David M. Ebel

How Judge Ebel rules, drawn from 50 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Position
Circuit judge
Status
Senior status
Appointed by
Ronald Reagan (Republican)
Commissioned
April 20, 1988
Education
Northwestern University (B.A., 1962); University of Michigan Law School (J.D., 1965, first in class; editor-in-chief, Michigan Law Review)
Signed orders read
50

About Judge Ebel

David M. Ebel is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Appointed by President Ronald Reagan, Judge Ebel received a commission on April 20, 1988. Judge Ebel assumed senior status on January 16, 2006.

Judge Ebel's practices and standing orders

The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Ebel's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Ebel decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Porter Trust, the court applied the removal statute’s text and held that an administrative board was not a state court under § 1441(a).

“Under the plain language test, it does not fit the definition of a ‘state court’ for purposes of § 1441(a).”

In Schrader, the court held that the Rehabilitation Act’s reference to ADA standards did not import the ADA’s fifteen-employee threshold for covered employers.

“does not incorporate the ADA definition of an ‘employer,’ and thus even employers with fewer than fifteen employees are subject to the Rehabilitation Act’s requirements so long as they are recipients of federal assistance.”

Procedural preferences

In a sovereign-immunity case, he held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s decision because no waiver applied when the complaint was filed.

“Without an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity at the time the complaint was filed, the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to the Secretary's decision.”

In an immigration case, he found the INA ambiguous on asylum eligibility for an illegal reentrant with a reinstated removal order and upheld the Attorney General’s reasonable interpretation.

“The INA does not clearly answer the question whether an illegal reentrant with a reinstated removal order may apply for asylum. The Attorney General, however, has reasonably interpreted the ambiguous statutory scheme.”

Cautions

In an excessive-force appeal, he applied the rule that officer reasonableness is judged from the on-scene perspective rather than hindsight.

“We evaluate the officer's reasonableness from the on-scene perspective, not with the advantage of 20/20 hindsight.”

In an ACCA sentencing appeal, he held that a conviction under Oklahoma’s drive-by shooting statute categorically qualified as a violent felony under the elements clause.

“A conviction under Oklahoma's drive-by shooting statute ... categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause of the ACCA.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Harris v. Champion
Nos. 93-5123, 93-5209 · 1994-01-26
Appeal (petitioners (consolidated indigent Oklahoma prisoners)) Granted in part

“The orders and judgments of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma are AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Cox v. Phelps Dodge Corp.
· 1994-12-28
Appeal (appellant (Lupe Cox)) Moot / procedural

“Cox's request for relief is mooted by the legitimate termination of her employment; therefore, we cannot consider whether Chino Mines would otherwise be [liable] for the hostile work environment to which she was subjected. Hence, we DISMISS this appeal, VACATE the district court's judgment only on the question of Chino Mines' liability for the hostile work environment claim and REMAND for the district court to modify its opinion accordingly.”

Belhomme v. Widnall
No. 96-2305 · 1997-10-14
Appeal (appellant (Renaud Belhomme)) Denied

“Although we differ in some respects from the district court's rationale, we affirm the district court's judgment on all of the appellant's claims”

Schrader v. Fred A. Ray, M.D., P.C.
No. 00-5224 · 2002-07-16
Appeal (appellant (Alexis Kim Schrader)) Granted

“even employers with fewer than fifteen employees are subject to the Rehabilitation Act's requirements so long as they are recipients of federal assistance. ... Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.”

Cargle v. Mullin
Nos. 01-6027, 01-6041 · 2003-01-27
Appeal (appellant (Marcus Cargle, capital habeas petitioner)) Granted

“we agree with the district court that petitioner's death sentences cannot stand. However, we hold that constitutional error undermines petitioner's convictions as well, and thus his present convictions cannot stand either.”

Felix v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.
No. 03-6112 · 2004-10-26
Appeal (appellants (former Lucent employees)) Granted

“we conclude that Plaintiffs' state law fraud claims are not completely preempted by ERISA, the LMRA, or the NLRA. Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND with instructions to remand to state court.”

Jiron v. City of Lakewood
Nos. 02-1421, 02-1505 · 2004-12-20
Appeal (appellant (Jessica Jiron)) Denied

“Officer Halpin's use of force against Plaintiff was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Officer Halpin on the basis of qualified immunity ... The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.”

Shikles v. Sprint/United Management Co.
No. 03-3326 · 2005-10-20
Appeal (appellant (Davis Shikles)) Moot / procedural

“we vacate the district court's judgment in favor of Sprint and remand the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Because we resolve the case on jurisdictional grounds, we do not reach the parties' arguments addressing the merits.”

Stone v. Department of Aviation
No. 04-1019 · 2006-07-06
Appeal (appellant (Robert Stone)) Granted

“because Stone had not yet received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC at the time he filed his responsive pleading in the state-court action, his ADA claim was not a compulsory counterclaim under Colorado law. ... we REVERSE the district court's decision dismissing this federal action and REMAND this case for further proceedings.”

Governor of Kansas v. Kempthorne
· 2007-10-24
Appeal (appellants (Governor of Kansas and several Indian tribes)) Moot / procedural

“Without an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity at the time the complaint was filed, the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to the Secretary's decision. Thus, we are constrained to vacate the district court's judgment and order this case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”

Hydro Resources, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
· 2009-04-17
Petition for review (petitioner (Hydro Resources, Inc.)) Denied

“Under our precedents, we agree with EPA's conclusion and, accordingly, we deny HRI's petition.”

DeFranco v. Storage Technology Corp.
No. 08-1095 · 2010-10-20
Appeal (appellant (Thom DeFranco)) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.”

Draft for Judge Ebel with the record in hand

Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Ebel, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Grounded in Judge Ebel's own signed orders
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace