IRS document 200120006: Criminal Tax Bulletin reviewed recent court decisions

Plain-English summary

This Criminal Tax Bulletin summarizes court decisions rather than resolving a taxpayer's request. Its December 2000 issue covers mail fraud, IRS investigation disclosures, false refund claims, speech restrictions on tax protest materials, forfeiture, money laundering, and sentencing. Among the cases discussed, the Supreme Court held that an unissued state license was not property for the federal mail fraud statute, and a court addressed good faith protection for IRS agents who disclosed an investigation during witness interviews. The bulletin includes a table of cases and says it is informational rather than a directive.

Ruling snapshot

• Question: What recent court decisions affected criminal tax and related enforcement topics?
• Outcome: Informational bulletin
• Key authorities: Cleveland v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 365 (2000); Gandy v. United States, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31751; IRC §§ 6103 and 7431

Full text (IRS public release)

Number: 200120006
CT-119372-00
Release Date: 5/18/2001
UILN: 9999.98-00
CC:CT
January 17, 2001

Criminal Tax Bulletin
Department of Treasury
Office of Chief Counsel
Internal Revenue Service
Criminal Tax Division

December This bulletin is for informational purposes. It is not a directive. 2000

SUPREME COURT CASES settling a circuit split, held an unissued state or municipal
Unissued State Licenses Are Not Property
license is not "property" for purposes of the federal mail
Under the Mail Fraud Statute
fraud statute and, therefore, a scheme to obtain a license
from the state by false pretenses is not punishable under the In Cleveland v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 365 (2000), statute.
Cleveland and others were prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 for making false statements when applying to the
state police for permission to operate video poker machines.
The mail fraud counts alleged, Cleveland and a co- TITLE 26 AND TITLE 26
defendant, in applying for and seeking renewal of the video RELATED CASES poker license, had fraudulently concealed they were the true owners of the business which applied for the license. These Violation Of Code Of Professional counts also served as predicates for money laundering and
Responsibility racketeering charges.
In In re Complaint as to the Conduct of Daniel J. Gatti, Before trial, Cleveland moved to dismiss the mail fraud 8 P.3d 966 (2000), Gatti, a private practitioner licensed to counts on the ground the alleged fraud did not deprive the practice law in Oregon, while gathering facts as part of his state of "property" under § 1341. The district court denied representation of a client, misled others to believe he was a the motion, concluding "licenses constitute property even medical doctor. When confronted by the Oregon Bar, Gatti before they are issued." The Fifth Circuit affirmed responded that the State Professional Responsibility Board Cleveland’s conviction, considering itself bound by a prior of the Oregon Bar had previously held Oregon Department circuit decision holding Louisiana video poker licenses are of Justice lawyers who, in the course of an undercover "property" under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. operation, advised "investigators to have individuals pose as janitors and injured workers for the purpose of Rejecting all the government’s arguments, the Court infiltrating chiropractors’ and lawyers’ offices to obtain concluded the state video poker license did not qualify as information about suspected fraudulent workers’ property within § 1341's compass. The Court found it did compensation claims," had violated no provisions of the not suffice that the object of the fraud could have become Code of Professional Responsibility. Gatti cited this property in the recipient’s hands. For purposes of the mail holding for the proposition that since government attorneys fraud statute, the thing obtained must have been property in can oversee undercover operations, private practice the hands of the victim. The Court stated that state and attorneys should be able to conduct "investigations," even municipal licenses in general, and the video poker licenses if in doing so they mislead. in particular, did not rank as property for purposes of § 1341, in the hands of the official licensor. Further, Since Gatti put into play the role of government attorneys "equating issuance of licenses or permits with deprivation overseeing or rendering advice in the course of undercover of property would subject to federal mail fraud prosecution operations, both the United States Attorney for the Judicial a wide range of conduct traditionally regulated by state and District of Oregon and the Attorney General for the State of local authorities." Absent a clear statement of Oregon filed amicus curiae briefs urging the Supreme Court Congressional intent, the Court refused to read the statute as of Oregon to recognize a "prosecutorial exception" to the having that result. Thus, a unanimous Supreme Court, Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility. In deciding

the case, the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected Gatti’s good faith in believing that the disclosures were authorized and, therefore, necessary."

argument as well as the positions asserted by those Omission of Materiality Instruction Held government and private parties who had filed amicus curiae Harmless briefs. The Supreme Court of Oregon held neither government nor private attorneys were ". . . entitled to
In United States v. Foster, 229 F.3d 1196 (5th Cir. 2000), misrepresent [their] identity and purpose to gather the Fifth Circuit held the omission of a jury instruction on information without violating the [Oregon] Code of materiality in a prosecution for presenting false and Professional Responsibility and ORS 9.527(4)." fraudulent claims for tax refunds in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 287, was subject to a harmless error analysis. Foster
Good Faith Upheld
made the fraudulent claims for refund in connection with
the 1996 tax returns of three different individuals. Each
In Gandy v. United States, 99-40205, 2000 U.S. App. count charged Foster with filing a claim for “black taxes in LEXIS 31751 (5th Cir. Dec. 11, 2000), the Fifth Circuit the amount of $43,209" which he knew was false, fictitious affirmed the district court’s finding the IRS special agents and fraudulent. Foster appealed his conviction contending were not liable for disclosing to third party witnesses that the district court erroneously refused to charge the jury that Gandy was under criminal investigation. Gandy appealed materiality was an essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 287, and the district court’s decision which held although the such error prejudiced his defense and thus, not harmless. disclosures were in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6103, the errors were in good faith, as the agents believed the disclosures The Fifth Circuit cited to Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 were necessary to perform their jobs. Thus, pursuant to (1999), where the Supreme Court held the omission of a 26 U.S.C. § 7431(b), the district court held liability did not jury instruction on materiality, where it was an essential
attach to the disclosures.
element of the offense, was subject to a harmless error
analysis. Thus, if the error was harmless beyond a
On appeal, Gandy argued a reasonable IRS agent could not reasonable doubt, the conviction could stand. In this case, have acted in good faith in orally disclosing he (Gandy) the Fifth Circuit noted the error, if any, in omitting a was under criminal investigation when the Handbook for materiality instruction was of such quality. There was no Special Agents § 347.2 prohibits such a disclosure in doubt the amounts claimed in the “black tax returns” that circular letters. Gandy further argued no reasonable agent Foster assisted with were as material as they were could interpret IRS regulations and manuals to authorize a unjustified. Thus, the court concluded Foster’s false statement made orally, while forbidding it in a written statements were material to the tax refund claims and his disclosure. The court, however, agreed with the conviction was affirmed. government that in-person interviews are more focused and selective than mass mailings of circular letters and, therefore, held a reasonable agent could conclude the OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL specific rules governing written disclosures in circular letters would not apply across the board to all disclosures, ISSUES including oral disclosures.
18 U.S.C. § 371 Conviction Vacated For
Furthermore, the court specifically cited Treasury Sixth Amendment Violation Regulation § 301.6103(k)(6)-1 and the Handbook for Special Agents § 348.3 in support of its holding. The court In United States v. Doherty, 233 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2000), noted those sections supported the agents’ conclusion that the Eleventh Circuit vacated Doherty’s conviction on the they could orally inform a potential witness they are ground the district court’s denial of his motion to sever his conducting a criminal investigation. The court found it to trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to cross- be clear that agents are authorized to display their examination. Doherty and two co-defendants, Gaudet and credentials and badges identifying them as CID agents Hatter, were convicted of, inter alia, conspiracy to defraud when interviewing a third party, as required by IRM the Service in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The
§ 977(11).1(4). Despite this holding, the court declined to convictions stemmed from the defendants alleged "decide the difficult legal question of whether agents[’] involvement in a multi-state conspiracy to defraud the
. . . oral disclosures that Gandy was under criminal United States of federal excise taxes on sales of diesel fuel investigation were necessary [because it] agree[d] with the purchased for highway use. Doherty, Gaudet, and Hatter district court that agents . . ., as reasonable agents, were in

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worked for Young as truck drivers, delivering the diesel provisions enjoining advertising, marketing and selling
fuel for its illegal re-sale.
documents which provide false tax advice permissible since
false, deceptive or misleading commercial speech is also unprotected. Further, the court found provisions enjoining the supply of materials or assistance in filing false IRS
When the government provided notice of its intent to forms and provisions enjoining the filing of frivolous FOIA introduce the testimony of an IRS special agent to relate requests permissible since these actions also constitute statements made by Gaudet which incriminated both Gaudet incitement to imminent unlawful activity. and Doherty, Doherty filed a motion to server his case from his co-defendants. Doherty argued pursuant to the holding of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), his Sixth FORFEITURE Amendment right to cross examination would be violated if the special agent was permitted to testify. The district court
No Community Property Interest in Property denied the motion finding no Bruton violation. When
Doherty renewed his motion at trial, it was overruled again Forfeited Criminally and the district court allowed the agent’s testimony which inculpated Doherty and served as a confession for Gaudet. In United States v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 2000),
the Ninth Circuit held any community property interest
Although the court found the evidence was sufficient to conferred by state law in the proceeds of a spouse’s drug support Doherty’s conviction as a conspirator, it vacated his trafficking is not protected from federal criminal forfeiture convictions pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in under 21 U.S.C. § 853. Hooper and Ralph are wives of Bruton finding the district court had committed a violation criminal defendants who plead guilty to drug trafficking and by permitting the agent’s testimony regarding Gaudet's agreed to the forfeiture of cash and property in which
incriminating statements.
Hooper and Ralph asserted an interest under California
community property law.
Injunctions Against Sale Of Tax Protest
Interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A), the court decided Programs Are Permissible Prior Restraints unless a claimant is a bona fide purchaser, the criminal
On Political Speech If Narrowly Drawn
forfeiture statute limits its protection of third parties’
property interests to interests which vested prior to the
In United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2000), commission of the crime. The criminal forfeiture statute Raymond and his co-defendant, as members of the U.S. provides a third party may petition for relief from a criminal Taxpayers Party, sold collections of material (“the forfeiture if he/she establishes by a preponderance of the Program”), which they represented were a method of legally evidence (1) he/she is a bona fide purchaser or (2) the removing the purchasers from the jurisdiction of the federal property meets the requirements of § 853(n)(6)(A). government’s taxing authorities. In March 1997, the United Section 853(n)(6)(A) requires a claimant to show he/she has States filed a civil suit against the defendants requesting a a legal right, title or interest in the property which renders permanent injunction against their sale of the Program and the order of forfeiture invalid because the right, title or against their participation in any conduct intended to
interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the interfere with the enforcement of the internal revenue laws. defendant or was superior to any right, title or interest of the The district court granted the injunction and the defendants defendant at the time of the commission of the acts giving appealed to the Seventh Circuit. rise to forfeiture.
On appeal, the defendants argued their promotion and sale The court explained the statute’s temporal requirement "at of their Program constituted political advocacy and the the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to injunction was an unconstitutional prior restraint on free
speech. Relying on United States v. Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144 the forfeiture" applies to both property interests or interests (7th Cir. 1987), the court reasoned since the injunction was "vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant" and the a court order that forbade speech activities, it constituted a alternative "or was superior to any right, title or interest of classic example of a prior restraint on speech. Construed the defendant." The court noted the legislative history narrowly, however, the court determined the injunction did indicated the temporal requirement was intended to prevent not violate the defendants’ First Amendment rights. a defendant from defeating forfeiture by conveying title
prior to conviction. The court acknowledged the practical
For example, after re-writing part of the injunction, the effect of § 853(n)(6)(A) is that it is unlikely ever to apply to court found provisions enjoining incitement to violate the proceeds of a crime and is far better designed to deal with tax laws permissible since incitement to imminent unlawful instrumentalities of the crime, such as the family car used activity is unprotected speech. The court also found for drug trafficking. Thus, the court concluded, to qualify

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for relief under § 853(n)(6)(A), Hooper and Ralph’s legal Annunzio-Wylie Act interest, if any, must have been vested in them at the time
their husbands committed their crimes.
In Coronado v. Bankatlantic Corp, Inc., 222 F.3d 1315
(11th Cir. 2000), Bankatlantic informed federal authorities
Money Laundering And Forfeiture Laws
of suspicious practices occurring in its new international
Used To Attack Foreign Tax Evasion
division which was formed as a result of Bankatlantic’s
recent acquisition of Megabank. Authorities impaneled
In United States v. $15,270,885.69 Formerly on Deposit in grand juries in Florida, New York and New Jersey which, Account No. 8900261137, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12602 in the spring of 1996, issued subpoenas demanding account (S.D.N.Y. August 25, 2000), a federal district court documents and records regarding all of the accounts in approved the use of the money laundering and forfeiture Bankatlantic’s international division. Bankatlantic laws of the United States to prosecute and forfeit the assets complied with the subpoenas turning over information of those who evade a foreign country’s taxes and regarding all international division accounts, including transaction reporting requirements. On August 20, 1999, Coronado’s account which had been opened in May of the day after the Bank of New York ("BONY") money 1996. In June of 1996, Coronado’s account was frozen and laundering scandal came to light, the FBI seized forfeiture proceedings were commenced against the account
$15,270,885.69 from the correspondent account maintained shortly thereafter. Coronado’s account was later released
at BONY by the Russian bank, Sobinbank. The and the funds returned with interest before the end of 1996.
government, thereafter, filed a forfeiture complaint pursuant In September of 1996, Coronado filed a class action lawsuit to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 984, and 1956, alleging the Sobinbank claiming Bankatlantic had violated the Electronic account, along with several other accounts at BONY held in Communications Privacy Act, the Right to Financial the name of shell companies, served as "a pipeline for the Privacy Act and Florida law by disclosing his account surreptitious movement of approximately $7 billion from information to grand juries. Bankatlantic moved for Russia to fund suspicious or illegal activities around the summary judgement claiming immunity from liability since world." Moreover, the government alleged these transfers its disclosure of Coronado’s account information in defrauded the Russian government of taxes and violated compliance with the subpoenas fell under the immunity that nation’s currency controls. Sobinbank filed a motion provision of the Annunzio-Wylie Act. In June of 1998, the to dismiss the complaint arguing Sobinbank lacked district court granted Bankatlantic’s motion for summary sufficient detail of criminal activities relating to its account. judgement and Coronado appealed.

The district court accepted the government’s theory that the On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found the immunity seized funds were the proceeds of schemes to avoid Russian provision of the Annunzio-Wylie Act provided immunity taxes and capital controls as well as the proceeds of the from liability for three types of disclosures: 1) disclosures kidnaping of a Russian businessman, both of which were of any possible violation of law or any regulation; specified unlawful activities. See § 1956(c)(7)(B)(ii) - (iii) 2) disclosures pursuant to the Annunzio-Wylie Act itself; and United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 552 (2nd Cir. and, 3) disclosures pursuant to "any other authority." The 1997) (finding evasion of foreign taxes or currency controls Eleventh Circuit defined "other authority" as legal authority to be properly considered a "scheme to defraud" the derived from a statute, regulation, court order, or other proceeds of which are subject to forfeiture irrespective of source of law specifically authorizing disclosure. Since any technical arguments that could be made regarding such subpoenas are issued under the authority of a court and may violations’ explicit exclusion from § 1956). Relying on be enforced through contempt proceedings, the Eleventh Trapilo, the court stated, "what is proscribed is [the] use of Circuit found subpoenas possess the force of law and may the telecommunications systems of the United States in be considered "other authority" for purposes of the furtherance of a scheme whereby one intends to defraud Annunzio-Wylie Act. another of property. Nothing more is required. The identity of the victim and the success of the scheme are irrelevant." Coronado argued the subpoena was invalid since his Id. Accordingly, Sobinbank’s motion to dismiss was account information was privileged under the Electronic
denied.
Communication Privacy Act and, for that reason,
Bankatlantic should not have made the disclosure. The Eleventh Circuit, without reaching the question whether Coronado’s information was privileged, found forcing a
MONEY LAUNDERING
bank to challenge a facially valid subpoena would fly in the
face of both the Annunzio-Wylie Act’s clear intent to
Disclosure In Compliance With Subpoena
encourage cooperation with money laundering
Falls Under Immunity Provision Of
investigations and the more general policy prohibiting
witnesses from testing the limits of a grand jury’s authority.

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Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held, subpoenas confidential informant made five or six further requests of constitute "other authority" for purposes of the Annunzio- Searcy to sell him crack. Finally, Searcy agreed, sold crack Wylie Act and Bankatlantic’s disclosure in compliance with to the confidential informant and was arrested. Searcy pled the subpoena fell under the immunity provision of the act. guilty to possession with the intent to distribute crack.
Although Searcy’s guilty plea resulted in waiver of his right
SENTENCING
to raise entrapment as a defense to the elements, it did not
result in waiver of his right to raise sentenicng entrapment as a basis for a downward departure under U.S.S.G.
Grouping And Relevant Conduct
§ 2D1.1, Application Notes 12 and 15. At sentencing, the
government prevailed in its argument that Searcy had to
In United States v. Fitzgerald, 232 F.3d 315 (2nd Cir. 2000), prove he was predisposed not to commit the crime and the Fitzgerald was charged with three counts of tax evasion, government acted outrageously to overbear his will. Searcy thirteen counts of mail fraud and one count of conversion. failed to meet his burden of proof and his entrapment claim The district court severed the mail fraud and conversion was rejected. counts and proceeded to trial on the tax evasion counts. Following Fitzgerald’s conviction on all of the tax evasion On appeal, Searcy contended the district court’s rejection of counts, the district court did a grouping analysis under his sentencing entrapment claim for failure to prove U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), resulting in the tax offenses being one outrageous government conduct was improper. On review, group and the mail fraud and conversion offenses being the Eighth Circuit noted the Guidelines link drugs to another separate group, although the latter offenses had not specific sentencing ranges based primarily upon the proceeded to trial and, therefore, were not counts of quantity or type of drugs involved in an offense. The conviction. The district court, however, concluded the two government, therefore, can manipulate a defendant’s
groups could not be grouped together.
sentence by selectively charging violations based on
quantity or type of drugs. The Eighth Circuit acknowledged
The district court applied U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, counting the many of the sentencing entrapment cases of the past tax evasion group as one unit and the conversion/mail fraud required a defendant to prove outrageous government group as another unit for purposes of relevant conduct. conduct. The Eighth Circuit, however, observed neither the Here, the tax offense level was eighteen and with the two language of Application Notes 12 and 15, nor recent case level grouping addition, resulted in a total offense level of law, mentions outrageous conduct. See, United States v. twenty. Fitzgerald challenged the district court’s conclusion Berg, 178 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 1999). Rather, Application that his conversion and mail fraud should be characterized Notes 12 and 15 and Berg focus on the predisposition of the as relevant conduct to his tax evasion scheme. Fitzgerald defendant to commit the crime. In conclusion, the Eighth also challenged the enhancement of his sentence based on Circuit held proof of outrageous conduct is not required for this finding of relevant conduct. The Second Circuit held, a downward departure based on sentencing entrapment. although the district court correctly took the conversion and mail fraud offenses into account as relevant conduct, it
Heartland of Money Laundering Statute Not improperly treated those violations as a separate group in
calculating the base offense level, rather than recognizing Just for Drug Trafficking and Racketeering they could be grouped pursuant to § 3D1.2(d) and, thereby, Specified Unlawful Activities considered as relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(2). The court, considering the foregoing, held the facts of the case In United States v. Bockius, 228 F.3d 305 (3rd Cir. 2000), demonstrated the conversion and mail fraud offenses were the Third Circuit held the heartland of the United States part of the same plan as the tax evasion and thus should Sentencing Guidelines’ provisions on money laundering have been included as relevant conduct. Thus, as provided covers more than money laundering associated with large by § 1B1.3(a)(2), the Second Circuit concluded the correct scale drug trafficking and racketeering activity. Bockius analysis included an aggregation of the loss attributable to plead guilty to wire fraud, foreign transportation of stolen all of Fitzgerald’s offenses which yielded an offense level funds, money laundering and agreed to forfeiture of of nineteen, one less then that computed by the district numerous assets. Bockius was the president and one of four
court.
principals of an insurance brokerage firm, who in 1995, fled
to the Cayman Islands with $600,000 stolen from the
Sentencing Entrapment
brokerage and its clients .

In United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. Nov. 13, The district court, relying on United States v. Smith, 186 2000), a confidential government informant requested F.3d 290 (3rd Cir. 1999), ruled the heartland of the money Searcy to sell him crack. Searcy responded he did not sell laundering guidelines U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 encompasses only crack, only powder. Over the next four weeks, the conduct related to extensive drug trafficking and

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racketeering activity, and it departed to sentence Bockius
under the more lenient fraud guidelines. The government
appealed contending the district court misinterpreted Smith The court held Bockius’ conduct in moving funds through and adopted too narrow a view of the heartland. The Third casinos and shell corporations in the Cayman Islands was Circuit, in agreeing with the government, confirmed the more than merely incidental to his fraudulent scheme and heartland of the money laundering guidelines applied to the money laundering guideline, rather than the fraud typical money laundering as well as to those activities guideline, should have been applied. Finding the district connected with extensive drug trafficking and serious court misapplied Smith, the Third Circuit vacated Bockius’ crime. Smith, the court explained, was concerned about sentence and remanded the case for resentencing with application of the stiff penalties provided in the money direction for the district court to engage in a heartland laundering guidelines to cases in which the money analysis before applying the money laundering guideline. laundering activity was merely incidental to the underlying criminal scheme.

CRIMINAL TAX BULLELTIN
TABLE OF CASES
DECEMBER 2000

SUPREME COURT CASES

Cleveland v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 365 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

TITLE 26 AND TITLE 26 RELATED CASES

In re Complaint as to the Conduct of Daniel J. Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Gandy v. United States, 99-40205, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31751 (5th Cir. Dec. 11, 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 United States v. Foster, 229 F.3d 1196 (5th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

United States v. Doherty, 233 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

FORFEITURE

United States v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

United States v. $15,270,885.69 Formerly on Deposit in Account No. 8900261137, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12602 (S.D.N.Y. August 25, 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

MONEY LAUNDERING

Coronado v. Bankatlantic Corp, Inc., 222 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

SENTENCING

United States v. Fitzgerald, 232 F.3d 315 (2nd Cir. 2000), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 United States v. Bockius, 228 F.3d 305 (3rd Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service
Document 10023 (12-2000)

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Catalog Number 24304B

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