Joel M. Carson III
How Judge Carson decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He reads statutes by their text rather than their perceived purpose or title, giving effect to the words Congress actually chose; where a later enactment merely clarifies preexisting authority, he declines to infer that it silently changed the law.
“we give power to the language, not the intent, of statutes.”
In the search-and-seizure context he applies established multi-factor frameworks methodically -- working through each factor of a Supreme Court test in turn -- to decide whether a particular space falls within the home's constitutional protection.
“After reviewing the Dunn factors, we conclude that the curtilage included the detached garage. Thus, the search warrant authorized the search of the detached garage.”
Procedural preferences
He keeps the pleading and summary-judgment stages within their proper bounds: on a motion to dismiss a court may not reach outside the well-pleaded complaint to resolve the case, and doing so is reversible error.
“the district court could not properly consider the AAR when ruling on a motion to dismiss ... Instead, if the district court wished to consider the AAR, our precedents required it to convert the motion to dismiss ... into a motion for summary judgment”
He applies settled Supreme Court frameworks even where a party urges a newer or more deferential test, declining invitations to displace controlling precedent with an alternative standard.
“For the last forty-seven years, the Supreme Court has recognized only one test for determining whether a sex-based classification violates the right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, a Colorado charter school urges us to replace that test with another. We decline the invitation.”
Cautions
He enforces the plain terms of a bargained-for appeal waiver strictly, and will not let a defendant repackage a waived procedural argument as a substantive one to evade the waiver's language.
“a defendant cannot transform procedural arguments into a substantive challenge to avoid an appeal waiver's plain language.”
He requires appellants to carry their own burden with precision: a claim of prejudice or error that rests on assumption rather than a specific record showing -- for example, that delay actually caused evidence to become unavailable -- will not succeed.
“the defendant must show the government's delay caused evidence to be unavailable and that the evidence was actually irretrievable for trial.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“we hold that Rule 17(c) did not require the District Court to sua sponte appoint a guardian ad litem and that the District Court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Lance. Accordingly, the judgment was not void ... the District Court's judgment is Affirmed.”
“We thus Vacate the district court's Sell order and Remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“because the government did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that S.B. was in the "custody, care, or supervisory control of" Defendant at the time of the attempted sexual abuse, the district court's application of the enhancement constitutes clear error. We, therefore, Vacate the sentence and Remand to the district court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.”
“the CCA's determination that Petitioner validly waived the conflict (and that the conflict was, in fact, extinguished) was not contrary to clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. ... Affirmed.”
“The specific attributes of the LLC interests in this case compel us to conclude that they are not. We thus affirm the district court's order declining to characterize the LLC interests as securities and granting summary judgment to the defendants on that basis. ... we Affirm.”
“because the identity of a particular substance listed in schedule I or II is a means rather than an element of the offense, C.R.S. 18-18-403.5(1), (2)(a) is indivisible, and we thus do not apply the modified categorical approach. Finally, because no categorical match exists between the Colorado statute and the federal CSA, Johnson's state drug conviction cannot subject him to removal from the United States. Vacated and Remanded.”
“We agree with the district court that federal law preempts some of Plaintiffs' claims and that Plaintiffs insufficiently pleaded the rest. Therefore, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, we affirm.”
“In reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, we conclude evidence exists in the record sufficient to support the jury's determination ... Affirmed.”
“The district court found the expert's testimony unreliable and excluded it. It then granted a related motion for summary judgment in Raymond's favor. Plaintiff appeals. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, we affirm.”
“Thus, a reasonable jury could have found Harvell guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Affirmed.”
“Because we too conclude that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff's dispute with a nonmember of the Tribe arising on non-Indian fee lands, we exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and affirm.”
“Because we hold that a district court must apply the point source state's statute of limitations to state law claims preserved under the CWA, we remand to the district court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and Remanded.”
Put Judge Carson's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Carson actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Carson's own signed orders and cites them.