Gustavo A. Gelpi
How Judge Gelpi rules, drawn from 52 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Gelpi
Gustavo Antonio Gelpí, Jr. is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Appointed by President Joseph R. Biden, Judge Gelpí received a commission on October 19, 2021. Judge Gelpí previously served on the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, commissioned there on August 1, 2006.
Judge Gelpi's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Gelpi's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Gelpi decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Vivaldi Servicios de Seguridad v. Maiso Group, he vacated dismissal after counsel’s first missed pretrial conference because the district court had not considered a lesser sanction.
“May a district court dismiss a case for counsel's unexcused failure to appear at the final pretrial conference when this is the first and only instance of non-compliance and the district court did not consider a lesser sanction? Under our precedent, the answer is ordinarily, ‘No.’ Yet that is what the district court did here. We find such a draconian sanction unwarranted and thus vacate the dismissal order.”
In 289 Kilvert v. SBC Tower Holdings, he read the Rhode Island jurisdiction statute as allocating cases among state courts without limiting federal jurisdiction.
“We must begin with the text of the statute. ... [T]he text of the Rhode Island statute, read as a whole, suggests that it covers only the delegation of jurisdiction among state -- not federal -- courts.”
In an immigration appeal, Gelpí enforced the line between appellate review and new factfinding by the agency board. The board could analyze the existing record but could not add an intent finding the immigration judge had never made.
“the BIA conducted additional factfinding beyond that of the IJ and acted beyond the scope of its authority, committing clear legal error and thus abusing its discretion.”
In a political-affiliation case, Gelpí looked past the legislature's trust-position label to the actual functions of the municipal job. The inquiry turned on whether the duties involved meaningful policy discretion rather than technical auditing and compliance work.
“Legislative classification of the position ‘may be entitled to some weight,’ but is not dispositive.”
In reviewing a law criminalizing false emergency statements, Gelpí required the government to explain why counterspeech and narrower tools would not address the asserted imminent harm. A content-based restriction cannot cover substantially more speech than the urgent problem used to justify it.
“Perhaps there are false statements that immediately cause harm such that counter speech would be ineffective, but this law is not limited to that category.”
In Irizarry Sierra’s employment appeal, Gelpí rejected equitable estoppel because the later agency decision came after the deadline to seek review of the board decision had expired.
“The February FAD cannot be the basis of an equitable estoppel claim because it was issued after the expiration of the thirty-day period where Irizarry could appeal the MSPB's decision.”
In his Diaz Ortiz dissent, Gelpí would have upheld the agency’s immigration decision as supported by substantial evidence, despite concerns he identified about the gang database.
“The administrative record convinces me that the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the Immigration Judge (IJ) is supported by substantial evidence.”
Procedural preferences
In Oliveras-Villafane v. Baxter Healthcare, he treated arguments raised only by reference or implication as waived on appeal.
“Judges are not mind readers. Thus, we deem as waived arguments on appeal that an appellant fails to spell out squarely and distinctly. We likewise reject arguments raised only by mere reference or implication, which would otherwise require us 'to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument[s], and put flesh on [their] bones.'”
In United States v. Ceballos, he required enough explanation of a sentencing role adjustment to permit meaningful appellate review.
“sentencing courts must give sufficient explanation to 'allow for meaningful appellate review.'”
Gelpí enforced an individual-arbitration term that the parties had knowingly accepted in a prior settlement, including through a choice tied to additional consideration. A later dispute within the clause's scope remained subject to the procedure selected in that agreement.
“because all parties to the appeal knowingly contracted into an agreement where individual arbitration was a mandatory condition, the order to compel would require the parties to proceed as such”
Cautions
In Thornton’s religious-accommodation suit, he held that her allegations connecting opposition to vaccination with her religious beliefs were sufficient at the pleading stage, and reversed dismissal of the discrimination claims.
“At this nascent stage of the litigation, Thornton need allege no more facts -- nor more specific ones -- to show that she holds sincere religious beliefs that conflicted with the vaccination requirement.”
In a data-breach contract case, Gelpí would not use the covenant of good faith to create incident-response rights absent from the agreement. A claimant should identify the specific contractual entitlement allegedly frustrated and evidence of bad faith toward the contracting party itself.
“the covenant could not be used to create rights that did not exist in the contractual relationship.”
In his Northeast Patients Group dissent, Gelpí reasoned that a federally prohibited marijuana market called for different Commerce Clause treatment from lawful interstate markets.
“I believe that illegal markets are constitutionally different in kind, and thus disagree that the Commerce Clause protects the free-flowing operation of national markets that Congress has already made illegal through its Commerce Clause power.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the district court's application of the ACCA and imposition of a mandatory fifteen-year sentence is AFFIRMED.”
“We find no error in the district court's finding that no extraordinary and compelling reasons exist so as to warrant a reduction of Sepulveda's life sentence.”
“The judgment of the district court dismissing Watson's petition for habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.”
“For all the above, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the district court's order of dismissal is affirmed.”
“The district court's prison sentence upon revocation is AFFIRMED, and the imposition of the one-year supervised-release term to follow is REVERSED.”
“Thus, the district court's dismissal of DiCroce's amended complaint is Affirmed.”
“For the reasons stated, Colcord's substantive reasonableness challenge fails, and his sentence is affirmed.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the sentence imposed by the district court is affirmed.”
“We find such a draconian sanction unwarranted and thus vacate the dismissal order.”
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