David M. Ebel
How Judge Ebel decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In statutory-interpretation cases he begins and ends with the statute's plain language and resists atextual 'functional' tests, applying the enacted words to the facts even when a party urges a broader purposive reading.
“Section 1441(a) permits removal only from a state court, which necessarily implies that the entity must be a court.”
He parses a statute's structure to separate the standard of liability from the question of who is covered, declining to import a threshold limitation from a cross-referenced statute unless its text actually says so.
“we hold that Sec. 504(d) of the Rehabilitation Act, which incorporates the standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act ... does not incorporate the ADA definition of an employer.”
Procedural preferences
He is attentive to the threshold limits of jurisdiction, resolving cases on standing, sovereign immunity, mootness, or exhaustion before reaching the merits and dismissing rather than deciding when a live controversy or an applicable waiver is missing.
“Without an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity at the time the complaint was filed, the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to the Secretary's decision.”
In administrative-review cases he defers to a reasonable agency reading of a genuinely ambiguous statute, upholding the agency's interpretation once he concludes the statute does not clearly resolve the question.
“The INA does not clearly answer the question whether an illegal reentrant with a reinstated removal order may apply for asylum. The Attorney General, however, has reasonably interpreted the ambiguous statutory scheme.”
Cautions
In excessive-force and qualified-immunity cases he judges the officer's conduct from the on-scene perspective rather than with hindsight, and he treats a prior state-court guilty plea as conclusively establishing the elements of the crime in a later civil suit.
“We evaluate the officer's reasonableness from the on-scene perspective, not with the advantage of 20/20 hindsight.”
In criminal appeals he applies the categorical approach and existing sentencing precedent strictly, declining to stretch his 'legal imagination' to hypothetical statutory applications that are not realistically probable.
“A conviction under Oklahoma's drive-by shooting statute ... categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause of the ACCA.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We conclude that there is a rebuttable presumption that the State's process is not effective and, therefore, need not be exhausted, if a direct criminal appeal has been pending for more than two years without final action by the State.”
“Cox's request for relief is mooted by the legitimate termination of her employment; therefore, we cannot consider whether Chino Mines would otherwise be [liable] for the hostile work environment to which she was subjected. Hence, we DISMISS this appeal, VACATE the district court's judgment only on the question of Chino Mines' liability for the hostile work environment claim and REMAND for the district court to modify its opinion accordingly.”
“Although we differ in some respects from the district court's rationale, we affirm the district court's judgment on all of the appellant's claims”
“even employers with fewer than fifteen employees are subject to the Rehabilitation Act's requirements so long as they are recipients of federal assistance. ... Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.”
“we agree with the district court that petitioner's death sentences cannot stand. However, we hold that constitutional error undermines petitioner's convictions as well, and thus his present convictions cannot stand either.”
“we conclude that Plaintiffs' state law fraud claims are not completely preempted by ERISA, the LMRA, or the NLRA. Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND with instructions to remand to state court.”
“Officer Halpin's use of force against Plaintiff was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Officer Halpin on the basis of qualified immunity ... The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.”
“we vacate the district court's judgment in favor of Sprint and remand the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Because we resolve the case on jurisdictional grounds, we do not reach the parties' arguments addressing the merits.”
“because Stone had not yet received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC at the time he filed his responsive pleading in the state-court action, his ADA claim was not a compulsory counterclaim under Colorado law. ... we REVERSE the district court's decision dismissing this federal action and REMAND this case for further proceedings.”
“Without an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity at the time the complaint was filed, the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to the Secretary's decision. Thus, we are constrained to vacate the district court's judgment and order this case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”
“Under our precedents, we agree with EPA's conclusion and, accordingly, we deny HRI's petition.”
“DeFranco brought this lawsuit, claiming breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all Defendants. We possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, and affirm.”
Put Judge Ebel's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Ebel actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Ebel's own signed orders and cites them.