Carolyn B. McHugh
How Judge McHugh rules, drawn from 62 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge McHugh decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In categorical-approach sentencing disputes she is persuaded by close statutory-elements analysis and by sister-circuit reasoning that tracks the same text, rather than a defendant's attempt to broaden the comparison statute.
“Our reasoning is largely consonant with that expressed by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Becerril-Lopez.”
In administrative-law review she credits an agency's own prior methodology as the baseline, and is persuaded that a later unexplained departure from it, without record scientific support, is arbitrary and capricious.
“The USFS does not identify any scientific support in the administrative record for the contention that the model's results can be changed using the local factors.”
In qualified-immunity excessive-force appeals she looks past labels to the sequence on video: whether the officers' own advance, not the suspect's conduct, created the confrontation that supposedly justified deadly force.
“a reasonable jury could find facts under which Officers Vick and Girdner would not be entitled to qualified immunity”
Procedural preferences
She expects unobjected-to presentence-report facts to be treated as established, placing an affirmative burden on the defendant to object and explain why they are unreliable.
“Rule 32(i) thus imposes 'an affirmative duty [on defendants] to make a showing that the information in the [PSR] was unreliable and articulate the reasons why the facts contained therein were untrue or inaccurate.'”
She resolves threshold jurisdictional or justiciability questions in whatever order is most efficient, willing to reach an otherwise-unnecessary jurisdictional issue rather than remand it undecided.
“In the interest of judicial economy, however, we then proceed to the question of subject matter jurisdiction.”
A sentencing court that varies sharply from the Guidelines must affirmatively address deterrence, retribution, and disparity, not just the defendant's personal history, or its explanation will not survive review.
“The district court's failure to discuss multiple Guidelines factors impedes our review and compels the conclusion the sentence is not substantively reasonable.”
Cautions
Bare disagreement with a law or regulation, or a speculative chain of future harm, is not a cognizable injury for standing before her.
“This is little more than a statement that Appellants disagree with the requirement, and disagreement is not an injury-in-fact.”
In qualified-immunity appeals she requires a closely analogous published case (or a clear weight of out-of-circuit authority) at the time of the conduct: agreeing a constitutional violation occurred is not enough without 'clearly established' law on point.
“we disagree that clearly established law existing at the time of the incident would have put a reasonable officer on notice that his conduct was unlawful”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.”
“For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Mr. Lemmons's request for injunctive relief, his motion for appointment of counsel, his motion to supplement/amend his complaint, and each of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.”
“We therefore reverse the district court's order vacating Mr. Williams's conviction for lack of jurisdiction. But we exercise our discretion to treat Mr. Williams's appellate brief as a request to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), and we grant that request in part.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we deny Mr. Parker a COA and dismiss the matter. We deny Mr. Parker's renewed motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. Gregory a COA, DENY him leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and DISMISS the matter.”
“Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we affirm.”
“The district court did not err in concluding that a conviction under section 211 is a crime of violence. We therefore affirm Mr. Castillo's sentence.”
“Applying the deferential standard required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), we affirm the district court's denial of Mr. Ryder's petition for habeas relief.”
“Having concluded complete diversity between the parties is lacking here, we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”
“We granted Mr. Smith's request for a certificate of appealability on these four issues, and we now affirm the district court's judgment. ... Thus, applying the deferential standard mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, we affirm the district court's denial of habeas relief.”
“Deputy Bethards filed a timely appeal. We affirm the district court's decision.”
“After our independent examination of the record, we conclude the appeal is, indeed, wholly frivolous. We therefore grant counsel's motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.”
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