Nancy L. Moritz
How Judge Moritz rules, drawn from 50 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Moritz
Nancy Louise Moritz is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Moritz received a commission on July 29, 2014.
Judge Moritz's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Moritz's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Moritz decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal, she treats the district court's factual findings (and reasonable inferences the district court likely assumed) as fixed; only a genuinely 'blatant' contradiction by video evidence, not a mere factual dispute about a pixelated frame, lets the appellate court override them.
“Holcomb cannot show that the district court’s recitation of the facts amounts to a ‘visible fiction.’”
In Jenny v. L3Harris Technologies, she rejected the district court’s hypothetical innocent explanation for the employer’s action as unsupported judicial guesswork.
“But this type of judicial guesswork is the very antithesis of the 'conclusive[]' evidence the first Reeves scenario contemplates.”
A prosecutor's Brady disclosure duty extends to a testifying expert witness's own knowledge of her lack of credentials, even without proof the prosecutor personally knew it, when that witness functioned as part of the prosecution team.
“Under Brady, the prosecution has a duty to disclose material impeachment evidence that is favorable to the defense.”
Procedural preferences
In VR Acquisitions v. Wasatch County, she affirmed dismissal of § 1983 claims for lack of prudential standing.
“Because the district court properly dismissed VRA's Section 1983 claims for lack of prudential standing, we affirm the dismissal of those claims with prejudice.”
In VR Acquisitions v. Wasatch County, she reversed dismissal of state-law claims with prejudice and directed dismissal without prejudice instead.
“We reverse its dismissal with prejudice of those claims and remand with directions for the district court to dismiss those claims without prejudice.”
Cautions
A party who repeatedly treats an undesignated order as a mere procedural vehicle to reach a different, designated order cannot later switch strategies and claim that same order was the real target of the appeal all along.
“That's not a mistake. That's a strategy.”
In Simpkins’s Indian-country criminal appeal, she rejected the government’s invited-error argument because his general acquittal motions preserved a sufficiency challenge, then reversed convictions for lack of evidence of his non-Indian status.
“The government concedes that it offered no evidence of Simpkins's non-Indian status at trial, yet it argues that he cannot obtain relief because he invited the error.”
In sovereign-immunity challenges to a state statute, the Ex parte Young exception requires a real, present-day enforcement connection to the named official: a speculative or not-yet-operational link (like a driver's-license program that could someday be used for compliance) is not enough.
“A website's forecast of the future contours of the mDL program does not establish a present-day legal duty to ensure that the program provides a state-sponsored means of complying with the Act.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We agree that Great American—SRM’s excess insurer—did not breach its duty to fairly and in good faith discharge its contractual obligations to SRM. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.”
“We conclude that because Holub's responsibilities as an internal auditor for the District included discovering and reporting accounting and budgeting issues, her comments to the Board members concerning her budget findings were made pursuant to her official duties and were not protected. We also affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on Holub's state law claims.”
“We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the SANE nurse was a member of the prosecution team. As such, we impute her knowledge of her own lack of credentials to the prosecutor, who was obligated to disclose this impeachment evidence to the defense. Accordingly, we hold the prosecution suppressed favorable, material evidence in violation of McCormick's rights under Brady. We reverse the district court and grant McCormick's Section 2254 petition.”
“We conclude the district court properly admitted the FAA reports under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the relators failed to establish the scienter element of their FCA claims. Accordingly, we affirm.”
“The defendants didn't expressly designate that order in their notice of appeal. And we can't fairly infer an intent to appeal that order from any of the other relevant documents before us. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”
“Finding no basis to overturn our prior precedent rejecting this same argument, we affirm.”
“Because Sause fails to demonstrate that the contours of the right at issue are clearly established, we agree with the district court that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.”
“because we conclude that Sause lacks standing to assert her claims for injunctive relief, we reverse in part and remand with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice.”
“Because the district court properly dismissed VRA's Section 1983 claims for lack of prudential standing, we affirm the dismissal of those claims with prejudice.”
“But because the district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over VRA's state-law claims, we reverse its dismissal with prejudice of those claims and remand with directions for the district court to dismiss those claims without prejudice.”
“The plain language of the FCBA forecloses Hasan's claims against Chase and AmEx. ... We affirm the orders dismissing Hasan's complaints.”
“We agree with the district court that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Gutteridge’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.”
“Accordingly, we reverse in part the district court’s order granting summary judgment to OKDHS and remand for further proceedings.”
“We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order and remand with directions to enter summary judgment in Durborow's favor.”
“We conclude that a reasonable jury could believe Fassbender's version of events. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the district court's order granting CCS summary judgment on Fassbender's pregnancy discrimination claim under Title VII.”
“But because we agree that no reasonable jury could believe Fassbender's alternative claim that CCS terminated her in retaliation for reporting sexual harassment, we also affirm in part.”
Draft for Judge Moritz with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Moritz, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Grounded in Judge Moritz's own signed orders
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace