Gregory A. Phillips
How Judge Phillips decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He resolves a categorical sentencing-enhancement question by asking whether every definition of the underlying conduct already requires the threatened use of physical force, not by imagining an unusually timid victim who might feel threatened by innocuous conduct.
“This definition requires the objective threatened use of physical force.”
In a Fourth Amendment shooting case, he weighs whether the person was advancing or stationary, and whether an officer had been given specific, credible information (like a report that the person was mentally ill and non-threatening) that should have prompted more caution before deadly force.
“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Estate, a reasonable jury could find a Fourth Amendment excessive-force violation.”
He reads a sentencing enhancement's own text and application notes literally -- if the guideline says the enhancement must rest on the defendant's role in the specific offense being sentenced, basing it instead on a broader, related conspiracy is plain error even where the underlying conduct overlaps.
“That violated U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2S1.1 Application Note 2(C).”
Procedural preferences
He confirms appellate jurisdiction before reaching the merits, even sympathetic ones -- an order that grants habeas relief but has not yet produced a final resentencing judgment is not yet appealable, so the merits of the underlying ineffective-assistance claim go unaddressed until the district court finishes the job.
“We hold that the government's appeal is presently interlocutory. An appealable final judgment will arise only after the district court issues a resentencing order.”
On a motion to dismiss he holds the parties strictly to the four corners of the complaint -- video evidence a defendant says would tell a fuller story cannot be imported at the pleading stage, however persuasive it might be later on summary judgment.
“First, the district court correctly determined that it could not consider the videos on a motion to dismiss.”
Cautions
An appellant who wants to challenge a district court's alternative or threshold ruling (like a forfeiture/waiver finding) must attack that specific ruling in the opening brief -- arguing only the underlying merits, and never addressing the ruling that actually decided the case below, forfeits the issue on appeal regardless of the merits.
“Cyprus has waived appellate review because Cyprus failed to argue the district court's waiver finding in its opening brief.”
Qualified immunity turns on whether a prior case's facts are close enough to control the specific situation an officer faced -- a general excessive-force principle is not enough, and the absence of a squarely-on-point precedent can require granting immunity even where the panel is troubled by how events unfolded.
“Though, accepting the facts alleged in the light most favorable to Dahn, we condemn their efforts to protect the vulnerable child, we conclude under the controlling precedents that the Colorado caseworkers are entitled to qualified immunity, and reverse.”
A district court cannot use a criminal sentencing enhancement premised on "another felony offense" while simultaneously finding, on the merits, that the elements of that felony were not met -- the two rulings cannot coexist.
“But this ruling runs afoul of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), so we reverse and remand for resentencing without the enhancement.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we affirm.”
“Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant Pereira's requested relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), we affirm.”
“Moreover, we think this appeal is equally frivolous and dismiss it accordingly under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012).”
“We affirm the district court's denial of a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2).”
“The federal district court concluded that qualified immunity shielded Detective Baca from liability and granted him summary judgment. We agree. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.”
“We conclude that Eldridge is a state prisoner for purposes of § 2253(c)(1) and that he must obtain a COA to proceed on appeal. We further conclude that Eldridge has not met the necessary showing to obtain a COA. Accordingly, we DENY a COA and DISMISS this appeal.”
“Because Kostich has failed to satisfy the standards for the issuance of a COA, we deny his request and dismiss this matter.”
“Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), we conclude that none of Hanson's arguments merit relief. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of the habeas petition.”
“For these simple reasons, we agree with the district court's conclusion that the four-level enhancement applied. ... Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.”
“We hold that Cyprus has waived appellate review because Cyprus failed to argue the district court's waiver finding in its opening brief. ... Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.”
“Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.”
“Ostrowski appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City of Montrose. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, we affirm.”
Put Judge Phillips's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Phillips actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Phillips's own signed orders and cites them.