Gary Allan Spraker

How Judge Spraker rules, drawn from 19 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Alaska
Position
Bankruptcy judge
Commissioned
October 4, 2012
Education
Stetson University, B.A., 1985; University of Denver Sturm College of Law, J.D., 1988
Signed orders read
19

About Judge Spraker

Gary Allan Spraker has served as a United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Alaska since October 2012 and is its chief judge. Before joining the bench, he practiced bankruptcy and commercial law in Alaska and clerked for District Judge John W. Sedwick.

Judge Spraker's practices and standing orders

Rules for cases before Judge Spraker, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.

Key rules

Filing

Only CM/ECF filers may email proposed orders to [email protected].

“Only ECF filers may submit proposed orders to the email address.”

Filing

Submit proposed orders in Word format.

“The court accepts the orders in Word format only.”

Filing

Put the case name, case number and proposed order title in the submission email’s subject line.

“The subject line of the email must contain the case name, case number, and the title of the order being submitted.”

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Spraker decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In In re James Storm Faltz, Spraker denied confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan because the debtor had to commit his projected contractual bonuses during the applicable commitment period.

“He must commit, and pay, those bonuses over the course of his applicable commitment period.”

Procedural preferences

In In re Paul Ritz and Valerie Ritz, Spraker denied voluntary dismissal because the resulting risk of nonpayment would prejudice creditors while the debtors had not fully disclosed assets or cooperated with the trustee.

“The court finds the risk of nonpayment to constitute legal prejudice precluding the voluntary dismissal of this bankruptcy.”

In In re Yak Timber Inc., Spraker denied an ex parte request for a final decree without prejudice because other interested parties were entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard.

“Others may not agree. They are entitled to notice of the Motion for Final Decree and the opportunity to be heard if they disagree.”

In In re Aleksey N. Kozlov, he reduced committee counsel's requested fees after finding that counsel spent excessive time documenting an uncontested plan agreement. He allowed $224,106.70 in fees after other rate and hour adjustments.

“efforts should have been made to limit the fees required to document that agreement and obtain confirmation where there was no opposition.”

When a debtor sought a stay of a prepetition eviction judgment, a rent deposit made after the bankruptcy petition did not satisfy the filing-day requirement; the court left any claimed cure of the underlying rent debt to the state court.

“the failure to tender the upcoming 30 days’ rent with the petition caused the automatic stay to terminate under §§ 362(b)(22) and (l)(4).”

Cautions

In In re John Karl Youse, Spraker granted reconsideration for excusable neglect and retroactively annulled the stay, while warning counsel not to expect the same exercise of discretion in future cases.

“Counsel should not rely on the court’s exercise of discretion to reach the same result in any future similar situations.”

A collateral surcharge must be tied to a specific, quantifiable benefit to the secured creditor rather than the general value of administering the bankruptcy.

“amount of a surcharge is limited to the amount of the benefit and must be proven with specificity.”

A debtor objecting to a properly documented consumer credit claim needs evidence that rebuts its presumed validity; a demand for a full account history alone does not shift the burden back to the creditor.

“The debtors have not submitted any evidence to contradict Claim No. 16.”

In a construction fraud trial, an incomplete project and an unreturned deposit could support a contract claim without proving the debtor made a fraudulent promise when the deposit was paid.

“the failure to construct the house, and to return the balance of the deposit, may constitute dischargeable breach of contract damages.”

In a trustee counsel fee application, Spraker disallowed time spent on inventory, insurance, auction, and other estate administration because a trustee could not turn those duties into legal services by assigning them to counsel.

“A trustee cannot delegate his duties to his attorney.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

In re James Storm Faltz
22-00096 · 2023-02-23
Objection to plan confirmation (chapter_13_trustee) Granted

“the court shall deny confirmation of the current Plan”

In re Paul Ritz and Valerie Ritz
23-00060 · 2023-10-06
Motion to dismiss bankruptcy case (debtor) Denied

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Voluntary Motion to Dismiss Bankruptcy Case (ECF No. 49) is DENIED.”

In re Yak Timber Inc.
23-00080 · 2024-11-15
Motion for final decree (debtor) Denied

“Case (ECF No. 368) is DENIED without prejudice.”

In re John Karl Youse
23-00172 · 2024-02-13
Motion for reconsideration (creditor) Granted

“the court exercises its discretion to grant the Clifts’ request to reconsider its order on relief from the automatic stay for excusable neglect, and to annul the stay retroactively.”

In re Whittier Seafood, LLC
24-00139 · 2026-05-08
Motion for derivative standing and surcharge (former_debtor_counsel) Denied

“Collateral (ECF No. 586) will be denied in a separate order to be entered by the court.”

In re Aleksey N. Kozlov
24-00148 · 2026-09-01
Application for compensation and expenses (unsecured_creditors_committee_counsel) Granted in part

“the applicable hourly rates used in the Fee Application must be adjusted to reflect those charged within the applicable legal community, and (2) the hours billed must also be reduced to account for excessive hours and fees. The court shall allow total fees in the amount of $224,106.70”

In re Arseny Ilarionavish Polushkin and Anfisa Astemon Polushkin
25-00170 · 2026-09-29
Objection to proof of claim (debtors) Denied

“the court will enter a separate order overruling the Objection.”

Hrin and Hatcher v. Hayes
24-90006 · 2025-10-29
Nondischargeability adversary claim (plaintiffs) Granted in part

“the court finds that Garic, but not Mae, committed fraud with respect to some of these line items, in the aggregate amount of $26,768.46.”

Bauer v. Hayes
24-90005 · 2025-09-22
Nondischargeability adversary claim (plaintiffs) Denied

“The court will, therefore, enter judgment in favor of the Hayeses and deny the Bauers’ sole claim for relief under § 523(a)(2)(A).”

Cosme v. Taylor
24-90001 · 2025-03-12
Nondischargeability adversary claim (plaintiff) Granted

“Luis Cosme’s default judgment against debtor Christopher Taylor is a debt arising from fraud and is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).”

In re George Walton’s Gold and Diamond Company, Incorporated
21-00065 · 2021-10-20
Application for attorneys fees (trustee_counsel) Granted in part

“the Objection is sustained with the exception of 3.2 hours, for an additional allowance of $1,280.00 in fees.”

Beltran and Ball v. Miller
19-90008 · 2021-06-04
Summary judgment (plaintiffs) Granted in part

“the court will grant summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs as to the existence of damages in the amount of $5,158.79 in Trust assets which Miller used to pay her personal expenses.”

Cross motion for summary judgment (debtor_defendant) Denied

“All other requests for summary judgment made in the Motion and Cross Motion will be denied.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The twelve terminated sampled matters ranged from 114 to 1,997 days, with a median of 371 days. The sample deliberately spans Spraker's earliest post-appointment filings and recent written-decision cases and is descriptive only.

Draft for Judge Spraker with the record in hand

Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Spraker, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.

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