James Martin Fitzgerald

How Judge Fitzgerald rules, drawn from 19 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Fitzgerald no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.

Court
United States District Court for the District of Alaska
Position
District judge
Status
Deceased
Served
1974–2011
Appointed by
Gerald Ford (Republican)
Commissioned
December 20, 1974
Education
Willamette University, B.A., 1950; Willamette University College of Law, LL.B., 1951
Signed orders read
19

About Judge Fitzgerald

James Martin Fitzgerald was a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. Appointed by President Gerald Ford, Judge Fitzgerald received a commission on December 20, 1974. Judge Fitzgerald assumed senior status on January 1, 1989 and served until death on April 3, 2011.

How Judge Fitzgerald decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., Fitzgerald recognized an implied private cause of action under Section 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933.

“a private cause of action may be implied under Section 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act.”

In United States v. Kaiyo Maru Number 53, Fitzgerald found that forfeiture of the vessel was unwarranted in that fisheries case.

“I conclude upon consideration that in this case forfeiture of the vessel is not warranted.”

Procedural preferences

In Getty v. Sturm-Ruger and Co., Fitzgerald remanded the action because the plaintiff had stated a claim against a nondiverse defendant, leaving incomplete diversity.

“The plaintiff in this case has stated a claim under Alaska law against his father, hence there is incomplete diversity and the action must be remanded.”

In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Vessel Bay Ridge, Fitzgerald vacated a privately initiated vessel arrest because the admiralty rule’s procedure lacked sufficient judicial review and a prompt post-seizure hearing.

“The procedures required by Admiralty Rule C fail to provide the due process standards now well established by the Supreme Court.”

In Hanson v. Klutznik, Fitzgerald dismissed a challenge to federal fisheries regulations after finding the claims barred by the statute’s limit on judicial review. He also held that the plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies while the agency was still studying incidental salmon catches.

“administrative process should be exhausted before judicial intervention begins.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Getty v. Sturm-Ruger and Co.
462 F. Supp. 949 · 1979-01-04
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Granted

“The motion to remand is GRANTED and the Clerk shall prepare the Order of Remand.”

Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop)
22 B.R. 1017 · 1982-05-05
Bankruptcy appeal (appellant) Denied

“The decision of the bankruptcy judge is AFFIRMED.”

First National Bank of Anchorage v. Roach (In re Roach)
13 B.R. 431 · 1980-09-09
Bankruptcy appeal (appellant) Denied

“I conclude that there is no merit to this appeal. Accordingly, the final order of the bankruptcy court is AFFIRMED.”

In re the Complaint of Hokkaido Fisheries Co.
506 F. Supp. 631 · 1981-02-04
Motion to file claim (plaintiff) Granted

“I conclude that the government may file separate claims under the CWA for costs of cleanup.”

Osamu Mishima v. United States
507 F. Supp. 131 · 1981-02-11
Motion to quash (petitioner) Denied

“the motion to quash must be denied.”

Gay v. Williams
486 F. Supp. 12 · 1979-09-10
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Summary judgment is also granted in favor of defendant AP.”

Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co.
476 F. Supp. 275 · 1979-09-10
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“motion to dismiss Count I of the complaint is hereby DENIED.”

Eagle v. Kenai Peninsula Borough
489 F. Supp. 138 · 1980-04-30
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“I conclude that the defendants, as a group, and each of them are entitled to summary judgment since they violated no right of the plaintiff.”

Motion to dissolve lien (defendant) Granted

“are null and void and shall be can-celled.”

Motion for attorney fees (defendant) Granted

“Accordingly, defendants are allowed their reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees.”

Shields v. United States
504 F. Supp. 1216 · 1981-01-09
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“Motion for Summary Judgment is, therefore, DENIED.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED.”

Gomez v. Harris
504 F. Supp. 1342 · 1981-01-16
Social security appeal (plaintiff) Granted

“The decision of the secretary is reversed, and the case is remanded to the department for further proceedings.”

Gregoire v. Underwriters at Lloyds
559 F. Supp. 596 · 1982-01-20
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“Resolution of this issue does not allow me to grant summary judgment for either party.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied
Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd.
547 F. Supp. 633 · 1982-09-16
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“the company has standing to bring an action for damages under section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act.”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted in part

“The Municipality’s motion for summary judgment on liability on its claims under section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act is GRANTED. ... The Municipality’s motion for summary judgment with respect to its RICO claim is DENIED. ... The Municipality’s motion for summary judgment on these claims is DENIED.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

As a district and then senior judge from 1974 to 2006, Fitzgerald carried a full federal trial docket spanning admiralty and fisheries, Alaska Native land, civil-rights, labor, and criminal matters. The surviving case information covers only a small portion of that service and does not support career-wide caseload rates.

A historical record

Judge Fitzgerald no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.