Julie G. Rikelman
How Judge Rikelman rules, drawn from 46 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Rikelman
Julie Rikelman is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Appointed by President Joseph R. Biden, Judge Rikelman received a commission on June 23, 2023.
Judge Rikelman's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Rikelman's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Rikelman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Khalil v. Garland, she relied on the attackers’ statements to find that the victim’s refusal to convert was a reason for the beating.
“The attackers' own statements show that, regardless of whatever else prompted the beating, Khalil would not have been harmed had he agreed to convert.”
In United States v. Burgos-Montes, she found that the district court overlooked undisputed records showing delayed treatment for the defendant’s sleep apnea.
“We conclude that the district court overlooked the undisputed evidence demonstrating that, almost one year after Burgos's sleep apnea diagnosis and despite his ongoing severe hypertension, the BOP had yet to provide Burgos with the established treatment for sleep apnea.”
In Borges v. Bondi, she applied the court’s recent Rosa decision to resolve the family’s appeal in their favor.
“Our recent decision in Rosa v. Bondi ... resolves this appeal and requires us to rule in favor of the Borges family.”
In her Wadsworth concurrence, Rikelman explained that evidence comparing the plaintiff with others was not always required to support an equal-protection claim based on sexual harassment.
“comparator evidence is not always required to bring an equal protection claim, regardless of whether the claim involves sexual harassment or a different type of illegal discrimination.”
Procedural preferences
In Cotto v. Campbell, she found that a request to recover forfeited property targeted a past wrong outside the prospective-relief exception to sovereign immunity.
“Plaintiffs' attempt to recover their forfeited property focuses on a past alleged wrong, but the Ex parte Young exception applies only when individuals seek prospective relief against a state official's ongoing violation of federal law.”
In Triantos v. Guaetta & Benson, she reversed Rule 11 sanctions because the motion was served after dismissal and without the required 21-day notice.
“The district court plainly erred by granting G&B's sanctions motion when (1) G&B served its motion on Triantos long after the district court already had dismissed the offending complaint, and (2) in any event, G&B had not met its obligation under Rule 11's safe-harbor provisions to serve the motion on Triantos twenty-one days prior to filing it with the court.”
In Vicor v. FII USA, she read § 1659’s text to require the district court to grant Foxconn’s stay request.
“We conclude that Section 1659's scope is not as narrow as Vicor claims and that the statute's plain text required the district court to grant Foxconn's stay request.”
Cautions
In Rhode Island State Council of Churches v. Rollins, she found that the government’s stay papers gave the enforcement order at most three sentences of attention.
“In its stay papers, the government largely ignores the enforcement order. ... the government devotes, at most, three sentences to addressing that order.”
Defendants cannot invoke the Heck v. Humphrey bar to block a related civil rights suit when the plaintiff's criminal case ended in a pretrial-probation dismissal with no guilty plea or admission of wrongdoing: there is no valid criminal judgment for the civil verdict to impugn.
“the Heck bar is not triggered when there is no underlying criminal conviction or sentence”
Identifying one, non-protected motive for a petitioner's mistreatment does not by itself rule out a protected ground: the agency must actually grapple with whether both motives coexisted, not stop the analysis at the first motive it finds.
“the agency cannot conclude that there are no mixed motives simply by identifying one motive.”
In her Fellers concurrence, Rikelman agreed with the result but questioned whether the majority had explained the First Amendment framework supporting it.
“I agree that the district court erred in its viewpoint discrimination analysis. I write separately because the majority opinion implicitly resolves difficult questions under First Amendment law in reaching its holding, without explaining why its conclusions are consistent with existing precedent.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because the court imposed sanctions under Rule 11 without following the rule's procedural requirements, we reverse and vacate the order.”
“Because Crater's arguments cannot be squared with controlling precedent or the record in this case, we affirm.”
“After careful consideration, we affirm Morales's sentence.”
“because Morales has reached a settlement with the government over the seized $20,000, we conclude that his claims regarding the Rule 41(g) motion are moot.”
“Because St. John was not in the custody of any Massachusetts state official when she filed her petition, we affirm.”
“we must deny the petition because she has failed to develop any challenge to the legal and factual bases for the BIA's ruling.”
“Because we conclude the BIA does not have the settled practice that Phimmady describes, we deny his petition.”
“We agree with the district court that Puerto Rico's Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to the Board and that the Commonwealth did not waive that immunity through TEPPRA. Thus, we affirm.”
“We agree with the parties that, even under the plain error standard that applies here, Maldonado has established that he is entitled to resentencing because of the government's breach.”
“We agree with the district court's analysis and thus affirm.”
“Thus, we vacate the order granting the preliminary injunction and remand to the district court for further proceedings.”
“Thus, we affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment to Hearst, albeit on different grounds.”
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