Raymond Eugene Plummer
How Judge Plummer rules, drawn from 21 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Plummer no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Plummer
Raymond Eugene Plummer was a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. Appointed by President John F. Kennedy, Judge Plummer received a commission on September 18, 1961. Judge Plummer assumed senior status on June 1, 1973 and served until death on December 26, 1987.
How Judge Plummer decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In MacKay v. Nesbett, he held that judicial immunity barred the civil-rights claim against state judges and that the federal anti-injunction statute barred the requested injunction against state-court proceedings.
“The Civil Rights Act creates no exception to this immunity.”
In Standard Oil Co. of California v. Hickel, he construed an ambiguity in a federal oil and gas lease against the United States, which drafted the lease, and granted summary judgment to the lessee.
“must be charged to the party who drew the lease.”
In State of Alaska v. O/S Lynn Kendall, he held that the State did not consent to an affirmative money judgment merely by suing and limited the counterclaim to a defensive setoff or recoupment.
“no affirmative relief may be given against the sovereign in the absence of consent.”
In an early NEPA-review decision he applied deferential arbitrary-and-capricious review to an agency's environmental-impact statement, upholding the AEC's compliance rather than second-guessing the substance of its judgment.
“its final decision is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”
In Ault v. Harris, a lien-priority dispute involving an SBA deed of trust, he adopted local law as the federal rule of decision, following the Federal Tax Lien Act rather than a general first-in-time rule.
“the Court adopts as the applicable federal rule in this case that which Congress declared controlling in the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323 as amended, namely, local law.”
Procedural preferences
In Standard Oil Co. of California v. Hickel, he found summary judgment appropriate because the facts were undisputed and the dispute turned on construction of the lease.
“There is no disputed issue of fact, and inasmuch as the decision of the Secretary turned on construction of the lease contract, the case is appropriate for summary judgment.”
In United States v. Erickson, he rejected the defendant’s delay challenge because a bare assertion of fading memory did not establish prejudice.
“A mere assertion of the dimming of memory is not sufficient to establish a showing of prejudice.”
In Traill v. Felder, he denied a Rule 56(f) continuance after finding that further discovery would not help resolve the insurance coverage dispute.
“It does not appear that further discovery would be useful in the disposition of this matter.”
In Swanson v. Sharp, he concluded that Alaska’s garnishment procedure created an independent action removable under federal law.
“An independent analysis of Rule 89(f), Rules of Civil Procedure, State of Alaska, leads me to the conclusion that the garnishment proceedings established thereby is an independent”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted.”
“plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed on the merits with prejudice.”
“this Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Counsel for defendants shall within ten days prepare, serve and submit an appropriate order dismissing the action with prejudice.”
“Plaintiff as a matter of law is entitled to a summary judgment decreeing his claim of lien in the amount of $920-00 to be prior to all other liens or claims.”
“The motion for summary judgment by the United States is denied.”
“Plaintiff’s motion for order limiting recovery is granted.”
“the Chief Adjudicator acted arbitrarily and plaintiff is entitled to a summary judgment declaring that the correct rental for the lands in question is 50 cents per acre as provided for nonparticipating lands in the lease agreement.”
“the Chief Adjudicator acted arbitrarily and plaintiff is entitled to a summary judgment”
“The motion for summary judgment is accordingly denied.”
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment is denied.”
“The complaint does not allege substantial grounds for attacking the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 603 and 607 (1969) and should be dismissed without convening a three-judge court.”
“The motion for continuance is accordingly denied.”
“Plaintiff’s motion for relief from this court’s order of March 26, 1971, is granted.”
“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
- As a United States District Judge and Chief Judge from 1966 to 1973, Plummer carried a general federal civil and criminal docket that included Federal Tort Claims Act cases, maritime and fisheries disputes, airline and common-carrier regulation, labor matters, oil-and-gas and public-lands litigation, insurance and contract claims, lien-priority disputes, and Alaska Native and environmental cases.
- The surviving record does not permit a quantitative caseload breakdown.
A historical record
Judge Plummer no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.