James Arnold von der Heydt
Judge Heydt no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Heydt decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In maritime maintenance-and-cure disputes he applies the seaman-favoring rule that any doubt about whether maximum cure has been reached is resolved for the seaman, and will reinstate terminated payments unless the employer's decision to stop was unequivocal.
“Any ambiguities whether maximum cure has been reached are to be resolved in favor of the seaman.”
He reads Miles v. Apex Marine's damages-uniformity holding narrowly: it forecloses punitive damages for Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness but does not reach exemplary damages for the separate, contract-based maintenance-and-cure obligation.
“The court does not agree that the rationale in Miles extends to an exemplary damage claim in regard to maintenance and cure.”
He will follow binding Ninth Circuit precedent even where he thinks it wrong, saying so on the record while applying it -- as when he criticized the Basart accretion doctrine but held himself bound by Wittmayer.
“no way exists to escape the binding effect of the Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Wittmayer, 118 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1941), one of the cases upon which the doctrine is based.”
On implied private rights of action he applies the strict congressional-intent test and declines to infer a civil remedy from a criminal statute merely because it would advance the statute's purpose -- here rejecting a private action under 18 U.S.C. section 1163.
“Nothing in its language or structure suggests that Congress intended to create anything more than criminal liability.”
Procedural preferences
He resolves questions of federal subject-matter jurisdiction at the threshold and will dismiss the entire action when it is absent, as under the Warsaw Convention's exclusive-forum provision.
“pursuant to the terms of the Convention, this court does not have jurisdiction over this case.”
He exercises Declaratory Judgment Act discretion against hearing a federal declaratory action that would produce piecemeal litigation of issues a parallel state suit can fully resolve, especially on novel questions of state law.
“this declaratory action will not necessarily determine the rights of the parties, whereas the presently-pending state court action would necessarily decide all issues and terminate the controversy.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS ORDERED THAT plaintiffs motion to reinstate maintenance and cure payments is granted in part and denied in part as outlined above.”
“IT IS ORDERED THAT defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED, and the case is dismissed as to all parties in its entirety.”
“the Hanlon plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction filed March 6, 1990 (Docket No. 50) is DENIED”
“the motion to supplement filed May 18, 1990 (Docket No. 219) by plaintiffs Hanlon et al. in Hanlon v. Barton, No. J86-024 Civ. (consolidated) is GRANTED”
“the Hanlon plaintiffs’ renewed motion to expedite filed July 5, 1990 is DENIED as now being moot”
“THAT defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment (Docket No. 47) is granted”
“THAT plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Docket No. 64) is denied”
“defendant’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.”
“The court will affirm the Magistrate’s orders on grounds different from those advanced by the Magistrate and will deny the pending motion.”
“the court concludes that Fluor's motion should be granted.”
“That defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.”
“That plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied as moot.”
Tribal suit over removal of ceremonial artifacts. On its own request for briefing, the court held the criminal statute barring theft from Indian tribal organizations, 18 U.S.C. section 1163, creates no implied private right of action and dismissed the plaintiff's third cause of action sua sponte for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. No party motion was decided; recorded as an order read.
“The motion of Plaintiff Reliance Insurance Company, Inc. for summary judgment is granted”
“The motion of defendant, third party plaintiff, Alaska State Housing Authority, to dismiss plaintiff’s action is denied.”
“The motion of defendant Alaska State Housing Authority for summary judgment against First National is granted”
“Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fee flowing from the motion to compel and pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4) is denied.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
As a district judge and then senior judge from 1966 to 2013, von der Heydt carried a general federal civil and criminal docket. The 20 reviewed terminated civil cases, filed in the Juneau Division in 1986 and 1987, are dominated by admiralty and vessel matters, including fishing-vessel forfeitures, ship-mortgage foreclosures, and maritime and construction contract disputes.
A historical record
Judge Heydt no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.