Paul J. Kelly Jr.

How Judge Kelly rules, drawn from 49 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Position
Circuit judge
Status
Senior status
Appointed by
George H. W. Bush (Republican)
Commissioned
April 13, 1992
Education
University of Notre Dame (B.B.A., 1963); Fordham University School of Law (J.D., 1967)
Signed orders read
49

About Judge Kelly

Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr. is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Appointed by President George H.W. Bush, Judge Kelly received a commission on April 13, 1992. Judge Kelly assumed senior status on December 31, 2017.

Judge Kelly's practices and standing orders

The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Kelly's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Kelly decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In United States v. Toledo, Kelly held that the defendant’s testimony had to receive full credence when deciding whether the evidence supported his requested jury instruction.

“when deciding whether the evidence supports a particular jury instruction, a court ‘must give full credence to [the] defendant's testimony.’”

In a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e), he found “any person” ambiguous as to singular or plural meaning and applied lenity to the unit of prosecution.

“we conclude that ‘any person’ as used in § 2113(e) could be interpreted either in the singular or plural, making it sufficiently ambiguous as to require lenity.”

In his Scannell concurrence, Kelly focused the mootness comparison on whether the replacement ordinance disadvantaged the businesses in the same fundamental way, even if to a lesser degree.

“That ‘[t]he new ordinance may disadvantage [Plaintiffs] to a lesser degree than the old one’ matters little because it still ‘disadvantages them in the same fundamental way.’”

Procedural preferences

In a Rule 50 appeal, he applied the requirement that a judgment-as-a-matter-of-law argument raised under Rule 50(a) be renewed under Rule 50(b) before appeal.

“the precise subject matter of a party's Rule 50(a) motion -- namely, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law -- cannot be appealed unless that motion is renewed pursuant to Rule 50(b).”

In a limitations-tolling case, he read the statutory language as covering state postconviction review and other collateral review, including federal habeas review.

“We agree that the language of the statute is best read as tolling the limitations period for ‘State post-conviction review’ and for ‘other collateral review,’ including federal habeas review.”

In the same concurrence, he would not decide whether the ordinance changed materially because the plaintiffs had not briefed the point and the parties had not addressed it.

“Therefore, I would not address this argument based upon waiver.”

Cautions

In Digital Ally’s appeal, he held that the appellant conceded independent grounds for summary judgment by failing to address them in its opening brief.

“Even if Digital Ally could persuade us that the district court's summary judgment decision was incorrect on the issue of ‘bad faith’ ... Digital Ally would still have to address in its opening brief the other grounds on which the district court decision rests. The failure to do so amounts to a concession as to the proof.”

In Estate of Hurtado v. Smith, Kelly held that the doctor’s considered medical judgment did not meet the subjective deliberate-indifference standard absent an extraordinary degree of neglect.

“The subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim ‘is not satisfied, absent an extraordinary degree of neglect, where a doctor merely exercises his considered medical judgment.’”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Counts v. Kissack Water and Oil Service, Inc.
No. 92-8036 · 1993-02-01
Appeal (appellants (Dennis and Delores Counts, plan participants)) Granted

“The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED with directions to enter judgment for the Plaintiffs-appellants.”

Baca v. Department of Health and Human Services
· 1993-09-28
Appeal (appellant (Raymond Baca, disability claimant)) Granted

“The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for remand to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

LWT, Inc. v. Childers Manufacturing Company, Inc.
· 1994-03-18
Appeal (appellant (Childers Manufacturing Co.)) Granted

“We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we reverse and remand.”

Thompson v. City of Lawrence, Kansas
No. 94-3203 · 1995-07-05
Appeal (appellants (Ward A. Thompson and Frances S. Wisdom)) Denied

“We affirm.”

Fowler v. Ward
· 2000-01-06
Appeal (petitioner (Mark Andrew Fowler, capital habeas petitioner)) Denied

“Having reviewed the entire record, we are not in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of the error, and as such, Mr. Fowler's claim for relief on this ground fails.”

Petrick v. Martin
No. 99-6399 · 2001-01-03
Appeal (appellant (Rick Dean Petrick, habeas petitioner)) Granted

“The judgment of the district court is therefore REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Allison v. Bank One-Denver
No. 01-1240 · 2002-05-15
Appeal (appellants and cross-appellants (retirement-plan trustee, IRA holders, and Bank One)) Granted in part

“We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.”

Blossom v. Yarbrough
· 2005-11-23
Appeal (appellant (Jeff Yarbrough, defendant official)) Granted

“Under these circumstances, Mr. Pickup posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer, and the use of deadly force, while tragic, was reasonable. REVERSED.”

Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School District
· 2008-01-04
Appeal (appellant (Kristine Rost, as next friend of her minor daughter)) Denied

“The district's response was not clearly unreasonable so as to be deliberately indifferent to the harassment. Accordingly, we conclude that summary judgment was appropriate on the Title IX claim.”

Thomas v. Durastanti
· 2010-06-04
Appeal (appellant (John Durastanti, ATF agent)) Granted

“We hold that a reasonable officer could have reacted in the manner Agent Durastanti did, and therefore he is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, we REVERSE.”

Gallego-Arroyave v. Holder
No. 12-9537 · 2012-12-12
Petition for review (petitioner (Jaime Gallego-Arroyave)) Denied

“For the reasons stated, Mr. Gallego's voluntary departure claim is dismissed and the petition for review is otherwise denied.”

United States v. Hodge
No. 13-6042 · 2013-08-01
Appeal (appellant (Larry Eugene Hodge)) Denied

“Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.”

Draft for Judge Kelly with the record in hand

Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Kelly, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Grounded in Judge Kelly's own signed orders
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace