Robert Bruce Propst
Judge Propst no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Propst decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He treated the state supreme court’s characterization of a retaliatory-discharge claim as especially informative when applying the federal removal statute.
“Who better to determine whether a claim so arises than the Supreme Court of the ‘State?’”
He found no statutory or legislative basis for implying an employer contribution right under the ADA.
“There is no indication, either from the face of the ADA or from the legislative history of the Act, that Congress intended to create a right of contribution on behalf of an employer against a labor union.”
He required more than a prima facie discrimination case to survive summary judgment.
“Contrary to plaintiffs suggestion, she cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by simply offering proof of a prima facie case.”
He treated a genuine dispute over both constitutional deprivation and qualified immunity as a jury question.
“The court concludes that this is one of those cases where there are factual disputes as to both the constitutional deprivation issue and the qualified immunity issue.”
Procedural preferences
He expected settlements and consent judgments to resolve costs expressly rather than leave them for later controversy.
“When a case is settled, there should be a complete settlement.”
Even where he would have ruled differently on a clean slate, he followed controlling circuit precedent.
“If this court were writing on a clean slate, it would grant Jefferson County’s motion.”
He insisted that the bankruptcy court address an unresolved threshold state-law issue first.
“The issue needs to be first addressed by the bankruptcy court.”
He independently policed federal subject-matter jurisdiction at the outset.
“Federal courts are powerless to act outside their jurisdiction”
Cautions
He would not displace plain statutory text for an asserted policy rationale.
“This court cannot, for some ‘policy’ reason(s), override the plain statutory language at issue here.”
He treated reasonableness as fact-bound unless the answer was obvious.
“What is and what is not ‘reasonable’ is uniquely a question of fact unless it is totally obvious.”
He framed enforcement reasonableness as the threshold forum-selection question, separate from the contract’s ultimate validity.
“The initial issue is whether the enforcement of the selection clause is unreasonable under the circumstances.”
He viewed arbitration costs that made small consumer claims economically infeasible as conflicting with the remedial statute’s purpose.
“If it becomes economically unfeasible for plaintiffs to bring suit under the TILA, the purpose of the TILA will be eviscerated because potential defendants will have no incentive to abide by its provisions.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons discussed above, the Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings filed by the union will be granted.”
“Jefferson County’s motion will be denied without prejudice to subsequent motions addressing the merits”
“Accordingly, the decision of the Bankruptcy Court is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceeding.”
“its judgment will be affirmed.”
“The motion will be granted as to the Title VII claims.”
“A judgment for the defendant will be entered contemporaneously herewith.”
“The court independently finds and concludes that plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was, at pertinent times, a ‘major’ source.”
“The court will reverse the ruling denying leave to further amend and remand the case for consideration of whether the ALSLA applies and, if not, what the effect will be on limitation issues.”
“This court concludes that the enforcement of the selection clause would be clearly unreasonable.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 1008 days (N = 19).
The twenty located assigned cases were all terminated and included Social Security, employment, prisoner, contract, property, and personal-injury matters. One case predated Judge Propst’s commission and was excluded from duration calculations.
A historical record
Judge Propst no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.