Thomas B. Bennett
How Judge Bennett rules, drawn from 20 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Bennett no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Bennett decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Procedural preferences
An untimely removal required remand once the applicable procedural defect was established.
“The outgrowth is that Greyrock’s second removal attempt was untimely. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)’s provisions delineate that the Removed Action is to be remanded to the Circuit Court of Greene County, Alabama.”
Cautions
Stay relief was treated as a context-specific inquiry rather than a mechanical tally of factors.
“As this Court has often noted during hearings, multi-factor tests — particularly those used to determine ‘cause’ for stay relief — essentially come down to a totality of the circumstances analysis.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Accordingly, Lynda Cunningham’s debt to James Cunningham, Jr. in the amount of $140,513.44 is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4).”
“Summary judgment is granted as a matter of law in favor of the Trustee, Max C. Pope, and against the Gordons.”
“Henry Tyler did not obtain the actual or constructive possession required to perfect a lien and Toffel’s objection to the asserted secured claim of Henry Tyler is sustained. Based on disallowance of the claim under 11 U.S.C. § 723(c), Henry Tyler Construction Company, Inc.’s claim is disallowed in full”
“This Court’s decision of granting nothing to Carter for the bare claim of an Alabama homestead when none has existed is consistent with this principle.”
“The Bank redounded to the jury demand by a motion to strike. This the Court denied by order dated March 22,1994.”
“Disagreeing with the denial, the Bank filed a motion to reconsider which was denied by this Court in May, 1994.”
“Ever hopeful of victory, the Bank by a second motion to reconsider sought that a jury trial be denied Robinson. Its hope was again not realized by yet another denial of its request.”
“On October 28, 1994, the Court denied Robinson’s request for summary judgment and granted the Bank partial summary judgment establishing the amount owed for dischargeability purposes at $202,675.36, excluding attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest from that date forward.”
“As the day of trial approached, Robinson filed in September, 1995, a second motion for summary judgment with the third Bankruptcy Judge assigned this case. This motion, too, was denied.”
“Robinson requested a directed verdict at the conclusion of the Bank’s case in chief and the end of the trial. Both were denied.”
“The Bank prevails under both theories. The debt, $202,675.36, is nondischargeable.”
“Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, Assured’s Motion is denied.”
“The outgrowth is that Greyrock’s second removal attempt was untimely. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)’s provisions delineate that the Removed Action is to be remanded to the Circuit Court of Greene County, Alabama.”
The opinion resolved several lien issues but certified the remaining state-law question before final summary judgment.
“Therefore, a separate order incorporating the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in this memorandum opinion will be entered overruling all of the objections to Jefferson County’s eligibility as a municipal debtor.”
“The result is the Trustee’s motion for partial summary judgment on his demand for marshaling is denied.”
The original municipal-bankruptcy stay opinion was superseded by an amended published opinion.
“For the reasons, findings, and conclusions set forth in this opinion, the Andrews/Bush/Winston Defendants’ motion in limine to exclude from admissible evidence Mr. Hart’s testimony and report is granted.”
A historical record
Judge Bennett no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.