Terrence L. O'Brien
How Judge O'Brien decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He construes contracts and leases by their ordinary text and the meaning the relevant community commonly ascribes to the words, treating the common law as reflecting settled community practice rather than a tool for imposing new duties -- so where a state has not adopted a pro-owner default rule, the bargain the parties actually struck controls.
“We rely on the text of the leases and the meaning commonly ascribed to the language used (the essence of the common law, which reflects the practices of the community, rather than dictates practices to the community).”
He reads plea-agreement appellate waivers narrowly and against the government, holding a defendant to only the discretely expressed rights she would reasonably have understood herself to be surrendering -- a generic waiver of 'the sentence' does not reach a later, separately appealable revocation sentence.
“Porter would have reasonably understood at the time of her guilty plea that she was waiving only discretely expressed rights, notably the right to directly appeal from the sentence imposed in accordance with that plea”
Procedural preferences
He respects the jurisdictional limits Congress placed on review of discretionary immigration relief, declining to review the agency's 'exceptional and extremely unusual hardship' judgment even while reaching the pure questions of law the statute preserves.
“We dismiss the petition in part for lack of jurisdiction and deny the petition in part.”
He confines arbitration to what the parties actually agreed to arbitrate, refusing to let a broad grievance procedure be stretched to cover a dispute the collective bargaining agreement's own text did not commit to arbitration.
“we agree with Avaya's position and reverse the district court's order compelling arbitration.”
Cautions
He enforces mandatory-minimum sentencing statutes by their plain terms even when the equities are sympathetic: where a statute commands a fixed consecutive term for the discharge of a firearm, that term applies regardless of whether the district court found the discharge accidental or even involuntary.
“We answer in the affirmative and reverse.”
In immigration review he applies the substantial-evidence standard strictly and does not reweigh the record: an applicant's testimony may be fully credible yet still legally insufficient, and the agency's factual findings stand unless the record would compel a contrary conclusion.
“even credible testimony may not be "persuasive or sufficient in light of the record as a whole."”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We answer in the affirmative and reverse.”
“Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand.”
“For the reasons stated below and exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.”
“Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.”
“The Administrative Review Board (ARB) ... concluded she was not and therefore determined she lacked standing to sue under the employee protection provisions of the environmental statutes. We agree.”
“We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM.”
“The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MWA. Jencks appealed. We affirm.”
“Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.”
“We REMAND to the district court with instructions to vacate Tiger's sentence and resentence.”
“The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM.”
“Davis' appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous.”
Put Judge O'Brien's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge O'Brien actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge O'Brien's own signed orders and cites them.