Bobby R. Baldock

How Judge Baldock rules, drawn from 35 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Position
Circuit judge
Status
Senior status
Appointed by
Ronald Reagan (Republican)
Commissioned
December 17, 1985
ABA rating
Qualified
Education
New Mexico Military Institute (1956); University of Arizona College of Law (J.D., 1960)
Signed orders read
35

About Judge Baldock

Bobby Ray Baldock is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Appointed by President Ronald Reagan, Judge Baldock received a commission on December 17, 1985. Judge Baldock previously served on the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, commissioned there on June 7, 1983. Judge Baldock assumed senior status on January 26, 2001.

Judge Baldock's practices and standing orders

The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Baldock's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Baldock decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In United States v. Mayville, Baldock upheld a nineteen-minute traffic stop because the officer’s rental-car and criminal-history checks did not extend the detention beyond the time reasonably needed to complete the stop.

“Because the traffic stop here did not exceed the time reasonably required to execute the tasks relevant to accomplishing the mission of the stop, Defendant's nineteen-minute roadside detention accorded with the Fourth Amendment's dictates.”

In Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., Baldock reversed the district court’s ruling that backpay was available under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), concluding that the provision allowed equitable relief but not that legal remedy.

“Reviewing the district court's resolution of the question of law de novo, we answer no and reverse.”

In Ruiz, Baldock affirmed denial of a motion to suppress a photo-array identification after assessing the witness’s three daylight, close-range encounters with the defendant, prior descriptions, and certainty. The panel resolved reliability without deciding whether the array itself was unduly suggestive.

“In this case, we need not decide whether the photo array procedure was unduly suggestive because we agree with the district court that Weaver’s identification was sufficiently reliable under the Biggers factors to dispel any risk of misidentification.”

Procedural preferences

In United States v. Suggs, Baldock vacated the denial of a suppression motion because the residential search warrant lacked particularity and could not be saved by severing its invalid portions.

“Because the residential search warrant failed to meet the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement and cannot be saved by the severability doctrine, we vacate the order denying Defendant's suppression motion.”

In United States v. Ramstad, Baldock remanded the suppression issue for further factfinding because the district court had not developed a record sufficient to resolve the appeal.

“we believe the record below is insufficiently developed regarding the suppression issue. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for further fact-finding.”

Cautions

In United States v. Perea, Baldock dismissed an interlocutory appeal from a competency ruling because the nonfinal order did not qualify for review under the collateral-order doctrine.

“the collateral order doctrine does not apply to the district court's non-final order finding Defendant is competent to stand trial. We therefore grant the Government's motion and dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”

In Mickeviciute v. INS, Baldock remanded the denial of a motion to reopen because the immigration board's brief order cited a regulation without explaining which ground it relied on. The opinion held that the court could not meaningfully review the decision without that reasoning.

“We cannot perform a meaningful review where the Board does not sufficiently articulate its reasoning.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Dutton v. Brown
No. 84-2489 · 1987-02-19
Appeal (appellant (Lonnie Joe Dutton, habeas petitioner)) Granted

“We reverse the district court and direct the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Gee v. State of Kansas
No. 89-3320 · 1990-09-07
Appeal (appellant (Donald Gee, habeas petitioner)) Denied

“Finding petitioner’s contentions wanting, we affirm.”

Pratt v. Petroleum Production Management, Inc. Employee Savings Plan & Trust
No. 88-2190 · 1990-11-29
Appeal (appellants (Petroleum Production Management ERISA plan, administrator, and trustees)) Granted in part

“DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED.”

United States v. Welch
No. 90-6089 · 1991-03-19
Appeal (appellant (Fred Bennett Welch, criminal defendant)) Denied

“Accordingly, the resentencing did not violate the double jeopardy clause... we affirm.”

United States v. Mitcheltree
No. 90-6113 · 1991-07-24
Appeal (appellant (Jo Ann Mitcheltree, criminal defendant)) Granted

“we must reverse the convictions on counts one and four and also remand for a new trial.”

Baca-Prieto v. Guigni
No. 95-2148 · 1996-09-11
Appeal (appellant (INS district director)) Granted

“we reverse and remand with directions for the district court (1) to affirm the challenged order of deportation and (2) to conduct further proceedings, if necessary, in connection with a pending application for adjustment of status”

United States v. Ramstad
No. 99-3183 · 2000-08-02
Appeal (appellant (Howard Lee Ramstad, criminal defendant)) Moot / procedural

“Instead, the district court merely stated... Accordingly, we remand to the district court for further fact-finding.”

Mickeviciute v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
No. 02-9536 · 2003-04-28
Petition for review (petitioner (Daive Mickeviciute)) Granted

“For the reasons stated above, we remand to the BIA for further explanation of its decision denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen.”

Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
No. 02-5187 · 2004-05-21
Appeal (appellant (McDonnell Douglas Corporation)) Granted

“Reviewing the district court’s resolution of the question of law de novo, we answer no and reverse.”

United States v. Esser
No. 05-3277 · 2006-06-21
Appeal (appellant (Chad L. Esser, criminal defendant)) Denied

“We review these legal questions de novo and affirm.”

United States v. Valenzuela
No. 06-1222 · 2007-07-12
Appeal (appellant (Carlos Valenzuela, criminal defendant)) Denied

“AFFIRMED.”

United States v. Leyva-Matos
No. 09-2242 · 2010-09-21
Appeal (appellant (Wilmer Leyva-Matos, criminal defendant)) Moot / procedural

“Because we conclude Defendant’s appellate waiver is valid and enforceable, we dismiss this appeal without addressing the merits.”

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