Statute Annotations › Puerto Rico › 29 P.R. Laws Ann. § 146

29 P.R. Laws Ann. § 146

Discrimination in employment: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Puerto Rico
Case notes
60
Cited in passing
83
Citing cases indexed
153
Case dates
1985–2025
Screened through
2025-12-08
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-21
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

143 citing cases reviewed of 153 in the citation index: 60 interpreted the section (annotated below), 83 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2025-12-08 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under 29 P.R. Laws Ann. § 146?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 2013-05-29 Act 22 amended Law 100's Article 1 to protect against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. Source
  • 2017-01-26 Act 4 removed Law 100's general presumption of discrimination after an unjustified discharge and capped specified damages by employer size, while preserving statutory doubling of damages. Source
  • 2022-06-20 Act 41's amendments were annulled; the official Law 100 compilation omits them and retains the pre-Act-41 text. Source
  • 2024-07-23 Act 106 amended Article 1 to protect against employment discrimination based on protective hairstyles and hair textures associated with particular racial and national-origin identities. Source

Burden shifting

Law changed since Act 4 of January 26, 2017 removed Law 100’s general presumption of discrimination after an unjustified discharge; this burden framework governs the earlier law, not claims governed by the amended rule.

Section 146 places the burden on the employer to prove that a discharge of an employee at age sixty-one was not discriminatory.

Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corporation, Mark Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corporation · filed 1985-09-23

Under the Puerto Rico Anti-Discrimination Statute, the fact of discharge at age sixty-one would put the burden on the employer to prove that the discharge was not discriminatory.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 146 places the ultimate burden on the employer to prove that a challenged discharge was not discriminatory after the employee makes the initial showing required under Law 100.

Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc. · filed 1997-06-20

While the ultimate burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff in an ADEA case, the ultimate burden of proof in a Law 100 case rests upon the defendant.
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For age-discrimination claims, Law 100 places the ultimate burden of proving discrimination on the plaintiff, and its merits are coterminous with the ADEA.

Rivera Rodríguez v. Sears Roebuck De Puerto Rico, Inc. · filed 2005-12-23

Rivera's claims under P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146, also known as "Law 100," and P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194a, also known as "Law 115," were also properly dismissed. While Law 100 and the ADEA allocate the burdens of proof in different ways, see Alvarez-Fonseca v. Pepsi-Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 152 F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 1998), "the burden of proof on the ultimate issue of discrimination remains with the plaintiff" in both causes of action, id. at 28. See also Gonzales v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 73 n.7 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[T]he merits of the age-discrimination claims asserted under the ADEA and Law 100 are coterminous." (citation omitted)).
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Section 146 makes an employer civilly liable for discharging or discriminating against an employee because of age.

Al De ARTEAGA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. PALL ULTRAFINE FILTRATION CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1988-12-15

Under sec. 1 of Law 100, P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 (1985), an employer who discharges or discriminates against an employee on the basis of age incurs civil liability.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 146 creates a presumption of discrimination once an employee shows that a discharge was unjustified, shifting both production and persuasion burdens to the employer, which must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the action was not motivated by discriminatory age animus.

Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc. · filed 1999-02-18

Under Law 100, however, once the employee triggers the act’s protections by showing that his discharge, constructive or otherwise, was not justified, the employee enjoys a presumption that he or she has been the victim of discrimination and the burdens of both production and persuasion shift to the employer. ... “Thus, in order to rebut the Law 100 presumption, the employer must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged action was not motivated by discriminatory age animus.”
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The Law 100 presumption that a dismissal was discriminatory depends on the Law 80 presumption that the dismissal was unjustified.

Jose R. ALVAREZ-FONSECA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PEPSI COLA OF PUERTO RICO BOTTLING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1998-08-05

It follows that the Law 100 presumption that a dismissal was discriminatory depends on the Law 80 presumption that the dismissal was unjustified.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The Law 100 presumption of discrimination is triggered when the plaintiff shows that an adverse employment action was taken without just cause.

Colon-Muriel v. Asociacion De Suscripcion Conjunta Del Seguro De Responsabilidad Obligatorio · filed 2007-07-30

The Law 100 presumption is triggered when a plaintiff presents evidence that some adverse personnel action was taken without “just cause”.
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After the employer shows good cause, a Law 100 plaintiff must rebut that showing and prove that the discharge was actually motivated by discrimination.

Torres-Segui v. YRC, Inc. · filed 2022-09-28

Thus, Torres must rebut his employer’s showing of good cause to prevail on a Law 80 claim, and he must demonstrate that the discharge was actually motivated by discrimination to prevail on a Law 100 claim.
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Coverage, remedies, and succession

Section 146 does not cover political-discrimination suits against the Puerto Rico government or authorize double damages against officials in their official or individual capacities when they are not the plaintiffs' employer.

Jusino v. Carmen Sonia Zayas, Etc. · filed 1989-06-01

The assignment of error has undeniable merit. Recently, a panel of this court, after considering the same two statutes in a materially identical context, concluded that neither law was intended to cover political discrimination suits against the government of Puerto Rico or to permit official-capacity commonwealth actors to be held liable for double damages. ... Finally, we disposed of any basis for claims against defendants in their individual capacities, pointing out that “damages are not available under the statute against defendant in her personal capacity because as such she was not plaintiffs’ ‘employer’ ”. ... Therefore, the award of double damages under local law must be reversed.
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Section 146's doubling of base compensatory damages is mandatory rather than discretionary.

Baralt v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2000-02-23(a)

The doubling of base compensatory damages under Act No. 100 is not discretionary.
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Section 146(a)(1)'s doubled damages are compensatory rather than a penalty barred by FIRREA, so the Law 100 claim was not dismissed on that ground.

Font-Llacer-De-Pueyo v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 2013-03-25(a)(1)

Because this court is bound by the First Circuit’s interpretation of the compensatory nature of the damages award provision of Law No. 100, we must DENY the FDIC-R’s request that this claim be dismissed.
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Section 146 discrimination claims may be released in a valid settlement; the court held that these employees' releases were valid settlements of their Law 100 claims.

Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. · filed 2007-05-01

In point of fact, the Puerto Rico courts have explicitly given their imprimatur to releases of employment discrimination claims. ... As a theoretical matter, then, a release of Law 100 claims is authorized under the law of Puerto Rico. ... Thus, the releases were valid settlements of the Law 100 claims.
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A Law 100 employment-discrimination claim survives the employee's death and may be pursued by substituted plaintiffs.

Vaello-Carmona v. Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. · filed 2015-03-17

Therefore, we hold that Vaello-Carmona's Law 100 and Law 44 claims survive his death, and the district court erred when it denied appellants' motion to substitute themselves as plaintiffs.
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When a jury award is allocated to Puerto Rico law claims, the § 146(a)(1) back-pay component is doubled.

Gonzalez-Carpio · filed 2025-12-08(a)(1)

the back pay award under Puerto Rico law is doubled to $129,998.
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Statute of limitations

Section 146 claims are subject to a one-year limitations period that begins when the employee learns of the termination, and an extrajudicial claim tolls that period only if it specifically seeks the relief later requested in the lawsuit.

Juan A. Damiani Montalban, Ivelisse Vazquez De Damiani, and the Conjugal Partnership Composed by Both v. Puerto Rico Mar · filed 1993-05-19

On March 10, 1989, Damiani became aware that he would be terminated, therefore the statute of limitations for any claim of damages under § 146 then began to run. ... Damiani's statements did not evidence an urgent decision to obtain payment for damages under § 146. ... Damiani's statements did not toll the one year statute of limitations. Dismissal was required as a matter of law.
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Section 146 discrimination claims accrued when the employer made its termination decision known, rather than when the plaintiff later sought reinstatement, and the limitations period was not tolled while he received disability benefits.

Iglesias v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York · filed 1996-02-07

Plaintiff has moved the Court to reconsider its prior dismissal of the discrimination claims asserted pursuant to P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 (1985), Law 100 of June 30, 1959; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (ADEA) as time-barred. ... Thus, we find that there is no basis for finding that the discrimination claims were somehow tolled during the period plaintiff was receiving disability insurance benefits and that .the actions accrued when he reapplied for his manager position.
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Law 100 claims under § 146 et seq. are subject to a one-year limitations period, accrue when the employee becomes aware of the adverse personnel action, and have that period suspended during qualifying administrative proceedings after notice to the employer.

Reyes-Ortiz v. Valdes · filed 2010-03-22

The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has held that the one-year statute of limitations found in Article 1868 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code applies to Law 100 claims. ... A cause of action under Law 100 accrues on the date that the employee becomes aware of the adverse personnel action either through notification by the employer, ... or the effectuation of the decision. ... Additionally, the filing of a claim with the Anti-Discrimination Unit of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor constitutes an extrajudicial claim. ... Once the plaintiff has filed the claim and notified the employer-defendant of its filing, the one-year prescriptive period is suspended throughout the duration of the administrative proceedings and until the employer-defendant is notified of the agency’s decision.
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A claim against one jointly liable party tolls the one-year limitations period for related Law 100 claims against the other jointly liable parties.

Cintron-Alonso v. GSA Caribbean Corp. · filed 2009-03-18

Under Puerto Rico law, a claim against one jointly liable party tolls the statute of limitations against the others. ... Therefore, this Court finds that the one year statute of limitations for the above-mentioned Commonwealth law claims was effectively tolled against Gordils and Serrano.
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Law 100 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before an employment-discrimination suit.

Lopez-Machin v. Indupro · filed 2009-11-10

Law 100 does not include compulsory administrative remedies as a prerequisite for bringing a cause of action.
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Law 100 claims have a one-year limitations period that is tolled by a timely administrative discrimination charge after notice to the employer.

Oquendo v. Costco Wholesale Corporation · filed 2020-04-07

Once the plaintiff has filed such a claim and has notified the employer-defendant of its filing, the one-year statute of limitations under Law 100 is tolled throughout the duration of the administrative proceedings and until the employer-defendant is notified of the agency’s decision.
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Protected classes and discrimination theories

Section 146 (Law 100) prohibits employment discrimination on enumerated grounds but does not cover discrimination based on physical or mental handicap.

Iris v. Rivera-Flores v. Puerto Rico Telephone Company · filed 1995-11-28

In 1959, the Puerto Rico Legislature enacted Law 100 (codified at P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 146, 147, 147a, 148, 149), which prohibited employment discrimination based on age, gender, race, color, social or national origin, social condition, or religion, and permitted persons who were subjected to such discrimination to bring tort claims for damages. However, Law 100 made no mention of employment discrimination based on physical or mental handicap. ... Law 53 does not suggest in any way that the Legislature intended in 1959 that victims of handicap discrimination were protected by Law 100, nor that it intended in 1985 that such victims would have a private cause of action for damages under Law 44.
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Section 146 prohibits discrimination based on religious ideology.

Rojas v. GMD Airlines Services, Inc. · filed 2015-09-09

Law 100 prohibits discrimination on account of several protected characteristics, including “religious ideology.”
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Section 146 (Law 100) broadly prohibits employment discrimination, and its hostile-work-environment claim is essentially analyzed like a Title VII claim; the ultimate burden remains on the plaintiff.

Cerezo-Martin v. Agroman · filed 2016-10-04

“Law 100 is a broad antidis-crimination statute analogous to Title VII in many respects.” ... While Law 100 employs different presumptions and burdens of proof than Title VII, “the burden of proof on the ultimate issue remains with the plaintiff in both causes of action.” ... “Nevertheless, a hostile work environment claim pursuant to Law 100 remains viable. Courts in this district have held that hostile work environment claims brought pursuant to Law 100 are “essentially the same as a Title VII hostile work environment claim.” ... Because the Court has determined that plaintiff’s Title VII hostile work environment claim should proceed to trial, defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to that claim’s Law 100 counterpart is also DENIED.”
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Section 146 prohibits employment discrimination because of age or sexual orientation, but its sexual-orientation protection does not cover discrimination based solely on a romantic partner's litigious conduct.

Villeneuve v. Avon Products, Inc. · filed 2019-03-19

Among other things, Law 100 prohibits discrimination in employment because of age or sexual orientation. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146. ... But an employee's being in an affectionate relationship with a lawyer who has sued the employer simply is not a protected class under the statute.
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Age discrimination—Constructive discharge

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 146 prohibits an employer from discharging, laying off, or discriminating against an employee in salary, wages, working conditions, status, or work privileges because of age, and an employee must first show an actual or constructive discharge without just cause before the burden shifts to the employer to disprove discriminatory motivation.

Dominguez v. Eli Lilly and Co. · filed 1997-03-21

Like ADEA, Law 100 prohibits the employer from either discharging, laying off, or discriminating against an employee regarding her or his salary, wages, working conditions, status, or work privileges on the basis of the employee’s age. Even though the Court has already found that Plaintiffs have not garnered sufficient evidence to prove a violation of the ADEA, the burden of proof under Law 100 requires the Court to entertain Plaintiffs’ claim in a separate analysis. ... Under Law 100, once the employee presents sufficient evidence that the employer discharged him or her without “just cause,” there is a rebuttable presumption that the discharge was due to discrimination. The burden of proof shifts to the employer who must show by a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination was not a motivating factor in the discharge of the employee. The burden is one of both production and persuasion.
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Section 146 prohibits adverse employment actions based on age.

American Airlines, Inc. v. Cardoza-Rodriguez · filed 1998-01-07

In pertinent part, Law 100 forbids adverse employment actions based on any one of several protected characteristics, including age. ... Therefore, in the context of a constructive discharge, the date the employee elects to retire triggers the Law 100 limitation period.
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A Law 100 age-discrimination plaintiff must show an actual or constructive discharge before the claim can proceed.

Lopez-Rosario v. Programa Seasonal Head Start/Early Head Start de la Diocesis de Mayaguez · filed 2017-03-29

Here, as analyzed above, plaintiffs have failed to establish that plaintiff Lopez-Rosario was actually or constructively discharged.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 146 provides a cause of action for age discrimination in employment and, under the applicable Law 100 framework, shifts the burdens between the employee and employer after a prima facie case is shown.

Ramos-Santiago v. WHM Carib, LLC · filed 2019-03-22

Under Law 100, once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of discrimination, "the employee enjoys a presumption that he or she has been the victim of discrimination; and . . . the burden of production and persuasion then shifts to the employer to rebut this presumption." ... An employer may rebut the presumption of discrimination by presenting evidence demonstrating that "the existence of discrimination [as a factor in the dismissal] was less probable than its nonexistence." ... If an employer meets this burden, the burden of persuasion returns to the plaintiff who must show that a reasonable jury could conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "the defendant . . . violated Law 100 because the dismissal was motivated by discriminatory animus instead of or in addition to [any] legitimate reasons for dismissal."
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Section 146 allows an age discrimination claim to proceed when the evidence could show that age was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.

Morales v. Venegas Construction Corp. · filed 2015-04-30

In light of the more plaintiff-friendly burden of proof under Law 100, plaintiffs’ evidence of age discrimination discussed in reference to his ADEA claim is also sufficient to create a jury issue as to whether age was a motivating factor in defendant’s decision to terminate him, in violation of Law 100.
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Section 146 prohibits age discrimination in employment; a claim fails when the evidence does not support an inference of age animus.

Erazo-Vazquez v. State Industrial Products Corporation · filed 2021-08-31

Law 100 prohibits discrimination in employment because of various characteristics, including age. See, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 (setting forth prohibition). ... In consequence, as with the ADEA claim, plaintiff’s Law 100 claim must be dismissed.
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Employer sex discrimination

Section 146 prohibits sex discrimination by employers and provides for civil liability and damages.

Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez · filed 1998-01-06

Puerto Rico's Law 100 forbids sex discrimination by employers, and provides for civil liability and damages. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 (1995).
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Law 100 treats sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.

García v. Sprint PCS Caribe · filed 2012-01-05

The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has held that sexual harassment constitutes a kind of sexual discrimination shunned by Law 100.
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A sex-discrimination claim under Law 100 may proceed to trial when a reasonable jury could find that the employer took an adverse action because of the employee's sex or pregnancy.

Mercado-Reyes v. City of Angels, Inc. · filed 2018-06-26

A reasonable jury could find Mercado's testimony credible and determine that VHC discharged her on the basis of her sex and pregnancy, violating her rights pursuant to Title VII, Law 3, and Law 100.
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Coverage of government agencies and instrumentalities

Law 100 excludes nonprofit government instrumentalities from its coverage; government agencies and instrumentalities are covered only when functioning as private businesses or enterprises.

Dogson v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 1998-09-30

However, Law 100 does not apply to nonprofit government instrumentalities as is the U.P.R. Defendant is a government instrumentality. It does not operate as a private business or enterprise. Only government agencies and in-strumentalities functioning as "private businesses or enterprises” are within the scope of Law 100.
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Section 146 (Law 100) does not apply to municipalities or municipal employees.

Rios v. Municipality of Guaynabo · filed 2013-04-12

It is well settled that Law 100 applies neither to municipalities, ... nor to “municipal employees.” ... Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this score. Montalvo’s Law 100 claims are therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.
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Law 100 does not apply to municipalities or municipal employees.

Acevedo-Torres v. Municipality of Arecibo · filed 2012-04-25

Notwithstanding Plaintiffs allegations against Defendant, Law 100 does not apply to municipalities or municipal employees.
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Law 100 does not apply to nonprofit government instrumentalities such as the University of Puerto Rico.

Caez v. Universidad de Puerto Rico · filed 2023-07-11

Moreover, as to claims pursuant to Law 100, it is settled that “Law 100 does not apply to non-profit government instrumentalities as is the U.P.R.”
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Law 100's employment-discrimination protections require an employment relationship with the defendant.

Kalkey v. Euromodas, Inc. · filed 2023-12-11

Thus, the Law 100 claim against Norte and Oeste must be dismissed.
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A public corporation that is not an arm of the state can qualify as an employer under Law 100, so the § 146 claim may proceed against it.

Velez-Acevedo v. Centro de Cancer de La Universidad de Puerto Rico · filed 2021-07-02

Accordingly, Defendants’ request to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Law No. 100 claim is DENIED.
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Individual liability of supervisors under Law 100

Section 146 imposes civil liability on employers who discriminate against employees, but does not impose damages on supervisors or agents individually.

Berrios v. Squibb · filed 1999-04-26

In its remedies section, Law 100 states that “any employer who ... discriminates against an employee regarding his salary, wage, pay or remuneration, terms, rank, conditions, or privileges of his work, ... or who limits ... his employees in any manner which tends to deprive a person of employment opportunities, or to affect his status as employee, on the basis of age, ... race, color, sex, or national origin, or social position ... shall incur civil liability. ..P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146. In applying this section, the decisions of this District hold that Law 100 does not provide for the imposition of damages on supervisors or agents of employers.
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In the fraudulent-joinder context, § 146 permits a reasonable prediction that individual defendants may be liable for age-discrimination claims, without definitively resolving the statute's scope.

Bonilla-Perez v. Citibank NA, Inc. · filed 2012-09-25

The Court instead determines that, pursuant to the clear consensus among courts in this district, there is a reasonable basis for predicting that the Law 100 might impose liability against the Individual Defendants. Put another way, the defendants cannot shoulder their burden of showing that Bonilla has no reasonable basis exists to establish the Individual Defendants’ liability on his Law 100 claims. Under such circumstances, there is no fraudulent joinder, and removal is inappropriate, because the lack of complete diversity divests this court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
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Law 100 permits personal-capacity suits against individuals only when they are employees of a covered entity within the statute's scope.

Pizarro-Correa v. Puerto Rico Internal Revenue Department · filed 2017-07-31

Because Cardona is employed by an entity that is not covered pursuant to Law 100, he cannot be held individually liable.
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Section 146 permits individual employee liability for workplace sexual harassment and prohibits sex-based hostile work environments.

Maldonado-Cátala v. Municipality of Naranjito · filed 2015-10-26

However, under Puerto Rico Law 17, Law 69, and Law 100, there is individual employee liability for workplace sexual harassment. ... Law 100, Law 17, and Law 69 each prohibit a sex-based hostile work environment. ... Thus summary judgment is denied on these state law claims against all defendants.
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Law 100 does not impose liability on a government official in a personal capacity when the official was not the plaintiff's employer.

Educadores Puertorriqueños v. Hernandez · filed 2007-08-28

With respect to the claims asserted against Mr. Rey in his personal capacity, it is clear that this defendant was not plaintiffs’ “employer” and therefore, not subject to liability under this statute.
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Law 100 permits individual liability for hostile-work-environment acts that a supervisor can personally commit, but not for employment decisions reserved to the employer.

Villamia v. MVP Auto Group, Inc. · filed 2020-01-15

This allegation, like sexual harassment, is something that any person can cause regardless of the degree of control or authority they hold.
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Section 146 permits liability against an employer’s agent for the agent’s own discriminatory acts, but not merely for participating in events driven by another person’s sex-based animus.

Loranca v. Aerostar Airport Holdings, LLC · filed 2023-03-31

Moreover, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has made it clear that agents and employees may be liable under Laws 69 and 100 only “for their own acts.” Nieves Santiago, at 379, ECF No. 162-1 at 6 (emphasis added).23 Ergo, plaintiff’s makeshift conspiracy argument is untenable under Puerto Rico employment law.
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Age discrimination — relationship to federal law

Law 100's age-discrimination standard is substantially the same as the ADEA's, so claims under it may be evaluated under the same federal analytical principles.

Mojica v. El Conquistador Resort & Golden Door Spa · filed 2010-05-13

Because the analysis is practically the same under both federal and Puerto Rico law, Plaintiff chose to develop his arguments under the federal standards and case law. The Court agrees that the analytical principles are substantially the same and in the interest of judicial efficiency, does not analyze the claims separately under Puerto Rico law. Summary judgment, therefore, is also denied for Plaintiffs local law claims under Law 100 and Law 115.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Unlike the ADEA, Law 100 shifts the burden of proof to the defendant after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case.

Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Company · filed 1994-09-29

in an action brought under the ADEA, the plaintiff retains the burden of proof throughout the trial; in an action brought under Law 100, in contrast, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant once the plaintiff hás established a prima facie case.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Law 100 is Puerto Rico's equivalent of the ADEA but uses a different burden-shifting framework.

Colon v. SAN JUAN MARRIOTT RESORT AND STELLARIS · filed 2008-05-01

Law 100 is the Puerto Rico equivalent of the federal ADEA. However, the statutes differ in their burden-shifting frameworks.
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On the merits, an age-discrimination claim under Law 100 is analyzed alongside the ADEA and fails for the same evidentiary reasons.

Ortiz v. Becton Dickinson Caribe, Ltd. · filed 2013-09-13

Therefore, Plaintiffs Law 100 claim fails for the same reasons her ADEA claim fails.
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An age-discrimination claim under Law 100 is coterminous on the merits with an ADEA claim, so it fails when the plaintiff cannot make the ADEA prima facie showing.

Rivera-Rivera v. Medina & Medina, Inc. · filed 2017-01-11

her age discrimination claims under Law 100 must also fail.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Law 100 provides an employment cause of action for age discrimination and, when its presumption is triggered, shifts both production and persuasion burdens to the employer.

Bustillo-Formoso v. Million Air San Juan Corp. · filed 2016-07-26

Law “100, like the ADEA, ‘provides a cause[ ] of action in favor of those persons who suffer discrimination in their employment because of their age. However, [the statutes] differ with regard to the burden[s] of proof that they impose upon the employer and the employee,’ under certain circumstances.” ... “The most important difference between Law 100 and the ADEA is that when the Law 100 presumption has been triggered, it shifts not only the burden of production, but also the burden of persuasion, from the employee to the employer.” ... But even under the Law 100 framework, the “Law 100 plaintiff is ... in [the] same situation as an ADEA plaintiff after the defendant has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” ... As discussed within the context of Bustillo’s ADEA claims, Million Air has articulated a legitimate business reason for firing Bustillo that is neither retaliatory nor related to his age. Because Bustillo relies on the same arguments he made for his ADEA claims, and because summary judgment was granted on those claims, the Law 100 claim is also dismissed.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Law 100 is equivalent to the ADEA for age-discrimination liability, but uses a different burden-shifting framework.

Zayas-Ortiz v. Becton Dickinson Caribe, Ltd. · filed 2012-07-23

As applied to age discrimination, Law 100 differs from the ADEA only with respect to how the burden-shifting framework operates.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 146 prohibits discrimination because of age and national origin; age-discrimination claims under it are coterminous on the merits with ADEA claims, although the burden-shifting framework differs.

Perez-Abreu v. Metropol Hato Rey, LLC · filed 2024-10-21

Law 100 is Puerto Rico’s anti-discrimination statute and prohibits discrimination both because of age and national origin. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 et seq. “Puerto Rico's Law 100 is a broad antidiscrimination statute analogous to Title VII in many respects.” Pérez-Cordero v. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc., 656 F.3d 19, 26 n.10 (1st Cir. 2011). Likewise, “on the merits, age discrimination claims asserted under the ADEA and under Law No. 100 are coterminous.” Dávila v. Corporación De Puerto Rico Para La Difusión Publica, 498 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2007). The only significant difference between the analysis required under Law 100 and ADEA and Title VII is the burden-shifting framework. However, “where a plaintiff has ‘adduced no significantly probative evidence that his discharge was motivated by [discriminatory animus],’ summary judgment on a pending Law 100 claim is appropriate.” Cerezo-Martin v. Agroman, 213 F. Supp. 3d 318, 328 (D.P.R. 2016) (quoting Dávila, 498 F.3d at 18). Accordingly, because the Court granted summary judgment on the Title VII and ADEA disparate treatment claims after finding the evidence of pretext and discriminatory animus insufficient, the motion for summary judgment as to the equivalent Law 100 claims is GRANTED.
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A Law 100 age-discrimination claim fails when the record contains no direct or indirect evidence that age was a factor in the adverse employment action.

Alemay-Rivera · filed 2025-10-15

The Court has nonetheless conducted a review of the record and agrees with the magistrate judge’s reasoning as to why these claims should be denied.
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Employment discrimination

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 146 is Puerto Rico’s general employment-discrimination provision, and Law 100 places a tougher burden on defendants than Title VII in discrimination claims.

Ferrer-Marrero v. Misey Restaurant, Inc. · filed 2019-12-13

Law 100 is Puerto Rico’s general employment discrimination statute. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146; Cardona–Jiménez v. Bancomerico de P.R., 174 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 1999). The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has recognized that Law 100 is more plaintiff-friendly than its federal counterpart, Title VII. See Dominguez v. Eli Lilly & Co., 958 F.Supp. 721, 744 (D.P.R.1997) (citing Ibanez v. Molinos de P.R., Inc., 14 P.R. Offic. Trans. 58, 114 D.P.R. 42 (1983)). While Title VII and Law 100 claims involve similar issues, the statutes differ on their respective burden of proof allocations; Law 100 places a tougher burden on defendant. See Hoyos v. Telecorp. Commc’ns, Inc., 405 F.Supp.2d 199, 206–07 (D.P.R.2005) (discussing Law 100 burden shifting framework), aff’d, 488 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007); Mejias Miranda v. BBII Acquisition Corp., 120 F.Supp.2d 157, 174 (D.P.R.2000) (noting burden of production, not merely burden of persuasion, shifts to defendant under Law 100).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 146 prohibits age discrimination in employment; under the court’s framework, a discharged employee must first show the discharge lacked just cause to trigger a presumption of discrimination.

Santiago v. Edwards Lifesciences Technology Sarl, LLC · filed 2021-08-10

Law 100 prohibits, inter alia, discrimination based on age in the workforce. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146. The burden-shifting framework under that law provides that: “(1) the employee must first show that his or her discharge was not for just cause3 - if successful, the employee enjoys a presumption that he or she has been the victim of discrimination; (2) the burden of production and persuasion then shifts to the employer to rebut this presumption.” ... Here, because we have determined that Defendant made the showing that it had just cause to terminate Plaintiff in the Law 80 context, it follows that “the Law 100 presumption [of discrimination] disappears.” ... Thus, Plaintiff bears “the burden of proof on the ultimate issue of discrimination,” meaning that he “must prove that, even if the dismissal was justified, [Defendant] nevertheless violated Law 100 because the dismissal was motivated by discriminatory animus instead of or in addition to the legitimate reasons for the dismissal.”
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Section 146 prohibits employment discrimination based on sex, and a sex-discrimination claim under it may survive summary judgment when the evidence creates a genuine dispute over whether the termination was discriminatory.

Loranca v. Aerostar Airport Holdings, LLC · filed 2022-05-17

Even if the Court were to find that defendants met their burden, as discussed for purposes of the Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims, plaintiff has direct evidence which creates genuine dispute as to whether the non-discriminating reason was the justification for the adverse employment action or if it was illegal discrimination. ... For the same reasons, the Court denies defendants’ request for summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims under Laws 69, 100, 115. See Ríos v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 938 F. Supp. 2d 235, 258 (D.P.R. 2013)(“the Court would deny the defendants' request for summary judgment on [plaintiff]'s Law… 69, and 100 claims, precisely for the same reasons that the Court denied the defendant's summary judgment on [plaintiff]'s Title VII [] claim.”).
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Section 146 prohibits employment discrimination based on characteristics including sex.

Pedraza-Melendez v. Ethicon Johnson & Johnson · filed 2023-03-31

Law 100 prohibits discrimination in employment because of various characteristics, including sex. ... As discussed previously in connection with Title VII, there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to uncover any genuine issue of material fact relating to plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim. The record shows that the Company acted with legitimate grounds reasonably linked to the proper operation of the employer’s business, not with sex animus. In consequence, as with the Title VII claim, plaintiff’s Law 100 claim must be dismissed.
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Section 146 prohibits private-sector employers from discriminating against employees because of their religious beliefs.

Rosario-Velazquez v. Corporacion Educativa Ramon Barquin · filed 2024-07-24

Title VII and Law 100 bar employers from discriminating against employees because of their religion or religious beliefs. See, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Title VII); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 (Law 100). Discrimination claims under Law 100 are subject “to the same analysis” as those under Title VII. Grafals-Semidei v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 2022 WL 18861858, *3 (D.P.R. Jul. 26, 2022). ... In these conditions, the Title VII, Law 100, and Law 115 claims must be dismissed.
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83 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Cuello-Suarez v. Autoridad De Energia Electrica De Puerto Rico, the opinion cites 29 P.R. Laws Ann. § 146 et seq. in a footnote identifying Puerto Rico Law 100 and discusses Law 100 only in deciding whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction and whether differing state-law standards would cause jury confusion; it does not construe or apply the statute substantively. opinion →
Nunez-Soto v. Carlos Alvarado, Etc., the dissent lists § 146 among several authorities supporting its statement that the alleged conduct would violate Commonwealth law; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Candelaria CUELLO-SUAREZ, Et Al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY (PREPA), Defendant, App, the statute is mentioned only to identify one legal basis for the plaintiff's lawsuit. The court's analysis and holding address Title VII's disparate-treatment framework and do not construe, explain, or apply § 146. opinion →
Garcia v. Williamson Dickie Manufacturing Co., section 146 et seq. is mentioned only as the legal basis plaintiffs asserted for an age-discrimination claim; the court decided ERISA preemption and remand based on the Puerto Rico severance statute, without construing or applying § 146. opinion →
Hernandez v. Wangen, section 146 is cited to identify the plaintiff’s Law 100 claim. Although the court discusses the unresolved question of supervisor liability under Law 100, it does not construe or decide what § 146 means or requires; it dismisses the state-law claims without prejudice. opinion →
De Arellano v. American Airlines, Inc., the statute is cited only as the basis of an age-discrimination claim that the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed; the court did not construe or apply § 146. opinion →
Molina v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., the opinion reports the magistrate's view that § 146(d)'s three-year limitation applied, but the district court expressly disagrees with that recommendation and resolves the case on other grounds. It therefore does not hold what § 146(d) means or requires. opinion →
Pineda v. Almacenes Pitusa, Inc., section 146 is mentioned only in a footnote listing a state-law claim over which supplemental jurisdiction was invoked; the court did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Manuel T. HIDALGO, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. OVERSEAS CONDADO INSURANCE AGENCIES, INC., Defendant, Appellee, the opinion mentions § 146 only to identify a state-law claim in the procedural history. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute, and the state-law claims were not appealed. opinion →
Torres v. United States, the court cites § 146 only as an example of a special statute in explaining a general rule about a spouse's ability to pursue conjugal-partnership lost-earnings claims. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 146 itself. opinion →
Lopez v. Padilla, the court did not interpret or apply § 146; it expressly noted that supervisory liability under Law No. 100 was unresolved and dismissed the claims without prejudice for declining supplemental jurisdiction. opinion →
Zetina v. VIZCAYA, section 146 appears only in a string citation listing the statutes underlying plaintiff’s claims. The court does not construe, explain, or apply that statute; it resolves the summary-judgment motion using the federal discrimination frameworks and direct-evidence analysis. opinion →
Velazquez-Rivera v. Danzig, the court merely identifies § 146 as one of the local statutes cited in the complaint. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the statute; the pendent Puerto Rico-law claims are dismissed on other grounds. opinion →
Gonzalez v. BLACK & DECKER, PR, LLC., the court merely lists § 146 among the statutes invoked in the complaint. It grants summary judgment only on the federal ADEA claim and declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, so it does not interpret or apply § 146. opinion →
Arce v. Aramark Corp., the statute is mentioned only in the complaint’s list of claims. The court does not construe or apply Law 100 or § 146; its merits analysis concerns other statutes, and the judgment does not adjudicate this claim on the merits. opinion →
Stoll v. Principi, the statute is mentioned only as part of a list of local-law claims in the procedural history. The court affirmed dismissal on election-of-remedies grounds and expressly did not reach the magistrate judge's other grounds, including federal preemption of the local-law claims. opinion →
Velez v. Janssen Ortho, LLC, section 146 is mentioned only in the procedural history as one of the statutes under which Velez asserted claims. The court does not construe, interpret, or decide anything about that statute. opinion →
De Jesús v. LTT Card Services, Inc., section 146 is mentioned only in the procedural background as one of the Puerto Rico-law claims De Jesús asserted; the court neither interprets nor applies it. opinion →
Velazquez v. De Autobuses, the opinion merely identifies § 146 et seq. as one of the statutes invoked in the complaint. It does not interpret or apply Law 100; the supplemental Law 100 claim is dismissed without prejudice. opinion →
United States v. Municipio De Vega Alta, the opinion only identifies § 146 as one of the statutes invoked in the intervenors’ state-law claims; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 146. opinion →
Villanustre v. Hard Rock Cafe Puerto Rico, Inc., section 146 appears only in a list of supplemental Puerto Rico law claims. The court declined supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing the federal claims and did not interpret or apply § 146. opinion →
Velez v. MARRIOTT PR MANAGEMENT, INC., the opinion merely identifies section 146 et seq. as one of the statutes under which the plaintiff sought relief; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Monteagudo v. Asociación De Empleados Del Estado Libre Asociado De Puerto Rico, section 146(a)(1) appears only in a string citation supporting the district court's damages calculation and doubling of the award; the court did not construe or independently decide what the statute means or requires. opinion →
Rodríguez-Vallejo v. Mvm, Inc., the opinion mentions § 146 only in describing the statutory bases asserted in the complaint. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning that statute. opinion →
Delanoy v. Aerotek, Inc., the court merely disposed of the Law 100 claim procedurally after the federal age-discrimination claim failed; it did not construe § 146 or decide what the statute means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Rivera-Feliciano v. State Insurance Fund Corp., the statute is mentioned only to identify a state-law discrimination claim pleaded by the plaintiffs. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 146; it dismissed on other grounds. opinion →
Del Toro-Pacheco v. Pereira-Castillo, the court merely identifies § 146 as one of the statutes underlying plaintiff’s asserted Puerto Rico-law claims. It does not interpret, apply, or decide what § 146 requires; the later reference to dismissal of the Law No. 100 claim is procedural history. opinion →
Díaz-Figueroa v. Ricoh Puerto Rico, Inc., the court only identifies § 146 as one of the Puerto Rico-law claims and then declines supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing the federal claims; it does not interpret or apply § 146. opinion →
Del Valle v. Rico, the court merely noted that the parties mentioned § 146 in their memoranda but found no reference to it in the Amended Complaint; it did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Acosta v. Harbor Holdings & Operations, Inc., section 146 appears only in a footnote listing the local statutes underlying plaintiff's claims; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 146. opinion →
Rodriguez-Torres v. GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT BANK, the court merely identifies § 146 et seq. as the statutory basis for a pending Law 100 claim, then declines supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses the state-law claims without prejudice; it does not interpret or apply § 146. opinion →
Ortiz-Skerrett v. REY ENTERPRISES, INC., the court mentions § 146 et seq. only in the background as the statute underlying a supplemental discrimination claim. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 146. opinion →
Figueroa v. Alejandro, the court only gave a passing description of Law 100 in a footnote while affirming dismissal of the state-law claims for insufficient evidence; it did not construe or apply § 146. opinion →
Mercado v. Cooperativa De Seguros De Vida De Puerto Rico, section 146 appears only in the procedural background as the statute supporting plaintiffs’ pleaded Law 100 claim. The court dismissed the supplemental Puerto Rico-law claim without prejudice after dismissing the federal claims, and did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Maldonado v. Hospital Alejandro Otero Lopez, section 146 appears only in the complaint's list of state-law claims; the opinion does not interpret or apply it. opinion →
Vázquez-Fernández v. Cambridge College, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural background as one of the laws under which plaintiffs brought claims. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 146; it resolved discovery motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. opinion →
Amira-Jabbar v. Travel Services, Inc., the court only lists § 146 et seq. among the statutes underlying plaintiff’s supplemental Puerto Rico claims; it does not interpret or apply Act No. 100, and dismisses the state-law claims without prejudice for declining supplemental jurisdiction. opinion →
Duchesne v. BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO, INC., the statute appears only in a footnote identifying Plaintiff's supplemental Puerto Rico Law 100 claims; the court declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed those claims without prejudice, without interpreting or applying § 146. opinion →
Ramos-Borges v. PUERTO RICO HEALTH DEPT., section 146 appears only in the procedural history as a citation identifying one of the plaintiff's supplemental claims. The court did not construe or decide anything about the statute; it declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice. opinion →
Acevedo-Padilla v. Novartis Ex Lax, Inc., the statute appears only in a list of statutes under which the plaintiffs filed suit in the procedural background; the court does not interpret or apply § 146. opinion →
Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Velez, the court mentions § 146 to explain that the plaintiffs had reasonable grounds for bringing a related claim in reviewing an attorney-fee award. It does not construe the statute or decide its requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Baltodano v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme (I.A.) Corp., the court merely recited Law 100's liability framework and then expressly declined substantive analysis, taking no position on just cause or discriminatory animus. Its ruling vacated summary judgment because the plaintiff lacked a fair chance to complete discovery, so it did not decide what § 146 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Lugo v. Avon Products, Inc., the opinion merely identifies § 146 as the statutory basis for a pleaded Puerto Rico age-discrimination claim; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Rodriguez v. Henry Schein, Inc., section 146 appears only in the complaint's introductory list of asserted Puerto Rico law claims; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about that statute. opinion →
Perez-Cordero v. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc., the court expressly declined to separately address the Law 100 claim and resolved the appeal under the overlapping Title VII analysis; it did not construe or independently apply 29 P.R. Laws Ann. § 146. opinion →
Muñiz-Olivari v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote describing the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' Law 100 claims; the appellate court does not interpret, explain, or apply § 146. opinion →
Bermúdez-Rosa v. Kelly Services, Inc., the statute appears only in the complaint’s list of legal claims. The court did not interpret or apply § 146; it declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the Commonwealth-law claims without prejudice. opinion →
Cintron-Garcia v. Supermercados Econo, Inc., section 146 appears only in the introductory list of Plaintiff's Puerto Rico Law 100 claims. The court declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice, without interpreting or applying § 146. opinion →
Colon v. Infotech Aerospace Services Inc., the opinion mentions § 146 only as the statute underlying Colon’s previously dismissed Law 100 claim; the dismissal is reported as procedural history, and the court does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Torres-Rosario v. Mariott International, section 146 appears only in the procedural and factual background as one of the statutes Torres alleged Ritz-Carlton violated. The court did not construe or decide anything about § 146; it granted dismissal without prejudice and compelled arbitration under the FAA. opinion →
Calderon v. Unitex, Inc., the statute is cited only to identify one of Plaintiff’s supplemental state-law claims. The court’s ruling concerns exhaustion of the ADA claim and does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 146. opinion →
Perez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., section 146 is mentioned only as the citation for a pleaded Puerto Rico Law 100 claim. The court declines supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses the Law 100 claim without prejudice, so it does not decide what § 146 means or requires. opinion →
Talavera-Ibarrondo v. Municipality of San Sebastian, section 146 appears only in a footnote identifying Law 100 as Puerto Rico's general employment discrimination statute; the court decided the damages-cap issue under Laws 17 and 69 and did not interpret or apply § 146. opinion →
Gonzalez v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., section 146 is cited only to identify the Puerto Rico Law 100 claim in the procedural history, and the opinion states that the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that claim; the court does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Lopez-Cruz v. FPV & Galindez, PSC, section 146 appears only in the procedural history as one of the statutes under which plaintiff filed claims. The court did not interpret or apply it; it declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice. opinion →
Acevedo-Torres v. Municipality of Arecibo, section 146 is cited only to identify the Puerto Rico Law 100 claims alleged in the complaint. The court adjudicated the remaining Title VII claim and expressly stated that the potential state-law causes of action were not before it; it did not interpret or apply § 146. opinion →
Colon v. Tracey, section 146 appears only in a footnote's string citation listing claims pleaded below. The court reports that the Law 100 claims were dismissed and not challenged on appeal; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 146. opinion →
Soto-Feliciano v. Villa Cofresi Hotels, Inc., the opinion merely identifies § 146 as the basis for a supplemental Puerto Rico age-discrimination claim. The court declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the Commonwealth-law claims without prejudice, without deciding what § 146 means or requires. opinion →
Levine-Diaz v. Humana Health Care, the court quoted and cited § 146, but did not construe or apply its requirements; it dismissed the Law No. 100 claim because the Plaintiff requested dismissal. opinion →
Fontanillas-Lopez v. Morel Bauza Cartagena & Dapena LLC, section 146 appears only in the procedural description of the plaintiff’s state-law claims; the opinion does not interpret, explain, or apply the statute. opinion →
Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina, the opinion recounts the magistrate judge's conclusion that Law 100 does not apply to municipalities, but the First Circuit did not review or adopt that conclusion; it states that the § 146 claim was waived. opinion →
Esquilin v. Hospital Metropolitano, the court merely identifies § 146 et seq. as the statutory basis of plaintiffs’ age-discrimination claim in the procedural background; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what § 146 requires or covers. opinion →
Rivera-Velázquez v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance, the statute is cited only to identify the Puerto Rico law underlying the complaint's age-discrimination allegation; the First Circuit decides a Rule 60(b) dismissal issue and does not interpret or apply § 146. opinion →
Climent-García v. Autoridad De Transporte Marítimo Y Las Islas Municipio, the court merely identifies Law 100 as an analogous legal basis for the plaintiff's claims; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 146. The opinion also mentions that the magistrate judge doubled the damages under Law 100, which is procedural history rather than this court's holding. opinion →
Reyes v. Professional Hepa Certificate Corp., the court merely listed § 146 et seq. among the plaintiff’s supplemental state-law claims, then declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed those claims without prejudice; it did not interpret or apply § 146. opinion →
Diaz-Garcia v. Surillo-Ruiz, the court merely lists Law No. 100 and § 146 et seq. among the statutes underlying plaintiffs’ state-law claims; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on what § 146 requires. opinion →
Santiago v. WHM Carib, LLC, the court discussed whether Law 100 permits individual liability but expressly deferred the unsettled issue and only assumed the answer without deciding it; the statutory citation therefore did not establish a holding about the statute. opinion →
Sanchez-Estrada v. MAPFRE Praico Insurance, the court cited § 146 only as part of a list of Puerto Rico-law claims dismissed after resolving the federal claims; it did not construe or decide what the statute means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Cervantes v. International Hospitality Associates, S. en C. (SE), section 146 appears only in a footnote listing the statutes originally invoked; the court does not analyze, interpret, or rule on either Law 100 or Law 115 § 146. opinion →
Lavalle-Cervantes v. International Hospitality Associates, S. en C. (SE), section 146 appears only in a footnote listing state-law provisions asserted in the complaint. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about that statute. opinion →
Gonzalez-Bermudez v. Abbott Laboratories PR Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the introductory description of the claims Plaintiff pleaded; the opinion does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 146. opinion →
Morales-Ramos v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals LLC, the opinion mentions § 146 only in a footnote listing the causes of action asserted in the original complaint. The court decided remand based on ERISA complete preemption and did not construe, explain, or apply Law 100 or § 146. opinion →
Rodriguez-Candelario v. MVM Security Inc., the court only identifies § 146 as Puerto Rico Law 100 and dismisses the related claims without prejudice after disposing of the federal claims; it does not construe or decide anything about § 146's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Arroyo-Ruiz v. Triple-S Management Group, the statute is mentioned only in the background as the basis for a claim that the court later reports was dismissed; the opinion does not interpret or apply § 146. opinion →
Rivera-Colon v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc, section 146 appears only in the background's list of statutes underlying Rivera's age-discrimination claims. The court decided whether she accepted an arbitration agreement, not what § 146 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Reyes-Orta v. Highway & Transportation Authority, the opinion mentions Law 100 in a footnote while resolving other claims and does not substantively interpret or apply § 146. opinion →
Maldonado-Gonzalez v. Puerto Rico Police, the opinion mentions Law 100 only while describing limitations periods for other claims; it does not decide a Law 100 issue. opinion →
Rodriguez-Cardi v. MMM Holdings, Inc., the court mentions § 146 only while recounting the Law 100 claim pleaded in the district court; it expressly states that the appeal challenged only the ADEA claim and did not interpret or apply § 146. opinion →
TLS Management and Marketing Services LLC v. Rodriguez-Toledo, the court only dismissed defendants’ reliance on § 146 as inapposite because the claims were not employment-discrimination claims; it did not construe or apply the statute beyond that passing observation. opinion →
Perez-Abreu v. Metropol Hato Rey LLC, the court only identifies § 146 et seq. as the Puerto Rico law under which Pérez brought claims; it declined supplemental jurisdiction over those claims and decided the appeal on ADEA exhaustion and the single filing rule, without construing or applying § 146. opinion →
Sheridan v. Centerra Group LLC, the court mentions Law 100 while listing Puerto Rico enactments that implement the Constitution's equality principle and describes its general subject matter, but it does not interpret § 146, analyze its requirements, or decide the claim under that statute. opinion →
Medero-Gonzalez v. The Baldwin School of Puerto Rico, Inc., section 146 appears only in a footnote identifying Law 100 among the statutes invoked in the complaint. The court’s discussion cites § 148 and dismisses the Law 100 claims because the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his discrimination claims; it does not interpret or apply § 146. opinion →
Gallego-Pagan v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation of Puerto Rico, section 146 appears only in the background list of statutes Plaintiff alleged were violated. The court did not interpret or apply it, and dismissed the Puerto Rico-law claims without prejudice for declining supplemental jurisdiction. opinion →

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