Walter Hartman Hodge
How Judge Hodge rules, drawn from 25 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Hodge no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Hodge
Walter Hartman Hodge was a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. Appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Judge Hodge received a commission on February 19, 1960. Judge Hodge assumed senior status on August 30, 1966 and served until death on July 12, 1975.
How Judge Hodge decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In United States v. 40 Acres of Land, Hodge held that 40 U.S.C. § 257 alone did not authorize the federal condemnation action without other specific legislation.
“Sec. 257 is therefore not sufficient authority to sustain this action, in the absence of other specific legislation.”
He reads the Miller Act as a remedial statute entitled to liberal construction to protect suppliers of labor and material on public projects, requiring only a good-faith reasonable belief that materials were intended for the work.
“the Miller Act is remedial in nature and is entitled to a liberal construction in order to effect the legislative intent to protect those whose labor and material go into public projects.”
In Tapscott v. Page, Hodge granted the school district’s motion to dismiss a school-bus negligence claim, holding that transporting pupils was a governmental function and that carrying liability insurance did not waive the district’s immunity.
“However, even if so pleaded, it has likewise been settled that the carrying of liability insurance does not impose any liability or constitute any waiver of immunity in such instance.”
In Bujaki v. Egan, Hodge granted the dismissal motion against a district attorney in a false-imprisonment and civil-rights suit, holding that the complaint did not allege conduct outside the prosecutor’s official duties.
“In like manner it has been repeatedly held that a prosecuting attorney is a ‘quasi-judicial’ officer and is immune from suit under the Civil Rights Act for conduct in the performance of his official duties.”
Procedural preferences
In United States v. Alaska, Hodge denied summary judgment in a tidelands dispute because the record left genuine factual questions about Tlingit use and occupancy for trial.
“A motion for summary judgment cannot be granted where there is a genuine issue as to material facts.”
In United States ex rel. Atkins v. Reiten, Hodge held that the Miller Act’s 90-day period was a condition precedent to filing that suit.
“the ninety day period provided by the present Section 270b (a) likewise creates a condition precedent to commencing suit.”
In Collins v. Pacific Underwriters, Hodge held that appointing a receiver afterward did not divest an attachment lien already acquired against the fund.
“The mere appointment of the receiver, therefore, did not divest the lien acquired by the attachment.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The venue of the action is therefore properly laid in this district under the Jones Act.”
“Defendants Kelley and United Pacific Insurance Company are entitled to summary judgment against plaintiff that plaintiff take nothing upon the following claims”
“must be granted and the case dismissed against the surety”
“the motion to dismiss the complaint against said defendant is granted”
“The motion to dismiss is therefore granted.”
“The motion to reconsider is granted and the Court has considered the matter anew upon briefs submitted by both parties.”
“The motion of the plaintiff to dismiss the counterclaims must therefore be granted”
“the findings of the Examiner, affirmed by the Appeals Council, are supported by substantial evidence.”
“The petition for reconsideration must be denied.”
“No such order as appears to be prayed for by plaintiff may therefore be issued.”
“a fee of $250 is reasonable to be allowed to the defendants in this action.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
- As a Territorial and then U.S. District Judge from 1954 to 1975, and Chief Judge from 1961 to 1966, Hodge carried a general federal civil and criminal docket that included maritime and Jones Act cases, public-works and contract disputes, condemnation and Federal Tort Claims Act litigation, tax and license matters, Social Security cases, Alaska Native issues, and criminal proceedings.
- The surviving record does not permit quantitative caseload analysis.
A historical record
Judge Hodge no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.