James Hughes Hancock
Judge Hancock no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Hancock decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Hancock enforced clear statutory text without using legislative history to rewrite an unambiguous provision.
“Resort to legislative history is not appropriate where, as here, the statute is not unclear.”
He treated the written agreement’s four corners as the primary measure of contractual intent.
“Where there is a written contract, the court looks no further than the four corners of the document to determine the intent of the parties.”
At summary judgment, he required specific record evidence once the moving party identified the evidentiary gap.
“the non-movant can no longer rest on mere allegations, but must set forth evidence of specific facts.”
He used remittitur where the trial evidence could not sustain the jury’s mental-anguish award.
“The court is absolutely certain that an award of $50,000 for any such mental anguish was grossly excessive.”
Procedural preferences
He treated formal service as the event that starts the removal clock, even when service has a defect that still gives reasonable notice.
“the 30-day period begins with such service whether or not the service is defective”
He regarded failed good-faith conciliation as a threshold jurisdictional fact that the commission had to plead.
“the fact of whether or not the Commission did engage in a good faith effort at conciliation which proved unsuccessful is a matter for this Court to examine.”
Specifically described fictitious defendants prevented diversity removal when their citizenship had not been established.
“The fictitious defendants joined here are equally as well described.”
He required claims against state actors for violations of Section 1981 rights to proceed through Section 1983.
“§ 1983 is the exclusive means by which a plaintiff can pursue a federal damages remedy for violation of rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pursued against a state actor.”
Cautions
He rejected an effort to derive freestanding constitutional rights from the Ninth Amendment.
“unenumerated rights do not rise to constitutional magnitude by reason of the Ninth Amendment.”
He declined to apply newly enacted civil-rights remedies retroactively to pre-enactment conduct in a pending case.
“the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply to cases pending as of November 21, 1991”
He treated communications made while operating a federal facility and meeting regulatory duties as protected discretionary conduct.
“TVA should be immune from liability for torts involving information provided pursuant to their governmental function”
He distinguished a limitations defense imposed by law from policy defenses that an insurer could waive.
“the statute of limitations raised by the defendant is a procedural bar imposed by reason of law and not a defense conferred upon the insurer because of a contractual undertaking.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“must affirm the decision of the Bankruptcy Court.”
“The resolution of the pending appeal in this manner renders the July 19, 1994 motion to stay appeal filed by the appellee MOOT.”
“Since the instant proceeding arises under neither subchapter, the government is not entitled to the surcharge”
“The plaintiffs motion to reconsider is GRANTED to the extent set forth below.”
“is due to be affirmed.”
“the motion of defendant is GRANTED so as to provide therefor.”
“neither Plaintiff Stephen Smith nor Defendant Construction Datafax, Inc. is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the claim of interference under the FMLA.”
“Defendant Construction Datafax, Inc. is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs claims of retaliation under the FMLA.”
“plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted and judgment entered in plaintiffs’ favor.”
“The Secretary’s final decision is therefore due to be affirmed”
“Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted”
“Plaintiff’s motion to amend, therefore, will by separate order be denied.”
“Aetna’s motion for partial summary judgment on the amount of damages is due to be granted”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 1051.5 days (N = 20).
The twenty located assigned cases were all terminated and covered a broad range of civil matters. This limited case-level sample supports a subject-mix and duration description, not a motion-outcome rate.
A historical record
Judge Hancock no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.