED.”
“Because Armstrong's sentence reduction pursuant to Section 3582(c) was not a plenary resentencing proceeding, it does not constitute a new, intervening judgment, and Magwood does not reset the count for purposes of AEDPA's bar on second or successive Section 2255 motions. ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Armstrong's Section 2255 habeas petition. AFFIRMED.”
“For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the district court's denial of Maradiaga's motion for a new trial. AFFIRMED.”
“Because the district court lacked jurisdiction over the Pareskys' standalone overpayment interest claim, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the amended complaint. AFFIRMED.”
“Because the district court's alternative ruling denying Stevens's request to reduce or terminate his term of supervised release failed to provide a sufficient explanation to allow for meaningful appellate review, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. VACATED AND REMANDED.”
“Because a sentence reduction under the First Step Act does not constitute a new judgment for purposes of AEDPA's bar on second or successive habeas petitions, Telcy was required to obtain authorization from this Court before filing his second Section 2255 petition. ... We therefore affirm the district court's order dismissing Telcy's Section 2255 petition as second or successive. AFFIRMED.”
“We therefore respectfully certify this issue of Florida law discussed below to the highest court of that state. ... For the foregoing reasons, we defer our decision in this case until the Florida Supreme Court has had the opportunity to consider our certified questions and determine whether to exercise its discretion in answering them. QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's dismissal of both Maldonado's and Hill's claims and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED.”
“Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Newbauer's complaint, and we affirm the district court's dismissal of Newbauer's complaint for failure to state a claim. AFFIRMED.”
“For the reasons stated, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Lee's motion to dismiss the 2020 Indictment on double jeopardy grounds and therefore affirm the district court. AFFIRMED.”
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