Gregory A. Phillips
How Judge Phillips rules, drawn from 62 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Phillips
Gregory Alan Phillips is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Phillips received a commission on July 9, 2013.
Judge Phillips's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Phillips's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Phillips decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In United States v. McCranie, he held that the offense definition required an objective threat of physical force for the sentencing enhancement.
“This definition requires the objective threatened use of physical force.”
In a Fourth Amendment shooting case, he weighs whether the person was advancing or stationary, and whether an officer had been given specific, credible information (like a report that the person was mentally ill and non-threatening) that should have prompted more caution before deadly force.
“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Estate, a reasonable jury could find a Fourth Amendment excessive-force violation.”
In United States v. Arellanes-Portillo, he found error in applying a sentencing enhancement based on conduct beyond the offense being sentenced.
“That violated U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2S1.1 Application Note 2(C).”
Procedural preferences
In United States v. Kearn, he found the government’s habeas appeal interlocutory because no final resentencing order had yet issued.
“We hold that the government's appeal is presently interlocutory. An appealable final judgment will arise only after the district court issues a resentencing order.”
In Fuqua v. Santa Fe County Sheriff’s Office, he held that the district court could not consider videos on a motion to dismiss.
“First, the district court correctly determined that it could not consider the videos on a motion to dismiss.”
Cautions
An appellant who wants to challenge a district court's alternative or threshold ruling (like a forfeiture/waiver finding) must attack that specific ruling in the opening brief: arguing only the underlying merits, and never addressing the ruling that actually decided the case below, forfeits the issue on appeal regardless of the merits.
“Cyprus has waived appellate review because Cyprus failed to argue the district court's waiver finding in its opening brief.”
In Dahn v. Amedei, Phillips held Colorado caseworkers entitled to qualified immunity because the law had not clearly established a special custodial relationship between them and a foster child placed in Colorado by Oklahoma.
“But, for now, the law doesn’t clearly extend constitutional liability under the special-relationship doctrine to employees of a state that didn’t deprive Dahn of his liberty or supply his basic needs, even though they were social workers in the county where he resided.”
A district court cannot use a criminal sentencing enhancement premised on "another felony offense" while simultaneously finding, on the merits, that the elements of that felony were not met: the two rulings cannot coexist.
“But this ruling runs afoul of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), so we reverse and remand for resentencing without the enhancement.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we affirm.”
“We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Pereira’s Motion to Reconsider Sentencing.”
“Moreover, we think this appeal is equally frivolous and dismiss it accordingly under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012).”
“We affirm the district court's denial of a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2).”
“The federal district court concluded that qualified immunity shielded Detective Baca from liability and granted him summary judgment. We agree. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.”
“We conclude that Eldridge is a state prisoner for purposes of § 2253(c)(1) and that he must obtain a COA to proceed on appeal. We further conclude that Eldridge has not met the necessary showing to obtain a COA. Accordingly, we DENY a COA and DISMISS this appeal.”
“Because Kostich has failed to satisfy the standards for the issuance of a COA, we deny his request and dismiss this matter.”
“Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), we conclude that none of Hanson's arguments merit relief. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of the habeas petition.”
“For these simple reasons, we agree with the district court's conclusion that the four-level enhancement applied. ... Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.”
“We hold that Cyprus has waived appellate review because Cyprus failed to argue the district court's waiver finding in its opening brief. ... Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.”
“Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.”
“Ostrowski appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City of Montrose. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, we affirm.”
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