Lee Philip Rudofsky
How Judge Rudofsky rules, drawn from 21 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Rudofsky
Lee Philip Rudofsky is a judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Rudofsky received a commission on November 8, 2019.
Judge Rudofsky's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Rudofsky's own (checked October 9, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Rudofsky decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Asberry v. Little Rock School District, Rudofsky declined supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim, dismissed it without prejudice, and kept the federal claims.
“For the foregoing reasons, the TFDA claim is dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff requests a Rule 54(b) partial judgment on the TFDA claim (so that she can immediately proceed on that claim in state court), the Court will be inclined to grant it.”
In Bridgeforth v. New Age Distributing, Rudofsky held that detailed route-by-route testimony and consistent estimates of unpaid overtime could create a jury issue despite the employer’s dispute over the hours.
“Mr. Heard’s and Mr. Piggee’s detailed testimonies and consistent hours-worked estimates could lead a rational juror to conclude that they each worked at least one hour of unpaid overtime”
In the reviewed insurance dispute, he began with the policy text and denied summary judgment where the insured identified no provision creating a duty to defend and a contract-liability exclusion independently foreclosed coverage.
“Under the unambiguous language of the contract, Church Mutual does not have the duty to defend Rose Hill in the state court suit brought by Service Restoration.”
In the reviewed energy-royalty case, he treated authorized exercise of statutory and contractual rights as inconsistent with unjust enrichment or deceptive-practices liability.
“Exercising one’s legitimate contractual and statutory rights—without more—cannot constitute a deceptive or fraudulent business practice.”
Procedural preferences
In Kimmons v. AutoZone, Rudofsky denied dismissal motions embedded in answers because neither motion had the supporting brief required by Local Rule 7.2.
“Both Motions fail to comply with Local Rule 7.2. They are not accompanied by a brief.”
In Cheatham v. Adams, Rudofsky held that receiving required debt-collection information in the wrong format or at the wrong time did not establish standing without an alleged downstream harm.
“Without ‘downstream consequences,’ this is not a concrete injury. Without a concrete injury, Mr. Cheatham does not have standing.”
In the reviewed show-cause decision, intentional misrepresentations and willful disobedience produced monetary, continuing-education, client-notice, fee-shifting, and disciplinary-referral consequences; the order calibrated the penalties to deterrence and the lawyer's resources.
“the consequences must be significant enough to deter her from this type of conduct in the future.”
Cautions
In Livingston v. Progressive Eldercare Services-Cleveland, Rudofsky denied requests for extra time to oppose confirmation of an arbitration award after the parties left a lengthy delay unexplained.
“The Court denies the various outstanding requests for leave to file out of time a response to the Motion to confirm the arbitration award and to dismiss the case with prejudice.”
In Elite Autos v. Sparks Motors, Rudofsky held that a one-time sale initiated by an Arkansas buyer, followed by retrieval of the product for repair, did not establish purposeful direction toward Arkansas.
“The mere fact that Sparks Motors retrieved the vehicle from the buyer in a one-time sale gone bad does not change the foregoing analysis.”
At summary judgment in the reviewed prisoner-medical case, he rejected speculation about an institutional policy and excluded out-of-court medical statements that did not qualify as admissions by the defendants or their agents.
“To the extent any submissions by Mr. Flemons could be construed as contending otherwise, such contentions are supported by nothing more than impermissible speculation.”
In the reviewed employment case, the court denied preliminary relief for lack of likely irreparable harm while reserving judgment on the ultimate merits of the protected-speech retaliation claim.
“Ms. Gray has failed to show that she is likely to experience irreparable harm in the absence of the preliminary injunctive relief she requested.”
In Williams v. Pine Bluff School District, he denied a school employee’s request for a preliminary injunction requiring a name-clearing hearing. Because the employee was suspended with pay and faced no imminent unpaid suspension, demotion, or termination, the court found no likely Fourteenth Amendment liberty-interest claim.
“Because Plaintiff is currently suspended with pay—and is not facing imminent termination, non-renewal of a contract, suspension without pay, or demotion—the liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment is not triggered even assuming Defendants (or their agents) publicized stigmatizing statements about Plaintiff.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Federal-Mogul's two pending Motions are denied in their entireties.”
“Both Motions fail to comply with Local Rule 7.2. They are not accompanied by a brief. This is not just a technical foot fault. ... This is reason enough to deny the Motions.”
“For good cause shown, the Court hereby confirms the Arbitrator's decision in favor of Defendant and dismisses the present action with prejudice.”
“The Court denies the various outstanding requests for leave to file out of time a response to the Motion to confirm the arbitration award and to dismiss the case with prejudice.”
“The Court therefore DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's claims against Ribelin Sales Inc., now known as Azelies Americas CASE, LLC.”
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 43) is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered accordingly.”
“Accordingly, on all other claims brought by Plaintiff, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant. Judgment on those claims will be entered at the end of the case.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the TFDA claim is dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff requests a Rule 54(b) partial judgment on the TFDA claim (so that she can immediately proceed on that claim in state court), the Court will be inclined to grant it.”
“Sparks Motors’s Amended Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Clerk of the Court is directed to TRANSFER the entire case file to the District of Utah.”
“Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. New Age is granted summary judgment on the claims brought by Mr. Williams and Mr. Jamerson, but not on the claims brought by Mr. Heard and Mr. Piggee.”
“Ms. Adams’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice is GRANTED in part. Mr. Cheatham’s FDCPA and AFDCPA claims are dismissed, but without prejudice, for lack of standing.”
After a show-cause hearing, the court imposed monetary, continuing-education, client-notice, and disciplinary-referral sanctions on former counsel for intentionally misleading the court and willfully disobeying an order. The decision is retained as signed procedural context but contains no party motion classified in the statistics.
“Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 33) is DENIED. Plaintiff may proceed with his free exercise of religion claims.”
“Medical Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 125) is GRANTED IN PART while the ADC Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 128) is GRANTED IN FULL.”
“Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Expert and Examining Doctor (Doc. 149) is DENIED because the Court agrees with the RD’s conclusion that no additional expert testimony is necessary to decide this case.”
“Plaintiff’s Motion to Consider Belated Objections or in the Alternative Reconsider Decision of Untimely Filing (Doc. 153) is moot because the Court is considering as timely objections all papers filed by the Plaintiff between the issuance of the RD and the date of today’s Order.”
“For the foregoing reasons, all three of Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Among the reviewed terminated cases, prisoner civil-rights matters lasted roughly seven to fourteen months, while contested employment and tort matters lasted about 1.3 years to more than two years. This limited group does not represent the full docket.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 11 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 1 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 5 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 11 | 5 |
| Sep 2025 | 2 | 2 |
| Mar 2025 | 2 | 4 |
| Sep 2024 | 6 | 7 |
| Mar 2024 | 10 | 5 |
| Sep 2023 | 1 | 3 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 5 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 1 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2021 | 2 | 3 |
| Sep 2020 | 1 | 1 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, not for Judge Rudofsky: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 726 | 10.4 months |
| Closed with no court action | 373 | 12.7 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 338 | 7.9 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 2 | not reported |
| Closed during trial | 13 | 30.9 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 726 | 10.4 months |
| Sep 2024 | 787 | 10.1 months |
| Sep 2023 | 995 | 12.4 months |
| Sep 2022 | 894 | 12.7 months |
| Sep 2021 | 845 | 11.2 months |
| Sep 2020 | 848 | 10.9 months |
| Sep 2019 | 878 | 10.5 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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