David J. Barron
How Judge Barron rules, drawn from 70 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Barron
David Jeremiah Barron is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Barron received a commission on May 23, 2014.
Judge Barron's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Barron's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Barron decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In State of New Jersey v. Trump, he read the Citizenship Clause according to the broad language its framers chose rather than narrowing it to the particular injustice they sought to remedy.
“The Government is right that the Framers of the Citizenship Clause sought to remove the stain of Dred Scott v. Sandford ... which shamefully denied United States citizenship to 'descendants of Africans who were imported into this country, and sold as slaves,' even when the descendants were born here. ... But the Framers chose to accomplish that just purpose in broad terms, as both the Supreme Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark ... and Congress in passing 1401(a) have recognized.”
In United States v. Chin, he applied circuit precedent to the same operative Jury Plan language the court had construed earlier.
“we are bound, under the law of the circuit doctrine, to construe the operative language of the Jury Plan that is at issue in this case in the same manner that we construed the exact same language in In re Globe.”
Procedural preferences
In McBreairty v. Miller, Barron vacated the denial of preliminary relief because the appellant had not shown standing to seek an injunction, leaving the First Amendment merits unresolved.
“Every federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even though the parties are prepared to concede it.”
In Perez’s petition for review of discretionary immigration relief, he held that objections to the agency’s weighing of police reports and their hearsay character did not raise a colorable legal claim under circuit precedent, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
“To the extent that Perez means to argue that it was legal error for the BIA to adopt the IJ's findings because the police reports on which they were based constituted hearsay, that argument also fails to raise a colorable claim under our established precedent.”
In his Calvary Chapel concurrence, Barron would have ended the jurisdictional analysis once the court determined that denial of a temporary restraining order had not effectively denied a preliminary injunction.
“I agree that the denial of the temporary restraining order in this case did not have the practical effect of denying a preliminary injunction.”
Cautions
In United States v. Rivera, he upheld an inventory search despite the driver posing no danger because items in the vehicle and false theft claims remained concerns.
“Even if Rivera himself posed no danger to the trooper, the items in the vehicle might have. ... there was a risk that the vehicle would not be recovered promptly. Accordingly, there still remained the concern about 'false claims of theft.'”
In McDonough v. City of Portland, he found that the corrected statement showed only a possibility, rather than a likelihood, that the plaintiff would apply for the disputed permit.
“The corrected statement in the errata sheet at most indicates that there is a possibility -- not a likelihood -- that McDonough will be able and ready to apply for the permit that he contends he is being unlawfully denied the opportunity to seek.”
In his Concepcion dissent, Barron argued that the sentencing court had failed to exercise discretion it possessed when considering an intervening guideline change.
“a classic abuse of discretion for a district court to decline to exercise the discretion that it legally possesses because it mistakenly believes that it lacks that discretion as a matter of law.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“we again conclude that this restriction does not violate the First Amendment, either on its face or as it was applied. We thus affirm the District Court”
“We need not reach the substance of Rojas's appeal, however, because of the ‘waiver of appeal’ provision in Rojas's plea agreement. ... Rojas's appeal is therefore dismissed.”
“We affirm the District Court's conclusion that Bradstreet is entitled to summary judgment with respect to three of the four regulatory actions about which McCue complains in his First Amendment suit. But we also hold that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Bradstreet's retaliation for McCue's USDA appeal was a substantial or motivating factor in the DOA's alleged decision in May 2006 ... we reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment in part and remand for further proceedings.”
“Reyes Sanchez requires that we affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to American.”
“As Cruz has failed to offer any evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.”
“the judgments of the District Court in both actions are affirmed.”
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